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This PhD thesis consists of three chapters in the topic of applied labour economics. The first 
chapter investigates the determinants of higher education (HE) participation using new data 
on university-related subjective expectations elicited from parents and young people in the 
Innovation Panel of the UK Household Longitudinal Study. We find that differences in HE 
aspirations   can, partially, be explained by differences in the expected returns to a degree and 
that individuals adjust their university-related beliefs and subjective expectation in response 
to a light touch information treatment. The second chapter estimates the determinants of 
occupational choice after graduation. Specifically we look at the effect that labour market 
conditions have on a graduate’s decision to enrol onto an initial teacher training programme 
(TTP). We find that labour market conditions have no effect on the probability that a graduate 
will go into a TTP, but heterogeneity analysis suggests that periods of high unemployment 
impact the composition of graduates who enter the teaching profession. Graduating during a 
period of low labour demand has an effect on diversity (more male graduates and more ethnic 
minority graduates), subject specific shortages (more physics graduates) and composition of 
graduates from different Higher Education institutions. The third chapter analyses whether 
higher relative wages can motivate teachers to work harder, or more productively, in any way 
that affects pupil outcomes. Consistent with the predictions of the efficiency wage model, we 
find that teachers’ relative wages have a positive effect on their pupils’ cognitive outcomes 
(measured by test scores), with an effect size similar to a one pupil reduction in class sizes or 
an additional hours of weekly tuition for a 10 percentage change in relative wages. In 
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In this thesis I explore the role that pecuniary factors have in determining individual choice 
behaviour. I test if expected labour market returns affect education and labour market 
decisions in two distinct contexts and how the pecuniary ‘returns to teaching’ affect teacher 
characteristics and teacher productivity. 
In my first chapter I test the idea that the expected returns to a degree affect the decision to 
apply to university. In my second chapter I test the idea that the pecuniary ‘returns to 
teaching’ affect i) the decision to enrol onto a teacher training programme ii) the 
characteristics of trainee teachers. In my third chapter I investigate how the pecuniary returns 
to teaching affect teacher productivity. 
Human capital plays an important role in determining individual and social prosperity. As 
investment decisions in education differ along socioeconomic lines, understanding the 
determinants of human capital accumulation is important for achieving a more equitable 
society where every individual can thrive and prosper regardless of background (Woessmann 
2016). 
There are several, potentially non-exclusive, reason why young people from less affluent 
backgrounds are less likely to go to university. Traditional economic models have 
emphasised the role of resources (e.g. availability of financial aid), information (e.g. about 
the application process or labour market returns), tastes and preferences for education, as well 
as genetic factors (Carneiro and Heckman 2002, Dearden et al., 2004, Lochner and Monge-
Naranjo 2012). Without data on expectations it is challenging to separate these various 
explanations as any combination of factors can conceivably be consistent with observed 
choices (Manski 2004). Yet, the policy implications of these various reasons are distinct. 
Financial constraints can be alleviated with reduced tuition fees, increased financial aid or 
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easier access to credit. The effect of poor parenting skills and poor home learning 
environments can be mitigated through high-quality pre-school programmes aimed at 
boosting cognitive and non-cognitive skills for all children. Unequal access to information 
can be reduced by targeted information campaigns, as well as mentoring and coaching 
programmes tailored to disadvantaged students.     
In my first chapter I get around the limitations of traditional datasets by using new data on 
university-related subjective expectations elicited from parents and young people in the 
Innovation Panel of the UK Household Longitudinal Study. Two unique features of this data 
are that it i) contains both parents and their own children’s subjective expectations ii) we 
implement a light touch information intervention and evaluate its effect on respondents’ 
accuracy, on the returns to education, and subjective expectations. 
Using this new data I am able to add to a long tradition of work seeking to determine whether 
expectations about future earnings (or about returns to schooling) influence university 
attendance, field of study or occupation choice (Arcidiacono 2004, Beffy et al., 2012, Berger 
1988, Buchinsky and Leslie 2010, Flyer 1997, Willis and Rosen 1979). I also contribute to 
the growing literature that investigates the role of subjective expectations about the pecuniary 
returns to education on educational plans or achievement (Delavande and Zafar 2014, Jensen 
2010, Wiswall and Zafar 2015a). My work also speaks to the effects of providing information 
on earnings (Bleemer and Zafar 2018, Jensen 2010, Wiswall and Zafar 2015b) on education-
related expectations. 
In my first chapter I find that parents/young people who expect higher labour market returns 
from a degree also expect a higher probability that their child/they will apply to university. I 
also find that a very light-touch information intervention, showing some statistics about 
population earnings and employment to families, is powerful enough to change parents’ 
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expectations about population earnings so that they become more accurate, with changes still 
visible 6 months later. This information also increases participants’ perceptions about the 
returns to a degree in the population. However, it does not change parents’ perceptions about 
the future labour market outcomes of their own children. Possibly due to private information, 
those may be less responsive to general information. 
Interestingly, I find that young people’s intentions to apply to university are related to their 
own perception of labour market returns to a degree, but not their parents’ (once their own is 
controlled for). However, parents and young people from various SES backgrounds hold 
similar beliefs about the earnings return and employment returns to a degree and this suggests 
that it is unlikely that information gaps about the labour market advantage of a degree 
explains the SES gap in participation. 
In the second chapter I investigate whether and how the relative labour market returns to 
teaching affect the quantity and composition of graduates who enrol onto teacher training 
programs. Specifically I test the hypothesis that a possible response to graduating during a 
period of low labour demand is for graduates to sort into teaching – an occupation whose 
demand is unrelated to the business cycle. However capacity constraints might mitigate the 
ability of individuals to get access to teacher training placement, so I also investigate if 
periods of low labour demand affect the composition of those enrolled. 
Using rich survey data from the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE), my 
second chapter builds on the existing literature (Chevalier et al., 2007, Dolton and Klaauw 
1995, Dolton et al., 2003, Dolton and van der Klaauw 1996, Dolton and Mavromaras 1994) 
that shows that in England the supply of teachers is sensitive to labour market conditions. 
My work is distinct from previous contributions in at least three aspects. First, I consider the 
current Higher Education environment, with tuition fees and a formal assessment. The 
11 
 
existing evidence in England uses data prior to the introduction of tuition fees, when there 
were no financial costs associated with teacher training, and no cirtification requirements, i.e. 
applicants did not have to pass a formal assessment. These are two important distinctions as 
empirical evidences demonstrates that these policies have a meaningful impact on the supply 
of teachers (Castro-Zarzur et al., 2019, Hanushek and Pace 1995, Manski 1987). Thereofore I 
would expect the introduction of tutition fees, and certification requirements,  to change the 
relationship between economic conditions and enrolment behavior. 
Second, I am able to more precisely estimate the effect of labour market conditions on 
teacher supply as I observe graduates six months after graduation rather than five to seven 
years later (Chevalier et al., 2007, Dolton et al., 2003). In England teacher attrition rates are 
very high, roughly one in three new teachers quit within five years, therefore using data on 
graduates five to seven years after graduation might be misleading as many teachers will have 
left the profession by then. 
Third, I am able to speak to the effect of low labour market demand on new teachers’ 
composition. Specifically my data allows me to investigate the effect of labour market 
conditions at entry on the sex, ethnicity, socioeconomic status and educational attainment 
(degree subject, classification and the quality of institution attended) of the new trainees. As 
empirical evidence shows that teacher characteristics can affect pupil outcomes (Carrell et al., 
2010, Dee 2004, 2007, Egalite et al., 2015, Gershenson et al., 2016), my analysis speaks to 
the literature which indicates teacher composition is likely to be welfare improving for 
students (Bietenbeck et al., 2018, Dee 2005, Gershenson et al., 2018, Marcenaro‐Gutierrez 
and Lopez‐Agudo 2020). A unique feature of my analysis is that I am able to construct a 
measure of teacher demand to control for demand-side effects. 
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I find no evidence that graduating during a period of high unemployment has any effect on 
the probability that a graduate will enrol onto a TTP. One possibility is that the quantity of 
graduates who enrol in TTP’s might be subject to capacity constraints. However, the 
composition of trainee teachers might still be affected. Indeed, heterogeneity analysis 
suggests a compositional effect on the diversity of trainee teachers – with more male 
graduates, more graduates from an ethnic minority background and more Russell Group 
graduates as well as a positive effect on subject specific shortages (more physics graduates) – 
and this is might be welfare improving for students.  
While my second chapter investigates if pecuniary factors can affect the composition of the 
school workforce my final chapter speaks to the strand of literature that investigates if 
pecuniary factors can be used to motivate existing teachers to work harder, or more 
productively, in a way that affects pupil outcomes. I use twenty seven years of the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) to identify teachers’ relative wages and impute these estimates to five 
waves of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) to estimate the 
effect of relative wages on pupils’ test scores and enjoyment of learning. 
With this chapter I intend to contribute to a long tradition of work seeking to determine how 
higher salaries can affect labour productivity (Akerlof 1982, Fehr et al., 1997, Fehr et al., 
2009, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and to the growing literature that investigates the role 
teacher salaries have on pupil achievement (Britton and Propper 2016, De Ree et al., 2015, 
Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez 2011, Figlio 1997, Hanushek et al., 1999, Webb and 
Valencia 2005). 
I contribute to this literature in the following ways. First I derive a measure of teachers’ 
relative wages that accounts for differences in job security. This is an important contribution 
as existing evidence shows that job security plays an important role in the decision to become 
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a teacher and a failure to include this leads to an underestimation of the returns to teaching 
(Heinz 2015, Priyadharshini and Robinson-Pant 2003). Second, as teachers’ salaries are an 
important policy issue, I also investigate the extent to which teachers are underpaid, relative 
to their outside option and if teachers who leave teaching tend to sort into higher paying 
occupations. 
Third I use a rich data set that allows me to estimate the effect of teachers’ relative wages on 
tests scores (mathematics and science) and pupil wellbeing, measured by enjoyment of 
learning. The existing literature has exclusively focused on the effect of teacher’s wages on 
test scores and other measures of cognitive performance (Atkinson et al., 2009, De Ree et al., 
2015, Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez 2011, Kingdon and Teal 2007). As teachers play an 
important role in the development of a wide range of skills understanding the role teachers’ 











Parental Background, Labour Market Expectations 
and University Applications Intentions in the UK 




There has been a dramatic increase in participation in higher education in the UK. In England, 
for example, the proportion of 17 to 30 years olds participating in higher education increased 
from just 5% in 1960 to 49% in 2012, with a strong acceleration in the 1990s (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills 2013). A number of studies demonstrate that the expansion of 
the higher education sector has reinforced rather than attenuated socio-economic inequalities 
in higher education (Lindley and Machin 2012, Machin and Vignoles 2004). Previous research 
for the UK suggests that university enrolment (conditional on application) is not related to 
income once previous achievements are accounted for (Ermisch and Del Bono 2012), but 
application decisions are (Anders 2012). 
There are several (potentially non-exclusive) reasons for the socio-economic (SES) gradient in 
university applications. Traditional models have emphasised the role of difficulty in accessing 
credit to explain the gap in enrolment  (e.g., Lochner and Monje-Naranjo 2012). However, it 
is not clear why those gaps are seen in countries where grants and loans are available to students 
                                                          
1 Delavande: University of Essex (email: aldela@essex.ac.uk) 
2 Zafar: Arizona State University(email: Basit.Zafar@asu.edu)  
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from disadvantaged backgrounds. Other factors may correlate with family income: Many 
studies show high-SES families promote cognitive and non-cognitive skills, have better access 
to information (which could influence beliefs about available financial aid, the requirements 
for university admission and the returns to education), and have an increased taste for education 
or a greater ability to pass on academic ability (Carneiro and Heckman 2002, Dearden et al., 
2004). Without data on expectations, it is challenging to separate these various explanations 
(e.g., Manski, 2004). Yet, the policy implications of these various reasons are distinct. 
Financial constraints can be alleviated with reduced tuition fees, increased financial aid or 
easier access to credit. The effect of poor parenting skills and poor home learning environments 
can be mitigated through high-quality pre-school programmes aimed at boosting cognitive and 
non-cognitive skills for all children. Unequal access to information can be reduced by targeted 
information campaigns, as well as mentoring and coaching programmes tailored to 
disadvantaged students.     
In this paper, we use new data elicited from parents and young people in the Innovation Panel 
of the UK Household Longitudinal Study on: (i) university-related expectations about the 
chances of qualifying, applying and completing a university degree; (ii) subjective expectations 
about labour market outcomes conditional on having a university degree or not, (iii) beliefs 
about population earnings; to (a) provide descriptive evidence on labour market expectations 
and higher education intentions in the UK and how it varies by family background, (b) assess 
the accuracy of beliefs, (c) evaluate the relationship between parents and children expectation 
and, (d) investigate the role of future labour market expectations in the decision to apply to 
university. Finally, using a randomized information treatment, this paper investigates whether 
the provision of information on labour market outcomes impacts parents, and young peoples, 
labour market, and university-related expectations and outcomes.   
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The differences in expected university outcomes by parental education are clear and large: 
while 78 per cent of parents belonging to university degree households (i.e. where at least one 
parent has a university degree) believe their child will have a degree by age 30, only 54 per 
cent of their counterparts believe so (difference statistically significant at the one per cent 
level). This difference in expected outcome stems from differences in all the steps of the way 
toward acquiring a degree: parents from university degree households have higher expectations 
of the chance of qualifying to go to university (83 vs 65 per cent), the chance of applying if 
they qualify (83 vs 68 per cent) and the chance of finishing university conditional on going (91 
vs 87 per cent). Differences in application expectations persist by household degree status even 
when financial costs are (hypothetically) forgone. This suggests that there are differences other 
than financial constraints that explain the gap in expected university outcomes by household 
degree. While there are also differences in expectations by household income, they are 
substantially smaller than by household degree. Young people’s university-related expectations 
tend to mirror those of their parents, although children from households with a university 
degree have slightly lower expectations than their parents, resulting in a smaller gap in 
expectations by household education. 
Respondents perceive overall a positive payoff for their children/themselves to a university 
degree versus no university degree, both in terms of employment and earnings. For example, 
Parents expect their children to earn £33,500 per annum on average if they have a university 
degree, compared to £24,300 per annum without a degree. Interestingly, parents from a high-
income household or from a university degree household expect their children to earn 
significantly more both with a degree and without a degree than their counterparts. They also 
expect their children to have a more favourable growth in earnings. As a result, parents from 
more privileged backgrounds do not expect higher earning returns to a university degree than 
parents from less privileged background. 
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These differences in earnings expectations by background could be due to different beliefs 
about children’s ability, or different access to job networks. Interestingly, they do not seem to 
be driven primarily by differential knowledge of population earnings. To directly test 
respondents’ knowledge, we asked them about the average earnings of current 30 year-olds 
who have a degree and those of 30 years old who do not have a degree of the same gender as 
their child. For the population earnings with a degree, parents from all backgrounds tend to 
have similar, and underestimated, perceptions. Parents from more privileged backgrounds 
expect slightly larger population earnings without a degree than their counterparts, and are as 
a result slightly more accurate, as everyone tends to under-estimate those earnings as well.  But 
the difference by parental background in population earnings expectations is small, and more 
than half the one found for their children’s future earnings. Overall, parents under-estimate the 
population earnings returns to a degree by about £2,000 per annum.  
Our focus on the perceived labour market returns to a degree stem from the fact that they ought 
to be an important driver of the decision to go to university. Indeed, in our data, parents who 
expect higher labour market returns for their children also expect a higher probability that their 
child will apply to university. A unique feature of our data is that we have both parents and 
their own children’s subjective expectations. Interestingly, we find that young people’s 
intentions to apply to university are related to their own perception of labour market returns to 
a degree, but not their parents’ (once their own is controlled for). However, given that parents 
and young people from various SES backgrounds hold similar beliefs about the earnings return 
and employment returns to a degree suggest that it is unlikely that information gaps about the 
labour market advantage of a degree explains the SES gap in participation. 
Half of the households were randomly provided with information about the average annual 
earnings of men and women aged 26-34 and working full time for university degree holders 
and for those without a university degree, and their respective employment rate. Households 
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received a mailing with an information sheet just after the baseline interview, and by post again 
about 6 months prior to the follow-up interview. Those who received the information are more 
accurate about the population earnings of graduates than those who did not receive information, 
suggesting information had a positive impact on accuracy of expectations. This increase in 
accuracy translates into higher beliefs about the population returns to a degree: parents who 
receive the information expect the population return to a degree to be £2350 larger than parents 
who did not receive the information (controlling for household characteristics).  However, this 
does not translate into increased returns for their own children, and thus does not change plans 
to apply to university. Our results are consistent with the idea that parents have private 
information about their child’s future labour market outcomes (e.g., child’s ability, job 
network), such that beliefs about their child are less responsive to information than beliefs 
about population labour market outcomes. 
Our paper belongs to a long tradition of work seeking to determine whether expectations about 
future earnings (or about returns to schooling) influence university attendance, university field 
of study or occupation choice (Arcidiacono 2004, Beffy et al., 2012, Berger 1988, Buchinsky 
and Leslie 2010, Flyer 1997, Willis and Rosen 1979). The prior literature has relied on various 
types of assumptions (such as myopic or rational expectations) for the mapping between 
realized earnings and expected earnings. However, existing research from both developed and 
developing countries has found that individuals tend to be misinformed about the returns to 
schooling (Betts 1996, Jensen 2010, Wiswall and Zafar 2015a). This has prompted some 
empirical work on educational choice using expectations data about future earnings. We 
contributes to this growing literature investigating the role of subjective expectations about the 
pecuniary returns to education on educational plans or achievement (Delavande and Zafar 
2014, Jensen 2010, Wiswall and Zafar 2015a). Our setting is quite unique in that we have 
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expectations of both parents and young people.3 Parents are likely to be very important in those 
educational decisions.  
Our paper also contributes to a literature investigating the effects of providing information on 
earnings (Bleemer and Zafar 2018, Jensen 2010, Wiswall and Zafar 2015b) on education-
related expectations. For example, Wiswall and Zafar (2015a) find that students at a selective 
US university are misinformed about returns to college majors, and providing such information 
impacts intended major choice. Our results suggest that the nature of the expectations (whether 
it pertains to own child’s earning or population’s earning) and context might influence how 
responsive expectations are to new information. In our study, population earnings are more 
malleable than expectations about own/child’s earnings, a result similar Ciancio et al., (2020) 
who find that population survival expectations are more responsive to information about 
mortality risk than own survival expectations. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 3 examines the accuracy of parent’s labour market 
expectations while Section 4 investigates the relationship between expected returns and human 
capital accumulation. In Section 5 we present the effect of providing information about the 
labour market return to a degree on university-related expectations. 
1.2. Descriptive analysis of Subjective Expectations 
 1.2.1 Sample 
The data we use comes from the Innovation Panel (IP) of the UK Household Longitudinal 
Study (UKHLS).4 The UKHLS is a longitudinal study that interviews over 40,000 
representative households in the UK annually. The IP of the UKHLS uses a sample of 1,500 
                                                          
3 Giustinelli (2015) also analyses expectations of parents and young people and studies the joint decision-making. Attanasio 
and Kaufmann (2014) also have information on mothers and young people’s expectations.  
4 University of Essex, Institute for Social and Economic Research. (2019). Understanding Society: Innovation Panel, Waves 




households to test innovative ways of collecting data and for developing new areas of research.5  
The innovation Panel sample is a clustered, stratified and equal probability design. The survey 
is fielded over the phone, internet and face to face. The present paper uses wave 8 (Spring 
2015), wave 9 (Spring 2016) and wave 10 (Spring 2017) of the IP where a special module 
designed by Delavande and Zafar on higher education expectations was fielded. Young people 
aged 16 to 21 and not currently at university and parents of children ages 10 to 21 were asked 
a series of detailed questions regarding expected university-related outcomes for themselves or 
a co-resident child. In addition, half of the wave 8 respondents were randomly provided 
information about earnings and employment prospects of university graduates and individuals 
without a degree. 
A total of 169 young people and 332 parents participate in the module. We restrict our sample 
to young people who are under the age of 19 and parents who are responding to questions about 
children who are under 19.6 This gives us a sample of 104 young people and 324 parents. The 
young people are respondents aged between 16 and 18 and are either: not full-time students, or 
are a full-time student not in higher education. The parents are respondents whose co-resident 
child is aged between 10 and 18 and in full time education, but not higher education. Sample 
characteristics are shown in table 1, along with a comparison to the national population of 
parents of children aged 10 to 18.7 The IP parents are less likely to be White (71% vs. 76%) 
and are more likely to be from England (89% vs. 82%) than the population. But they look 
similar in terms of income and education, with 58% of the IP parents living in a household 
where at least one parent has a university degree (vs 56% in the population) and 55% of IP 
parents living in a high income household (vs 55% in the population). Where high income 
                                                          
5 Understanding society website https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/documentation/innovation-panel visited 
07/09/2018 
6 This is due to the UK institutional setting. Anyone who is 19 and not in higher education has most likely already chosen 
not to go into higher education. 
7 Note that the national population of parents aged 10 to 18 is estimated by using a weighted UKHLS sample. 
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households are defined as those earning more than £3,397 per month, the IP median gross 
household income. Therefore, as expected, our sample is broadly similar to the population. 
Table 1 Distribution of sample across observed characteristics (Percentage) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Innovation Panel Population 
 Child+ Parent  
High Income++ 58.7 54.8 54.8 
    
White British 78.9 71.2 76.2 
Other 17.3 11.8 19.4 
Missing 3.8 17.0 4.4 
    
Living in England 96.2 89.2 82.3 
    
HH Degree 53.9 57.9 56.0 
    
Father  37.8 47.5 
    
Male Child 47.1 53.3  
Female Child 52.8 46.7  
    
Only Father responds 6.7 9.5  
Father and Mother Respond 44.2 58.4  
Only Mothers Respond 





    
Children 18 years old 29.8 7.12  
    
Parent Over 45  53.3  
    
    
Maximum 
Observations 










Columns 1-2 report the sample characteristics of the children and parents we use from the 
Innovation Panel. Column 3 reports the characteristics of the national population of parents of 
children aged 10 to 18 estimated using the Mainstage of the UK Household Longitudinal Study 
survey weights. Parents are asked question about their co-resident child. 
+We define child as young people who are between 16 and 18 and are in full time education (but 
not higher education) 
++ High income is defined as gross monthly Household earnings greater than the IP median 




1.2.2 Overview of the Expectations 
At waves 8 and 9 of the IP, respondents are asked a series of university-related expectations. 
Most questions are elicited using a percent chance format on a scale from 0 to 100%. The 
detailed wording of questions is presented in Appendix A1 and summarized as follows:  
(1) Expectations of university-related outcomes: the percent change of (i) having a degree 
by age 30, (ii) gaining the qualifications to go to university; (iii) applying to university 
conditional on gaining the required qualifications; (iv) applying to university if all costs 
were forgone via a scholarship; and (v) graduating conditional on going to university; 
(2) Expected labour market returns to a university degree: expected earnings at age 30 and 
45 conditional on working full-time and conditional on (i) going to university and (ii) 
not going to university; and the percent chance of being employed at age 30 conditional 
on (i) going to university and (ii) not going to university; 
(3) Knowledge about labour market returns to a university degree: population earnings of 
30-year old of the respondent’s (or child’s) gender with and without a degree. 
(4) The expected monetary cost of going to university:  Expected tuition and expected loan.   
An overview of respondents’ expectations is presented in Table 2 (parents) and 3 (young 
people). Response rates are high (above 87% for parents and children), except for the monetary 
cost of going to university where they are 10 to 20 percentage points lower. Parents report on 
average a 68% chance that their child will have a university degree by age 30. The differences 
in expected university outcome by parental education are clear in the very first question: while 
78 percent of parents belonging to university degree households believe their child would have 
a degree by age 30, only 54 percent of their counterpart believe so (difference statistically 
significant at the 1% level). This difference in expected outcome stems from differences in all 
the steps to acquiring a degree but is larger for the expectations related to the application 
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process - parents from a university degree household have higher expectations for the chance 
of qualifying for university (83 vs 65%) and the chance of applying conditional on qualifying 
(83 vs 68%) – than the chance of finishing university conditional on going (91 vs 87%) where 
the latter is not statistically significant in a multivariate regression (row 5 table 4). 
The differences in expectations related to the application process may reflect the fact that young 
people from less affluent backgrounds are less likely to study academic post-16 qualifications 
(i.e. A-levels) and those who do are more likely to study subjects that are not as valued by 
university admissions.8,9 In addition, young people from less affluent backgrounds tend to have 
lower levels of attainment (Gill 2018, Tuckett et al., 2021).10 Taken together this means that 
young people from the least affluent areas are almost three times less likely to be accepted onto 
a university place than their more affluent peers.11 
Differences in application expectation persist by household degree status even when costs are 
forgone - parents from a household with a degree report a 13 percentage point higher 
probability of applying with a scholarship and 15 percentage point without. These relationships 
continue to hold in multivariate regressions (table 4). This suggests that there are differences 
other than financial constraints that explain the gap in expected university outcomes by 
household degree. While there are differences in expectations by household income, they are 
                                                          
8 In the UK many undergraduate courses require certain grades in certain subjects (i.e. most economics 
programmes require an A in A-level maths). The more ‘facilitating subjects’ a young person studies at A-level 
the more undergraduate courses will be available to them. These subjects are maths, sciences, modern and 
classical languages, English literature, history and geography (Group 2011). Young people from less affluent 
background are less likely to study these subjects. 
9 For example young people from more affluent backgrounds are more likely to choose subjects in science, 
maths and languages while those from less affluent backgrounds are more likely to choose subjects in vocational 
or newer humanities fields such as citizenship, film studies, health and social care, media studies and travel and 
tourism (Rodeiro 2007). 
10 In the UK many undergraduate courses require certain grades in certain subjects (i.e. most economics 
programmes require an A in A-level maths). The more ‘facilitating subjects’ a young person studies at A-level 
the more undergraduate courses will be available to them. These subjects are maths, sciences, modern and 
classical languages, English literature, history and geography (Group 2011). Young people from less affluent 
background are less likely to study these subjects. 
11 The 2015 UCAS end of Cycle Report.   
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substantially smaller than by household degree. In fact, with the exception of the expectations 
to apply to university, parents from high and low income households do not have statistically 
different expectations for their children. Regarding gender differences, parents of girls tend to 
have slightly more positive expectations about university-related outcomes than parents of 
boys, although the differences are spastically significant only for the chance of qualifying to 
university. Young people’s university-related expectations tend to mirror those of their parents, 
although children coming from households with a university degree have slightly lower 

















Table 2. Parents’ subjective expectations, wave 8 
 









 (£1k’s or %) 
Response 
Rate (%) 
Female Male Low High No Degree Degree 
Chance of a Degree by 30 68.02 95 70.2 66.1 64.4 70.7 54.4*** 77.8 
Chance Qualify for 
University 
75.63 95 79.4** 72.2 73.0 77.6 65.1*** 83.2 
         
Chance of Applying to 
University  
76.93 96 78.3 75.7 73.0* 79.9 68.3*** 83.2 
Chance of Applying With 
Scholarship 
82.45 96 83.9 81.2 80.8 83.7 75.2*** 87.5 
         
Chance Finish University  89.59 96 91.5 87.8 89.2 89.8 86.9* 91.1 
         
Childs Expectations 
 
        
Expected Earnings at 30 
With Degree 
33.49++ 87 31.3***++ 35.4++ 32.1*++ 34.5++ 30.7***++ 35.2++ 
Expected Earnings at 30 
No Degree 
24.31 87 22.8*** 25.6 23.0** 25.3 21.9*** 25.9 
Expected Returns to a 
Degree 30 
9.80 83 9.9 9.7 10.1 9.6 10.2 9.6 
         
Chance Employed With 
Degree 
91.40 93 92.1 90.8 91.0 91.8 90.0 92.3 
Chance Employed With 
No Degree 
86.83 93 88.8 85.1 87.5 86.3 86.4 87.2 
         
Expected tuition 


























Expected Loans 7.55 68 7.94 7.23 7.51 7.58 6.60 8.05 
         
Population Beliefs 
 
        
Expected Earnings at 30 
With Degree  
32.04++ 89 30.7***++ 33.2++ 31.2++ 32.7++ 31.7++ 32.3++ 
Expected Earnings at 30 
No Degree  
22.10 89 20.7*** 23.3 21.1** 22.9 21.2* 22.8 
Expected Returns to a 
Degree at 30  
 
9.910 83 9.9 9.9 10.3 9.6 10.6 9.4 
Maximum Observations 323  151 172 146 177 136 187 
Stars indicate statistical significances at the 10%(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.  The Plus’s indicate statistical 
significance between the ‘with, and without, a degree’ labour market outcomes at the 5% (+) and 1% (++) levels. 
For example the +’s next to the expected earnings at 30 with degree mean that the respondents expected 











Table 3. Young people’s subjective expectations, wave 8 
         








Variables  Mean 




Female Male Low High No 
degree 
Degree 
Chance of a Degree by 30 65.25 93 66.3 64.2 62.1 67.6 59.1  70.3 
Chance Qualify for 
University 
71.42 95 71.7 71.2 73.2 70.1 65.1* 77.0 
         
Chance of Applying to 
University  
72.48 96 73.1 71.7 71.1 72.9 69.7 75.1 
Chance of Applying With 
Scholarship 
80.39 96 81.2 79.3 79.0 81.3 81.6 79.2 
         
Chance Finish University  87.56 98 88.6 86.4 89.4 86.3 88.0 87.2 
         
Own Expectations 
 
        
Expected Earnings at 30 
With Degree 
36.21++ 92 34.2++ 38.4++ 34.8++ 37.2++ 36.7++ 35.7++ 
Expected Earnings at 30 No 
Degree 
26.57 91 24.1* 29.3 26.0 27.0 27.5 25.8 
Expected Returns to a Degree 
30 
8.9 84 9.8 8.0 8.8 9.0 8.8 9.0 
         
Chance Employed With 
Degree 
88.73 98 89.0 88.4 90.0 87.8 86.3 90.7 
Chance Employed With No 
Degree 
82.10 92 79.3 85.5 85.1 79.9 83.0 81.3 
         
Expected tuition 
 


























Expected Loans 7.42 63 7.6 7.2 8.6 6.6 8.7 6.3 
         
Population Beliefs 
 
        
Expected Earnings at 30 
With Degree  
31.22++ 88 30.4++ 32.1++ 29.8++ 32.3++ 30.3++ 31.2++ 
Expected Earnings at 30 No 
Degree  
22.67 88 21.7 23.8 22.3 23.0 21.8 23.5 
Expected Returns to a Degree 
at 30  
 
8.53 88 8.7 8.4 7.5 9.4 8.4 8.6 
Maximum Observations 104  55 49 39 65 49 55 
Stars indicate statistical significances at the 10%(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) level. The Plus’s indicate statistical significance 
between the ‘with, and without, a degree’ labour market outcomes at the 5% (+) and 1% (++) levels. For example the +’s next 
to the expected earnings at 30 with degree mean that the child’s expected earnings with a degree is statistically different 





The expected labour market returns to a degree are theoretically an important driver of the 
decision to go to university. We define three measures of returns to a degree: 
- Earnings returns at age 30: 𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 − 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 where 𝑤 is the expected earnings 
at age 30. 
- Employment returns at age 30: 𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) − 𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) 
- Labour market returns at age 30 of going to university. If a young individual goes to 
university, she faces some uncertainty about whether she will complete her studies, and 
whether she will be employed conditional on completing her degree. Assuming for 
simplicity no earnings if unemployed, her expected earnings at age 30 are thus given 
by 𝑃(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + (1 −
𝑃(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒))𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒. If she does not go to university, her 
expected earnings at age 30 are given by 𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒. The 
overall labour market returns to a degree are the difference between those expected 
earnings given by:           𝑃(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒)(𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 +
(1 − 𝑃(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒) )𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 −
 𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒. 
The first measure focuses on returns in terms of earnings only; the second measure focuses on 
returns in terms of employment only; the third measure takes into account the uncertainty 
associated with graduating and finding a job.  
Revisiting table 2 we see that parents perceive overall a positive payoff for their children to a 
university degree versus no university degree. They expect their children to earn £33.5k p.a. 
on average if they have a university degree, compared to £24.3k p.a. without a degree. They 
also perceive a benefit in terms of employment probability at age 30 (91% with a degree versus 
87% without). Parents from a high income household or from a university degree household 
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expect their children to earn significantly more with a degree and without a degree than their 
counterparts. They also expect their children to have a more favourable earnings growth. These 
differences in earnings expectations are quite large and significant (e.g., £4.5k p.a. with a 
degree and £4k p.a. without a degree at age 30). However parents from more privileged 
backgrounds do not expect higher earning returns (differences in earnings with a degree and 
without a degree) than parents from less privileged backgrounds. Similarly, there are no 
differences in the overall labour market return to a degree (see table 4, column 9). 
This difference in earnings expectations with and without a degree could be due to different 
beliefs about children’s ability, or different access to job networks. Interestingly, these 
differences do not seem to be driven by a difference in knowledge on the population earnings 
returns to a university degree. To directly test respondents’ knowledge we asked them about 
the average earnings of current 30 years old, who have a degree, and those of 30 years old who 
do not have a degree. For the population earnings of graduates, parents from all backgrounds 
tend to have very similar perceptions. The difference in population earnings without a degree 
between high and low income (resp. household with a degree and without a degree) are 
statistically significant but small in magnitude, resulting in no statistically significance 
differences in the earnings returns. See also results in table 4, column 11. We investigate the 
accuracy of beliefs in more details in section 3.  
Parents of male children expect higher earnings than those of female children, consistent with 
the gender pay gap. These differences by child’s gender are still statistically significant in a 
multivariate regression (Table 4, columns 6 and 7). Note that these differences hold for 





This table presents OLS regressions for the parent’s labor market and university relative beliefs and expectations on their observable characteristics. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and the stars indicate 
statistical significant to our usual levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Ethnicity Missing is our reference category for white British and ethnic other. The standard errors are clustered at the household level. In 
Column 7 Earnings Returns is defined as expected earnings at 30 with a degree minus the expected earnings with no degree at age 30. Column 6 uses Labour market returns at age 30 of going to University which takes 
into account the uncertainty about if they will complete their degree and their employment prospects, conditional on degree attainment. It is calculated by taking the difference between the expected earnings with a 
degree : 𝑃(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 + (1 − 𝑃(𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒))𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 and the expected earnings without: 𝑃(𝑗𝑜𝑏|𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒) log 𝑤𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 .  
+P>|t| 0.109 
Table 4. Parents Subjective Expectations on observable characteristics, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  
 University Related Expectations
 






Pr Qualify for 
University 




Labor  Market 
Returns age 
30 Own Child 
Earnings 
Returns at age 
30 Population  







           
Child 15 or 
over 
1.307 -1.708 5.878 0.366 2.042 0.347* 1433.1 -0.970 -310.6 598.0 
(4.661) (4.314) (4.134) (4.267) (3.151) (0.192) (1007.3) (2.182) (630.2) (1061.2) 
           
Parents Over 
45 
1.256 2.173 1.182 0.00533 0.517 -0.119 -3800.8*** 1.189 1216.4** -354.3 
(4.657) (4.552) (4.098) (4.285) (3.531) (0.187) (1022.8) (2.345) (603.4) (1117.6) 
           
Male Child -5.137 -7.745** -3.128 -3.544 -3.435 0.237 221.7 -1.672 -230.3 -824.3 
 (4.170) (3.726) (3.849) (3.796) (2.613) (0.215) (978.2) (1.903) (604.6) (1127.7) 
           
Male Parent -4.262 -1.746 1.792 -1.665 0.967 -0.216 1510.6* -1.942 -664.8 397.2 
 (2.754) (2.432) (2.924) (2.928) (1.904) (0.184) (889.1) (1.879) (518.5) (1044.5) 
           
HH Degree 19.89*** 14.92*** 13.32*** 11.44** 2.705 -0.141 -1145.6 2.858 2381.7*** 1156.3 
 (5.150) (4.157) (4.470) (4.587) (2.755) (0.212) (1030.9) (2.327) (631.8) (1102.5) 
           
High Income -1.497 -2.727 1.881 -1.906 -2.071 0.290 772.9 0.796 245.5 -890.4 
 (4.827) (4.438) (4.216) (4.135) (3.222) (0.222) (1021.5) (2.394) (601.8) (1278.2) 
           
Married 8.268 7.974* 3.035 6.124 3.736 0.232 -1375.8 -1.481 35.96 1023.7 
 (5.175) (4.810) (4.813) (4.811) (3.704) (0.259) (1178.7) (2.715) (708.2) (1456.8) 
           
White British 3.589 2.231 -1.494 -4.172 -0.320 0.158 653.9 -1.599 694.4 -919.9 
 (5.749) (5.399) (4.997) (4.576) (3.549) (0.221) (1100.5) (2.939) (722.8) (1835.6) 
           
Ethnic Other 11.08 8.076 1.700 0.297 1.912 1.276** 4902.8*** -1.027 169.0 491.1 
 (7.745) (5.811) (6.160) (5.899) (4.107) (0.545) (1374.7) (3.841) (1099.2) (2202.5) 
           
England 10.94* 13.36** -0.864 -1.588 3.221 0.0481 7.834 0.110 2392.2*** 3233.4** 
 (6.541) (6.746) (5.905) (6.138) (5.228) (0.233) (1336.6) (3.541) (793.4) (1407.6) 
           
constant 41.21*** 61.33*** 66.22*** 80.57*** 85.59*** -0.0703 15576.1*** 92.86*** 211.0 4418.4 
 (9.398) (8.976) (9.276) (9.521) (6.849) (0.419) (2148.1) (4.727) (991.9) (3085.9) 
 
R(2) 0.164 0.156 0.102 0.071 0.040 0.094 0.099 0.016 0.116 0.051 
DV mean 68.02 75.63 78.36 83.54 89.59 0.613 9909.6 91.40 4501.9 7550.4 
N 307 308 275 274 261 221 281 265 324 180 
30 
 
Table 5 Childs Subjective Expectations on Observable Characteristics, OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
 University Related Expectations
 
Earnings Expectation For self 
 
Earnings Beliefs  for Population 
 









































































































































































































































18.18 7.491 26.75* 37.85** 27.92*** 18164.3** -2621.1 10083.9** 0.999 -2604.0 -6473.6** 3877.2 12.14 11.49 1.964 716.0 1184.8 







































































(3840.2)   
R(2) 0.083 0.089 0.137 0.114 0.083 0.068 0.054 0.032 0.082 0.039 0.058 0.045 0.127 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.180 
DV mean 65.24 71.42 72.48 80.38 87.56 36209.6 26569.8 8901.1 5.67 31219.7 22674.4 8531.1 88.73 82.10 6.752 4659.6 7417.4 
N 97 99 75 75 85 93 93 91 74 91 90 90 90 96 85 104 54 
  
The table presents OLS regressions for the children’s labor market and university relative beliefs and expectations on their observable characteristics. We use robust standard errors that are reported in 
parentheses and the stars indicate statistical significant to our usual levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. We also control for parents marital status missing in our regressions but do not report them 




Young people’s future earnings expectations are quite similar to those held by their parents 
when looking at the overall average, but seem more balanced by family background. There are 
no statistical differences in earnings expectations by household degree or household income in 
multivariate analysis (table 5). The direction of the heterogeneity in belief is actually reversed 
in some cases, with young people coming from non-university household expecting on average 
higher earnings than their counterpart (table 3 and 5), possibly reflecting differences in private 
information about their future labour market outcomes (i.e. ability, job network). Note however 
that the sample sizes are quite smaller than those of parents. 
When it comes to costs, parents and young people expect to pay between £7.5k on average in 
tuition per year, and to take loans of a similar amount. Parents from university degree 
households expect to pay more in tuition than their counterpart, reflecting either differences in 
knowledge about university tuitions or different expectations in what university their children 
would attend. In England, tuition fees are capped at £9,250 a year for UK and EU students, 
with around 76% of all institutions charging the full amount in 2015-16. Contrarily to their 
parents, young people with no household degree expect to pay higher tuition than their 
counterparts. Those differences hold in multivariate analysis (tables 4 and 5). 
A correlation table of parents’ expectations about labour market outcomes is presented in Table 
6. As one would expect, the expectations about university-related outcomes are positively 
related to each other. There is a positive correlation between parents’ perceived population 
earnings and the expected earnings for their children both with and without a degree 
(correlation of about 0.5). Finally, there is also a positive correlation between expected earning 














Pr Apply Pr Apply 
With 
Sch 

































Pr Degree 30 1.0000               
Pr Qualify 0.8169* 1.0000              
Pr Apply 0.7925* 0.5193* 1.0000             
Pr Apply With 
Sch 
0.7094* 0.4827* 0.8164* 1.0000            
Pr Finish 0.4622* 0.5974* 0.5773* 0.5851* 1.0000           
Exp Earn 30 
Degree 
0.1761* 0.2472* 0.1627 0.0869 0.1041 1.0000          
Exp Earn 45 
Degree 
0.3002* 0.2787* 0.2599* 0.1908* 0.1577 0.7855* 1.0000         
Exp Earn 30 
No Degree 
0.0915 0.1713* -0.0349 -0.0601 0.0423 0.5362* 0.3528* 1.0000        
Exp Earn 45 
No Degree 
0.1470 0.2146* 0.0008 -0.0048 0.0526 0.4791* 0.5211* 0.7734* 1.0000       
Population 
Earn 30 Degree 
0.0389 0.0402 0.0075 -0.0473 -0.0508 0.5407* 0.4534* 0.4426* 0.3518* 1.0000      
Population 
Earn 30 No 
Degree 
-0.1243 -0.0759 -0.1984* -0.1967* -0.0821 0.2503* 0.1396 0.4367* 0.4018* 0.5500* 1.0000     
Pr Emp With 
Degree 
0.2868* 0.3688* 0.3227* 0.2028* 0.4563* 0.1680* 0.1979* 0.1657* 0.2194* 0.1656* 0.1309 1.0000    
Pr Emp No 
Degree 
0.2261* 0.3198* 0.1408 0.0837 0.3661* 0.1246 0.1680* 0.3177* 0.3004* 0.2165* 0.1533 0.6881* 1.0000    
Expected 
Tuition 
0.2172 0.2368 0.1800 0.2443* 0.2248 -0.0784 0.0312 -0.1551 -0.0747 -0.0730 0.0177 0.1608 0.1627 1.0000  
Expected 
Loans 
0.2090 0.1195 0.1743 0.2444* 0.1756 -0.0646 0.1171  -0.1384 -0.0685 0.0117 0.0115 0.1639 0.1215 0.3818* 1.0000 
 
Table shows the pairwise correlations between parent’s university and labour market related expectations for their own child (or population when specified). Stars indicate statistical significant at 
the 1% level 
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1.2.3 Link Between Parents and Children’s Subjective Expectations  
A unique feature of this data is that we have both parents and their child’s subjective 
expectations. Parents are likely to be an important source of information for children. We 
investigate this relationship in table 7. In every specification we use the child’s expectation as 
our dependent variable and their parents’ expectations as our independent variables of interest. 
We consider the separate effect of mother and father expectations and include missing dummy 
variables for instances where one of the parents response is missing. These regressions exclude 
children who have both parents missing (18% of the children’s sample).  
In terms of university-related outcomes, we find a strong association between the children and 
parents’ subjective expectations. For example, a 10% increase in their father’s (mothers) 
expectations of having a degree by age 30 is associated to a 4.7% (3.0%) increase in their 
child’s beliefs, statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Looking at earnings, we find that mother’s expectations are positively associated to their 
child’s expected earnings with a degree, while the father’s expectations are associated to their 
expected earnings without a degree. For example, a £100 increase in mothers expected earnings 
for her child with a degree is associated with a £49 increase in their child’s expected earnings 
for themselves, statistically significant at the 1% level (table 7, column 5). In contrast, there is 
no relationship between parents and children’s expectations about population earning or 






Table 7. Child’s expectations on their parents expectations and observed characteristics (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
        
 University Related Expectation
 
Earnings Expectations for Self
 
Earnings Beliefs For Population 
 











Degree by 30 






















Pr of Emp 
With 
Degree 
Pr of Emp 
With no 
Degree 
Fathers Beliefs 0.468*** 0.413** 0.460** 0.121 0.228 0.614*** 0.158 -0.0707 -0.00901 0.340* 0.187 0.290 0.215 
(0.136) (0.194) (0.208) (0.157) (0.192) (0.223) (0.261) (0.249) (0.182) (0.183) (0.197) (0.251) (1.01) 
              
Mothers Beliefs 0.304*** 0.412*** 0.217* 0.377*** 0.488*** 0.342 -0.0838 0.169 -0.0463 0.116 -0.0104 0.0910 0.0286 
(0.112) (0.133) (0.124) (0.112) (0.183) (0.272) (0.161) (0.121) (0.188) (0.137) (0.135) (0.205) (0.18) 
              
Male Child 7.680 2.226 -4.902 -1.144 1049.9 2282.1 -232.8 599.3 -0.350 2.129 8.376* -173.2 -1275.3 
(7.030) (7.676) (7.457) (4.347) (3895.7) (3491.0) (2763.3) (2012.1) (0.383) (3.214) (4.765) (1221.5) (2095.6) 
              
High Income -2.183 -6.402 -6.140 -6.053 3631.6 2182.6 1107.8 -286.7 0.231 -4.898 -7.677 1599.8 -2005.7 
(7.347) (8.008) (7.922) (4.383) (4241.2) (3654.9) (2840.6) (1983.0) (0.394) (3.527) (4.938) (1295.9) (2302.1) 
              
HH Degree  -4.156 -8.868 -11.30 -8.003 -6870.0 -5106.7 -1177.8 -104.3 -0.0918 -1.733 -2.050 -1607.1 -1719.7 
(8.063) (8.471) (8.359) (4.957) (4252.6) (3791.4) (2959.8) (2083.4) (0.402) (3.757) (5.173) (1365.8) (2520.2) 
              
England 11.41 -17.62 -12.49 -1.916 6877.7 7845.8 -26.50 2641.8 0.667 -4.840 -16.02 3504.5 5391.7 
 (17.68) (29.75) (29.26) (12.40) (9714.0) (8732.3) (6907.3) (4771.1) (1.002) (10.05) (11.94) (3322.9) (7487.0) 
              
White British 57.93* 25.71 23.53 24.09* 28209.7** -4016.7 -231.7 -6967.0 1.463 31.39*** 19.43 2089.1 4668.6 
(31.75) (21.88) (21.54) (13.82) (13576.5) (15263.1) (11853.3) (8296.6) (1.445) (11.12) (14.77) (4064.6) (4800.0) 
              
Ethnic Other 42.16 3.726 6.095 23.76 33960.8** -3814.5 -1709.2 -8045.1 1.624 31.73*** 19.15 -50.40 7121.2 
(32.44) (23.16) (22.53) (14.31) (14268.8) (15729.2) (12225.0) (8543.1) (1.542) (11.63) (15.52) (4233.7) (5209.0) 
              
Constant  -44.99 28.77 46.45 61.12** -21162.8 2965.7 30655.5** 18699.4** 5.996*** 28.78 68.54** -2846.7 -2895.2 
 (40.02) (37.89) (38.30) (23.80) (20095.4) (19740.1) (12823.1) (8199.2) (1.173) (27.55) (28.17) (4034.0) (9813.1) 
R(2) 0.352 0.398 0.301 0.345 0.222 0.203 0.098 0.136 0.166 0.250 0.189 0.107 0.165 
DV mean 67.94 74.46 81.43 87.58 36080 26658 31537 22679 5.728 89.58 81.82 4600 6841 
N 85 69 69 77 80 82 80 79 66 80 84 91 47 
The table presents OLS regressions for the children’s labor market and university relative beliefs and expectations on their mothers and fathers corresponding labor market and 
university related beliefs. We use robust standard errors that are reported in parentheses and the stars indicate statistical significant to our usual levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 
< 0.01. We also control for parents marital status missing in our regressions but do not report them in the table above because the quantity of young people in that category is 




1.3 Accuracy of Beliefs 
1.3.1 Earnings 
We use parents’ expectations about current population earnings to assess their accuracy in 
beliefs. We compare parents’ beliefs with population earnings data by gender and degree status 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) Income and Education Analysis using quarterly data 
between 2004Q2 -2011Q1. The ‘True Value’ for men is £27,100 with no degree and £39,700 
with degree, and £22,600 and £33,800 for women respectively.  
We define “error” by subtracting their beliefs from the ‘True Value’, so a positive (negative) 
error stipulates that the respondent underestimates (overestimates) population earnings. As the 
error takes positive and negative values, a mean error of zero does not necessarily represent a 
low level of error, we also use the absolute value of the error.  Parents typically underestimate 
population earnings, by around £5k with a degree and £3k without (not shown). As a result, 
parents underestimate the returns to a degree by around £2k. A relatively large standard 
deviation indicates considerable heterogeneity in beliefs –this is particularly striking for 
earnings with a degree: the 10th percentile is -£6.2k (-18%) while the 90th percentile is +£13.8k 
(+37%). Figure 1 presents the earnings return errors and show that about two-third of parent’s 
under-estimate the return to a degree. This is potentially important as we expect earnings return 
to be important for the decision to apply to university (see also section 4). 
We further assess how the accuracy varies by characteristics in a multivariate analysis using 
the errors and the absolute value of the error (Table 8). We are particularly interested in the 
difference by households SES status to investigate whether the SES gap in university 





Table 8 Accuracy of Parents beliefs (actual – belief) on observable characteristics (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




 With Degree No Degree   
  Absolute Value  Absolute Value  Absolute Value 
Child Over 15 -817.5 -653.8 56.21 74.18 -1433.1 -136.9 
(1268.8) (939.5) (940.5) (636.5) (1007.3) (696.6) 
       
Parents Over 45 628.5 210.9 -3008.5*** 244.4 3800.8*** 624.8 
(1293.4) (908.0) (963.4) (692.0) (1022.8) (686.8) 
       
Male Child 2964.9*** 1387.1* 1693.6* 1137.5** 1178.3 -116.7 
 (1055.8) (723.4) (888.1) (570.2) (978.2) (697.0) 
       
Male Parent -308.0 -576.4 671.7 -736.7 -1510.6* -623.3 
 (913.0) (617.0) (759.6) (545.5) (889.1) (552.7) 
       
HH Degree -409.1 -1364.5 -1261.0 -2109.2*** 1145.6 -1747.7** 
 (1127.0) (953.3) (1004.6) (655.6) (1030.9) (778.9) 
       
HH High Income  -2676.5** -1985.7** -1771.3 -2237.1*** -772.9 -485.0 
(1341.6) (988.3) (1101.0) (789.7) (1021.5) (773.9) 
       
Married 2598.6* 1813.2 1528.5 1497.1* 1375.8 47.79 
 (1433.2) (1132.1) (1139.7) (835.1) (1178.7) (874.0) 
       
White British -2612.3** -800.7 -1325.5 -1062.4 -653.9 568.6 
(1136.4) (940.1) (1031.6) (748.1) (1100.5) (736.7) 
       
Ethnic Other -7124.4*** -621.5 -1852.6 803.2 -4902.8*** 1093.7 
(2066.4) (1178.9) (1722.9) (1242.6) (1374.7) (1205.4) 
       
England 1010.3 1684.9* 1922.0 -4.300 -7.834 835.4 
 (1380.8) (922.1) (1543.5) (1095.8) (1336.6) (1088.8) 
       
Constant 5240.9*** 7501.3*** 3461.2* 7365.5*** -4376.1** 7479.8*** 
 (1796.2) (1270.4) (1957.2) (1291.2) (2148.1) (1694.5) 
R(2) 0.110 0.065 0.102 0.121 0.106 0.040 
DV mean 4891 7956 2903 5679 2047 6323 
N 286 286 284 284 281 281 
The table presents an OLS regression of the accuracy of parent’s beliefs on observable characteristics. We include Ethnic Missing in our model. We do 
not report the coefficients in this table as the sample in these categories are sufficiently low. The standard errors are reported in parentheses 





We find a very limited association between SES and accuracy about the earnings returns. High 
income households appear more accurate about both the earnings with and without a degree, 
resulting in no difference for the return. Household with a degree appear more accurate about 
the earning returns without a degree. This does not translate in smaller average error, or more 
accurate perception according to our accuracy indicator, when looking at the returns (Table 8, 
column 5). But we do see an effect in the absolute value of the error for returns (Table 8, 
column 6) suggesting that households with a degree are less likely to make large mistakes in 
either direction.  
We find that parents of male children are more inaccurate than parents of female children about 
earnings with and without a degree, but the inaccuracy balances out resulting in no differences 
in the returns. Finally we observe that older parents typically underestimate the expected 
returns by over £3.8k – driven by the fact that they overestimate earnings without a degree by 
over £3k. 
1.3.2 Employment 
Respondents are asked their expectations that their child/they will be employed at thirty both 
with and without a degree.  Unlike for earnings, they were not asked about the current 
population employment rates so we cannot directly assess knowledge about employment 
prospects. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to compare current employment rates with 
employment expectations. Using the LFS, we obtain an employment rate of 97% with a degree 
at thirty for both men and women, and 92% for men and 93% for women with no degree. Using 
these figures we construct parent’s employment “difference” by subtracting their expectations 
from the current employment rates. We do not call this an error as the difference may reflect 
private information respondents have about themselves/their children, beliefs about the 
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economy and future employment rates and errors about the current population unemployment 
rate.  
Table A1 in the appendix shows an average difference of 5.6 percentage point both with, and 
without, a degree, suggesting that they are more pessimistic for their children’s employment 
than is warranted with the current employment rate. There is however a nontrivial amount of 
parents who are more optimistic – as indicated by the significantly larger mean absolute value 
of errors. This is particularly true for difference without a degree where the 50th percentile is -
7 and the 90th percentile is +42. Using multivariate analysis we find that these differences do 
not differ by observable characteristics (table not shown).  
1.4 Expected Returns and Expectations of Applying to University  
We have focused on the returns to degree as those are thought to be important drivers in the 
decision to apply to university. We investigate this directly by looking at the relationship 
between the application intentions and expected returns. Using an OLS specification we find 
that parent’s application expectations are positively associated to their expected returns (Table 
9). Moreover, the effect is large. For example, an increase from the 50th to the 75th percentile 
of expected earnings returns (respondents labour market earning returns) leads to an increase 
of 31 percentage point in the probability to apply to university (Table 9, column 1). The same 
increase in labour market returns leads to an increase of 72 percentage points in the probability 
to apply (Table 9 column 2) while an increase in employment returns by the same proportion 
increases the probability of applying by 6 percentage points (Table 9, column 3). 
Focusing on young people, we find that application expectations are only associated with the 
expected returns for male children (Appendix Table A2). This is consistent with existing 
evidence that men’s educational decisions tend to be more driven by pecuniary factors (e.g. 
Malgwi et al., 2005).  
39 
 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and the stars indicate statistical significant to our usual levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. The expected tuition is reported in 1,000’s and Ethnicity Missing is the reference category for our ethnicity variables.  
 
 
Table 9 Parents Applications Intentions (Probability of applying) on their expected returns and observable characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probability of Applying No Scholarship 
 










  0.936** 
(0.412) 
  
     
Labor  Market 
Returns age 30 








      
Employment 
Returns 
  0.241* 
(0.136) 
  0.116 
(0.135) 
     
       
Child Over 15 1.220 3.897 3.487 -3.323 -0.393 -1.290 
 (3.897) (3.607) (3.920) (3.884) (3.579) (3.897) 
       
Parent Over 45 1.838 4.150 1.593 1.335 3.425 0.653 
 (3.934) (3.619) (3.984) (3.926) (3.588) (3.955) 
       
Male Child -1.684 -0.717 -3.758 -0.880 2.358 -2.740 
 (3.649) (3.393) (3.625) (3.655) (3.350) (3.597) 
       
Male Parent -0.661 -5.545 0.495 -3.531 -6.708* -1.492 
 (3.772) (3.491) (3.819) (3.771) (3.450) (3.790) 
       
HH Degree 8.003* 4.171 8.974** 6.249 1.147 6.739* 
 (4.070) (3.751) (3.974) (4.076) (3.710) (3.953) 
       
Parents Married 5.825 2.679 1.544 7.723 1.872 4.584 
 (4.671) (4.326) (4.454) (4.731) (4.310) (4.468) 
       
HH High Income -2.292 1.899 1.893 -6.009 -0.469 -2.352 
 (4.199) (3.954) (4.057) (4.283) (3.945) (4.077) 
       
White British -0.823 2.677 -1.819 -4.192 -0.450 -4.516 
 (4.944) (4.476) (4.938) (4.873) (4.416) (4.888) 
       
Ethnic Other 3.764 9.234 3.645 2.057 8.857 0.869 
 (7.365) (7.011) (7.110) (7.367) (7.023) (7.090) 
       
England -1.511 -3.700 -0.602 2.184 -4.006 -3.512 
 (6.217) (5.965) (6.295) (6.339) (5.895) (6.375) 
       
Expected 
Tuition 
0.0814 -0.162 -0.166 0.000298 0.000304 0.000343 
 (0.465) (0.427) (0.483) (0.000464) (0.000423) (0.000479) 
       
Tuition Missing -10.74* -1.295 -13.50** -8.836 2.108 -8.582 
 (5.461) (5.341) (5.481) (5.525) (5.280) (5.484) 
       
Constant 68.88*** 83.65*** 78.40*** 75.09*** 84.22*** 86.09*** 
 (10.03) (9.246) (9.439) 
 
(9.312) (7.860) (8.618) 
R(2) 0.125 0.106 0.127 0.105 0.064 0.084 
DV mean 78.37 81.32 77.75 83.49 86.22 83.24 
N 226 204 240 223 203 237 
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Because we have data on parents and children, we can also investigate whose expectations – 
parents’ or own– about the returns to a degree seem more relevant to the child’s application 
intentions. Next we use multivariate analysis regressing the child’s application intentions on 
the child’s, mothers and fathers expected returns with our usual controls (not reported). We 
find that the child’s expectations are positively associated to their enrolment probability. There 
is no statistically significant association between the parents expected returns and the child’s 
application intentions once the child’s expected returns are controlled for. 
1.5 Effect of a Randomized Information Intervention on Subjective Expectations 
Half of the households in wave 8 that were eligible for this module were provided information 
about the average annual earnings for men and women aged 26-34 who are working full time 
with, and without, a degree, and their respective employment rate.12 Households received the 
information sheet presented in Appendix A2 just after their wave 8 interview, and by post again 
about 6 months prior to their wave 9 interview.  
Table 10 shows that the treatment and control groups are balanced on baseline expectations 
and on most demographic characteristics. However, households in the treatment group are 15% 
more likely to have at least one parent with a University Degree than the control group at 
baseline. Our analytical sample for this section includes respondents who were interviewed at 
both waves 8 and 9. This resulting sample is very similar to the baseline sample in terms of 
characteristics. Again, it is balanced on expectations and most characteristics by treatment 
group, except for household degree. We discuss this at the end of section 5.2. 
 
                                                          
12 The treatment assignment was implemented prior to wave 8 by using a random number generator and a cut-off at the 
household level whereby households above (below) a certain number were assigned to the treatment (control) group. 




Table 10  Balance Tables. Report the Wave 8 mean of the treatment and control groups by the subjective expectations questions 
at the individual level using our wave 8 (columns a - b) and wave 9 (columns c-f) samples. Columns c – d show the mean 











(c) (d) (e) (f) 
Interviewed in Wave 8 
 
Not Interviewed in Wave 9 
 
Interviewed in Wave 9 
 
 Control Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Child Over 15 .45 .52 .44 .48 .46 .57 
Parent Over 45 .51 .46 .54* .38 .54 .57 
Child Male .51 .54 .44 .49 .54 .56 
Parent Male .34 .31 .34 .26 .38 .44 
HH Degree .46** .61 .48 .55 .48*** .70 
High SES .49 .51 .42 .48 .55 .60 
Parent Married+ .59 .59 .56 .52 .66 .73 
White British .76 .68 .64 .65 .80 .70 
Ethnic Other  .10 .12 .20 .22 .06 .13 




.59 .54 .94** .82 .52 .44 
Max n 
 (households) 
104 121 39 58 65 63 
       
Variable at the 
individual Level: 
      
       
Chance of Applying 
to University  
77.6 76.4 77.1 69.3 77.9 81.3 
Chance of Applying 
With Scholarship 
82.0 82.8 79.6 78.2 83.0 85.9 
       
Chance Finish 
University  
90.4 89.0 90.1 87.5 90.5 90.0 
       
Expected Earnings 
at 30 With Degree 
32.5** 35.3 30.0 33.0 33.5* 37.0 
Expected Earnings 
at 30 No Degree 
24.1 24.4 22.0 22.8 25.3 25.7 
Expected Earnings 
at 30 With Degree 
Population  
32.4 31.7 33.6 31.7 31.8 31.7 
Expected Earnings 
at 30 No Degree 
Population  
21.8 22.4 21.2 21.8 22.1 22.8 
       
Expected Returns to 
a Degree at 30 
Population 
10.3 9.6 12.3 10.4 9.3 9.0 
Expected Returns to 
a Degree 30 
8.8 10.6 9.0 10.1 8.8 11.0 
       
       
Chance Employed 
With Degree 
90.3 92.3 89.3 91.6 90.8 92.7 
Chance Employed 
With No Degree 
89.1 85.0 86.2 83.8 90.5* 86.0 
       
Max n  
(Individual) 
147 177 50 77 97 100 
 Stars indicate significance as the following labels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
+The national average was 68% in 2017 (ONS). This suggests that parents in our sample in wave 8 are less likely to be married than in the population. 
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We investigate the effect of the information intervention on respondents’ accuracy and 
subjective expectations by estimating the following ANCOVA specification: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 
Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+1 is individual i’s wave 9 outcome, 𝑇𝑖 is a treatment dummy equal to one if 
individual i received the treatment and zero otherwise, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is i’s outcome at wave 8, 𝑋𝑖 are 
demographic characteristics. Note that our standard errors are clustered at the household level, 
which is the level of the randomization. 
1.5.1 Treatment Effect on Parents Expected Earnings Accuracy 
By providing information on population earnings, the treatment may have improved 
respondents’ accuracy in that regard. We therefore start by investigating its impact on the 
accuracy of parent’s beliefs about the average earnings at 30. Figure 2 shows that the 
distribution of error in population earnings for the treatment group has its mode closer to zero 
compared to the distribution of the control group for the earnings with a degree (left panel) but 
there is no large difference for the earnings without a degree (right panel). Parent’s beliefs 
about population earnings with a degree at 30 who received the information are 15% more 
likely to be within 10% of the True Value and the fourth column shows that they are 14% more 
likely to be within £3k of the True Value (both significant at the 1% level, not shown). 
Similarly, Table 11 shows that the treatment reduces parental error by £1.5k in absolute terms 
(column 2). This evidence shows that the provision of information reduces the mean error in 
beliefs about population earnings with a degree. It is worthwhile to note that we only observe 
treatment effect on the accuracy of population earnings with a degree, even though there is 





Table 11 OLS Treatment on Wave 9 Errors (actual earnings – beliefs) in parents beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Error in Parents Beliefs about Population earnings 
 
 
 With Degree No Degree 











 (1131.5) (741.6) (739.6) (532.1) 
     
Wave 8 Errors 0.175* 0.158* 0.227** 0.336*** 
 (1.93) (0.0850) (0.0991) (0.0705) 
     
Child Over 15 1879.8 1676.2* 442.8 -440.2 
 (1397.7) (926.6) (909.6) (605.8) 
     
Parents Over 45 -158.3 -1046.6 -410.6 -970.1 
(1364.7) (850.6) (980.8) (619.9) 
     
Male Child 3705.5*** 3365.8*** 2375.0*** 757.7 
 (1259.7) (764.4) (785.2) (530.1) 
     
Male Parent -952.5 -482.1 -1851.8*** -908.2** 
 (861.8) (733.3) (623.9) (406.4) 
     
HH Degree 1025.5 438.3 -616.4 -739.1 
 (1512.7) (1005.1) (874.4) (639.0) 
     
HH High Income  -687.3 -7.857 -102.0 500.8 
(1237.0) (808.8) (921.7) (578.4) 
     
Married -2079.2 -1713.2 -1226.4 -519.4 
 (1638.5) (1063.1) (1041.9) (711.5) 
     
White British 248.8 341.5 291.4 -1044.1 
 (1491.6) (1079.2) (1195.4) (740.6) 
     
Ethnic Other -770.5 142.2 1917.2 -770.4 
 (2158.8) (1544.5) (1450.7) (948.3) 
     
England -2474.3 -2122.5** -3762.2*** -1915.4* 
 (1597.5) (990.2) (1301.0) (989.3) 
     
Constant 5775.0** 8368.6*** 6127.7*** 7229.3*** 
 (2598.9) (1614.2) (1907.2) (1336.5) 
R2 0.146 0.164 0.227 0.264 
DV mean 5440 7871 3053 5016 
N 235 235 232 232 









1.5.2 Treatment Effect on Parents Expectations  
We next explore how parents update their beliefs and expectations in response to the 
information we provided. Table 12 reports the coefficient associated with the dummy 
Treatment on parental expectations.  Row (a) shows the results for all parents. We find that the 
information treatment increase expectations about population returns by £2.4k (statistically 
significant at the 5% level). The effect is similar for mothers (row b) and fathers (row c), 
although slightly less precisely estimated for fathers (p-value=0.13). This increase in perceived 
population return is not accompanied by an increase in the returns to a degree for their own 
child. In rows (a) to (c), the coefficients associated with the treatment dummy are positive but 
much smaller in the specification for child’s return compared to population returns, and the 
standard errors are very large. Although our sample is relatively small, this suggests that 
expected returns about own child, for whom parents may have quite a lot of private information, 
is less responsive to general information about the labour market than beliefs about population 
return. 
Our intervention also included information about employment rate. Row (a) shows no effect 
on the subjective probabilities of employment when we look at all parents, but we see an 8 
percentage point increase in the probability of employment with a degree for mothers (statically 
significant at 10%), and a 7 percentage point decrease for fathers (statistically significant at 
5%). Perhaps not surprisingly given that there is no change in the expected returns to a degree 
for their child, there is no statistically significant treatment effect on the expectations to apply 
to university or the chance to have a degree at age 30. 
Despite the relatively small sample size, rows d-g investigates the heterogeneity in treatment 
effect using interactions by: (i) child’s gender, (ii) SES, (iii) household degree, (iv) baseline 
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accuracy. Overall, there does not seem to heterogenous treatment effects according to these 
categories. 
Recall that our treatment group is more educated than the control group. While we control for 
household degree in all our specification, our results are robust to using regression adjustment 
as in Cattaneo (2010) and propensity score matching, on baseline beliefs and observable 
characteristics (not reported but available on request).13 The treatment effects on population 
returns to a degree are of similar magnitude as in the OLS specification, and precisely 
estimated. There is also a large (6 percentage point) and precisely estimated treatment effect 
on the probability to apply to university when using propensity score matching. But this result 
does not hold in the regression adjustment, and therefore seems sensitive to the underlying 
assumptions. For propensity score matching, similarity between subjects is based on estimated 
treatment probabilities, while for the regression adjustment it is based on a weighted function 
of the covariates for each observation. 
1.5.3 Treatment Effect on Children’s Expectations 
We only have 73 young people who participated both in waves 8 and 9. We still estimate the 
treatment effect for children (now reported). While none of the coefficients associated with 
treatments are statistically significant, the magnitude of the effects on own versus population 
earnings are different than what we have observed for parents. The coefficient associated with 
treatment is £2.8k for own earnings returns, compared to £0.5k for population returns. It is 
plausible than young people have more malleable expectations about their own labour market 
outcomes than their parents. 
 
                                                          
13 Using a matching strategy we create a potential outcome for each respondent by comparing all the respondents in the 
treatment (control) group with a respondent who looks most similar to them in the control (treatment) group. We then and 
take the average of the difference between the observed and potential outcome for each respondent. 
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Table 12 Treatment effects on parental beliefs. 












































































   


















   
 
 
 Interactions Using All Parents 
 
 
Treatment x:          












-12.52** -2.212 757.5 
(5.248) (5.389) (1548.5) 
          
































































N 183 134 131 229 138 126 151 159 119 
SE in parentheses, starts indicate significance as the following labels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Rows d-g report the interaction by 




1.6 Conclusion  
Increasing social mobility is high on the government agenda in the UK, and many other 
countries. Widening participation into Higher Education is one possible pathway but, despite 
recent effort, there is still a large gap participation between high and low SES. We investigate 
whether differences in knowledge about the labour market returns to a degree might be 
responsible for this gap. Our focus on the perceived labour market returns to a degree stem 
from the fact that they ought to be an important driver of the decision to go to university. 
Indeed, in our data, parents/young people who expect higher labour market returns from a 
degree also expect a higher probability that their child/they will apply to university. 
Our detailed subjective expectations data reveal two important facts. Parents and young people 
from various SES backgrounds hold similar beliefs about the earnings return and employment 
returns to a degree. Moreover, parents under-estimate on average the population earnings return 
to a degree. It is therefore unlikely that the information gap about the labour market advantage 
of a degree explains the SES gap in participation. But providing information on earnings may 
help all families to make better informed-decision, irrespective of SES background. 
We have also found that a very light-touch information intervention, such as showing some 
statistics about population earnings and employment to families, is powerful enough to change 
parents’ expectations about population earnings so that they become more accurate, with 
changes still visible 6 months later. This information also increased participants’ perceptions 
about the returns to a degree in the population. However, this intervention did not change 
parents’ perceptions about the future labour market outcomes of their own children. Possibly 




We also provide indirect evidence that financial constraints at the time of university application 
are not a major factor in the decision to apply as differences in application expectations persist 
by family background even in the hypothetical situation of being provided a scholarship that 
would cover all costs. This does not mean that financial constraints are irrelevant; rather that 
they may matter earlier on - by affecting primary and secondary school quality, for example, 
or access to tutoring.  
More research is needed to better understand the underlying mechanism explaining the gap in 
higher education application by socio-economic status. Psychological costs are found to be 
important for educational choices (Eisenhauer et al., 2015) and those may be different for 
individuals who come from different backgrounds. Information gaps might still be relevant in 
other domains than labour market returns to a degree, such as the non-pecuniary returns to a 













1.7 Figures  
Figure 1 Parents Accuracy about the returns to a degree (actual returns – belief) we define error by 
subtracting their beliefs from the ‘True Value’, a positive (negative) error stipulates that the respondent 
underestimates (overestimates) population earnings.  
 
Figure 2 Parents Wave 9 Accuracy about the returns to a degree (actual returns – belief) we define error 
by subtracting their beliefs from the ‘True Value’, a positive (negative) error stipulates that the 








Figure 3 Parents Application intentions without a scholarship Wave 8 (LHS) and Wave 9 (RHS) by 
Treatment 
 
Figure 4 Parents Accuracy of Population earnings rescaled (actual earnings – belief) with (LHS) and 











Bad Economy, Good Teachers? The countercyclicality of 
enrolment into Initial Teacher Training Programmes in 
the UK 
2.1 Introduction 
Shifts in labour demand caused by technological growth and an increase in trade with 
developing counties have resulted in human capital playing a more prominent role in securing 
a well-paid position in the labour market (David and Dorn 2013, Goos et al., 2014, Michaels 
et al., 2014). This is the case in England where recent evidence shows that the decision to 
apply to university is motivated by expected labour market returns (Delavande et al., 2018). 
However, the lag between the decision to apply to university and graduation means that the 
investment in human capital might not pay off if entry into the labour market occurs during a 
period of low labour demand. Research shows that graduating during a period of low labour 
demand can have scarring effects on labour market outcomes (Altonji et al., 2016, Cockx and 
Ghirelli 2016, Kahn 2010, Oreopoulos et al., 2012) . Indeed, young people who graduate 
during a recession are less likely to find a job and those who do face a wage penalty (Baert et 
al., 2013, Del Bono and Morando 2016, Oyer 2006, Shvartsman 2018, van den Berge and 
Brouwers 2017). 
 To avoid the negative effects of entering the labour market during a recession individuals 
may decide to defer entry by remaining in education. Existing evidence shows that economic 
conditions do effect education related choices in a variety of settings including the decision 
for graduates to enrol into postgraduate study and the decision for school leavers to enrol into 
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post-compulsory schooling (Barr and Turner 2015, Clark 2011, Del Bono and Morando 2016, 
Foote and Grosz 2020, Kondo 2015). In this paper, we test the hypothesis that a possible 
response to periods of low labour demand is for graduates to go into teaching, a profession 
that generally requires at least one year of postgraduate study, and an occupation whose 
demand is mostly unrelated to economic conditions as it depends on population 
demographics and government policies. Specifically, we exploit the plausibly exogenous 
variation in labour market conditions at the time of graduation to investigate how this affects 
the probability that a graduate will enrol onto an Initial Teacher Training Programme (TTP). 
We find no evidence that graduating during a period of high unemployment has any effect on 
the probability that a graduate will enrol onto a TTP. While the quantity of graduates who 
enrol in TTP’s might not necessarily respond to labour market conditions due to capacity 
constraints, the composition of trainee teachers might still be affected. Our heterogeneity 
analysis suggests a compositional effect on the diversity of trainee teachers - more male 
graduates, more graduates from ethnic minority backgrounds and more Russell Group 
graduates as well as a positive effect on subject specific shortages (more Physics graduates).  
Understanding the factors affecting the supply of teachers is important because teachers are 
an essential component of the education production function whose impact on the 
development of human capital impacts student outcomes in both the short (Hanushek et al., 
2014) and the long run (Chetty et al., 2011). The magnitude of the effect is illustrated by 
Hanushek (2011a) who shows that a teacher who is 0.25sd more effective at raising student 
test scores than the average teacher annually generates marginal gains of more than $105,000 
for a class of twenty students. Furthermore, teachers have a significant impact on the wider 
economy as emphasised by Hanushek and Woessmann (2011), who show that improving test 
scores by 0.25sd (just over half the difference between the US and Canada) would increase 
the present value of GDP by $44 trillion. 
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In the simplest terms, the demand for teachers is driven by the quantity of school aged 
children and the policymakers’ desired pupil to teacher ratio (Zabalza et al., 1979). Even 
though we can reject the notion that class sizes have an economically meaningful impact on 
pupil performance as long as policymakers prioritise small class sizes, growing pupil 
numbers will ensure that teacher demand is unlikely to fall (Woessmann and West 2002). 
The supply of teachers comes down to the retention of current teachers, the return of qualified 
teachers who are not teaching and the recruitment of graduates into teacher training 
programmes (Chevalier et al., 2007). The recruitment of graduates to teacher training 
programmes will be our focus here as it is the largest source for filling new demand needs. In 
England, teacher training occurs after at least three years of undergraduate study and students 
typically apply to these programmes during the final year of their undergraduate course. 
Similar to a bachelor’s courses, teacher training requires fees to be repaid through income 
contingent loans (see section 2.1).  
Existing research provides evidence that the supply of teachers is sensitive to labour market 
conditions in England. Using graduate cohort data from the 1960s to the 1980s and the 1960s 
to the 1990s Dolton and Mavromaras (1994) and Chevalier, et al. (2007), respectively found 
that the graduate unemployment rate and relative wages have a significant impact on the 
probability that graduates will go into teaching. However, the graduates in their data are 
observed between five and seven years after graduation. Therefore, it is difficult to 
distinguish between enrolment and retention, as it is possible that graduates who are 
successfully placed onto a teacher training programme are less likely to leave the profession 
during periods of low labour demand.14 
                                                          
14 Attrition rates in England are very high, roughly one in three new teachers quit within five years. 
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While there is evidence that the graduates decision to go into teaching is countercyclical this 
does not, necessarily, mean that periods of low economic activity translate into lower pupil-
to-teacher-ratios. This is because teachers are costly - they are the largest component of 
educational expenditure - and school funding is not, necessarily, immune to periods of low 
economic activity. Therefore an increase in the supply of teachers will only lower the pupil-
to-teacher-ratio if the system have both the capacity and the funds to absorb them. In 
England, for instance, many aspects of school funding is ‘ring fenced’ which means current, 
and planned, expenditure on salaries is generally protected. As a consequence, even in a 
recession, schools generally will have the funding to maintain its current workforce and fill 
existing vacancies and temporary filled posts. As a consequence pupil-to-teacher-ratios in 
England tend to be more related to government policies than economic conditions, measured 
by the GDP growth rate (Dolton et al., 2003). But this is not the case in every context. In 
America, for example, many schools faced severe budgetary issues due to the 2008 financial 
crisis causing almost 300,000 teachers to lose their jobs. As a consequence pupil-to-teacher 
ratios to increase to 17.4, the highest level since 1989/90 (Evans et al., 2019). 
This paper contributes to this literature in three ways. First, we are able to more precisely 
estimate the effect of labour market conditions on teacher supply as we observe graduates six 
months after graduation rather than five to seven years after graduation. Second we test the 
hypothesis in a new environment, one with tuition fees and a formal assessment. The existing 
evidence from England uses data prior to the introduction of tuition fees, when there were no 
financial costs associated with teacher training, or certification requirements, i.e. applicants 
did not have to pass a formal assessment (Dolton and Klaauw 1995, Dolton and van der 
Klaauw 1996, Dolton and Mavromaras 1994). These are two important distinctions as 
empirical evidence demonstrates that these policies both have a meaningful impact on the 
supply of teachers. Castro-Zarzur et al., (2019) finds that tuition fees make teaching less 
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attractive and negatively impacts the quality and quantity of students who go into teaching. A 
relatively small body of literature, including Hanushek, et al. (1995) and Manski (1987), 
shows that teaching certification requirements reduces supply. Therefore, we would expect 
the introduction of tutition fees, and certification requirements to change the relationship 
between economic conditions and enrolment onto a TTP – particularly for male graduates 
who tend to be more responsive to costs incurred.  
Our third contribution is to investigate if the effect that graduating in a tough labour market 
has on the composition of graduates entering teaching measured by their university 
attainment (degree classification), the prestige of the university they attended and degree 
studied as well as their gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic status. Existing evidence 
suggests that salaries and economic conditions affect the composition of individuals who 
enter the profession. In the UK, Nickell and Quintini (2002) show that the decline in 
teachers’ relative wages caused the quality of men going into teaching, as measured by 
childhood test scores, to fall. Using administrative data on teachers in Florida, Nagler et al., 
(2015) found that teachers who started their career during a recession were more efficient in 
raising student test scores. However, this relationship is not well-established. Hanushek et al., 
(1999) and Hanushek and Rivkin (2007) using a rich data set on public schools in Texas, 
show that salaries do not explain teacher quality or ability, while Horvath et al., (2018) found 
that other factors are stronger predictors of entry into teaching – the most prominent of which 
is how much individuals enjoyed their teaching experiences during their teacher training.  
Teaching is a female dominated profession across the OECD. A potential reason why the 
majority of teachers tend to be female is that, consistent with the gender pay gap, women are 
significantly less likely to face a wage penalty in teaching compared to their male 
counterparts (Fullard 2019b). Moreover, the difference in the relative attractiveness of 
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teaching in terms of earnings might also explain why schools struggle to recruit and retain 
graduates with a degree in a STEM subject (Clotfelter et al., 2008).15 
Our ability to investigate the effects of economic conditions at graduation by observable 
charactersitcs is important as existing research suggests that a teacher’s ethnicity and sex 
influence pupil performance. Dee (2007) found that same sex teachers in high school 
generally have a positive effect on pupil performance, while Hermann (2017) found that 
female teachers had a strong negative effect on high-achieving boys in England. Gershenson 
et al., (2018) found that black pupils assigned to black teachers in the Tennessee STAR 
experiment were significantly more likely to graduate from high school and enrol into college 
Our data, the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education survey (DLHE), is collected 6 
months after graduation on the population of graduates from all UK Higher Education 
Institutions. Due to data availability we focus our analysis on the graduation years from 
2002/03 to 2011/12. The data contains information about each graduate’s labour market 
outcomes, prior education (vocational and academic qualifications, and performance levels 
obtained both before and during university), family background, and demographic 
characteristics. We combine this graduate level data with labour market statistics and the 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
data on teacher vacancies from the Department for Education’s (DfE) School Workforce 
Census (SWC) and a measure of economic conditions from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Due to the size and quality of our data, we can estimate the effect that economic conditions 
have on the enrolment behaviour of graduates onto TTPs and investigate the effects on the 
composition of trainees. As economic conditions are plausibly exogenous – young people in 
our setting enrol onto a specific degree programme with a fixed graduation date, typically 
                                                          
15 Note STEM is an acronym that stands for science, technology, engineering and mathematics. 
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three years after enrolment, and there is very little scope for deferring graduation or switching 
programmes - these estimates are intended to be interpreted as causal effects. 
This paper is organized as follows, section 2 discusses the institutional setting, sections 3 
discusses the empirical strategy , section 4 discusses the data we use,  section 5 presents our 
descriptive statistics, section 6 presents our main results, section 7 our robustness checks and 
we conclude in section 8. 
2.2 Higher Education in England  
In this paper, we restrict our analysis to the English-domiciled students graduating from 
English Universities, as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have some differences in their 
teacher training requirements and education systems. In England, all teachers in state schools 
are required to have a minimum of a lower second class (2:2) degree, qualified teacher status 
(QTS), and relevant school experience. To obtain a 2:2 degree, a student must enrol at a 
university and achieve an overall mark of between 50-59%. For an English student to enrol at 
a UK university, they must apply through the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service 
(UCAS). Students typically apply in the second year of their A-Levels (See Appendix for 
further details of the application process in England).16  
Unlike many countries, including the US, students in England enrol onto a specific 
programme at university and there is little switching between degree subjects and institutions, 
and a low dropout rate (Vignoles and Powdthavee 2009). Consequently, there is little scope 
for undergraduates to defer their graduation, dropout or switching degrees in response to 
periods of high unemployment. As the degree subject is chosen prior to university enrolment 
and it is not practically possible for graduates to adjust either their degree subject or when 
                                                          
16A-levels are Key Stage 5 in the national curriculum. Students typically start their first year at 16 and finish at 18. KS5 
typically occurs at a sixth form college. 
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they graduate in our setting, we argue that the subject specific unemployment rate, at time of 
graduation, is exogenous. 
2.2.1 Initial Teacher Training Programme 
During the final year of  undergraduate studies (typically a student’s third year), students can 
apply through UCAS  to do a Post Graduate Certificate in Education (PGCE), which is a one 
year Initial Teacher Training Programme (TTP) – a TTP is any teacher training programme 
that leads to qualified teacher status (QTS). This programme is made up of taught classes and 
school placements. Like the undergraduate process, students apply to five 
institutions/programmes through UCAS, attend interviews and are either accepted or rejected. 
If a student is rejected from all five of their choices, they have a second round, named ‘Apply 
2’. In this round, students apply to one institution/programme at a time, but can make an 
unlimited number of choices until they are accepted onto a programme. According to 
UCAS’s Analysis and Insights data, over 2,500 people (around 11% of those enrolled onto 
TTPs) found a teacher training place through Apply 2 in 2016. After completing a PGCE 
students are recommended for QTS which is the requirement to teach in England.  
In our data, we observe if a graduate is enrolled onto a teacher training programme six 
months after graduation, but we do not observe which programme they are enrolled on.  The 
most popular route to QTS is the PGCE but there are other routes.17 These include Schools 
Direct and Postgraduate Teaching Apprenticeships. Like a PGCE, these are one-year routes 
also applied for through UCAS. But, unlike a PGCE, they are salaried programmes where 
schools, in conjunction with partnering schools or a university, train teachers on the job. 
There are two similar employment-based teacher training programmes, Teach First and 
                                                          
17 The Initial teacher training census 2014-15 shows that 72% of those enrolled were on a PGCE. To this day, the PGCE 
remains the most popular route, but the alternative options have become more popular. For example, in 2009, 485 graduates 
enrolled onto Teach First, while in 2017, 1,300 were enrolled. 
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Premier Pathways, where students work for two years and are awarded a PGCE upon 
completion. A final route into teaching is a three year undergraduate degree in Education. But 
not all undergraduate degrees in education lead to QTS, and for those that do not, to achieve 
QTS, students would have to take one of the programmes outlined above (See the appendix 
for further details about initial teacher training programmes). 
2.2.2 Testing Requirements  
To enrol onto a TTP, all students are required to pass the professional skills test. This test 
assesses the numeracy and literacy of potential teachers. Since 2012, the pass threshold was 
increased (students had to achieve a higher score to pass) and students were limited to 2 
resits. Students who fail their two resits are not allowed to retake the test for 24 months. Due 
to of these changes the Department for Education professional skills tests statistics show that 
the pass rate fell from 98% (99%) in numeracy (literacy) in 2011/12 to 85% (87%) in 
2012/13.  
2.2.3 Tuition Fees  
From 1962, full time undergraduate students in the UK did not have to pay any tuition fees 
until their reintroduction in 1998 by the Teaching and Higher Education Act. Fees were 
initially capped at £1,000 per year for the cohort starting a university course in 1998. These 
tuition fees also apply to anyone starting a PGCE. The 2004 Higher Education Act tripled 
fees to £3,000 per year for the cohort starting in 2006. Following the Browne review, the UK 
Parliament capped fees at £9,000 for the 2012 cohort. Institutions typically set tuition fees to 
the highest possible level, but there is some variation. Table 1 in the Appendix presents the 





2.3 Empirical Strategy 
The aim of this paper is to investigate if labour market conditions have an effect on 
graduates’ decision to enrol onto a teacher training programme (TTP). To do this, we are 
going to exploit the variation in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation, which we 
assume is exogenous as we know students in England cannot choose their time of graduation 
once enrolled. 
Our unit of analysis is a graduate 𝑖 who obtained a degree in the field of study 𝑓, from Higher 
Education Institute ℎ, lives in region 𝑑 and is observed at time 𝑡(six months after graduation). 
Our principal interest is to establish if the unemployment rate during the previous year, 
𝑈𝑓,𝑡−1, affects the probability that they will be enrolled onto a TTP (𝑌𝑖𝑓ℎ𝑑𝑡). Our initial 
specification is the following: 
Yifhdt = β0 + β1Uf,t−1 + θt
′ + σ𝑑 +  μℎ + δf +  ϵifhdt 
 
(1) 
Where β1is our coefficient of interest which denotes the effect of a one percentage point 
increase in the subject specific unemployment rate on the probability that a graduate is 
observed in a TTP six months after graduation. Note that the unemployment rate that each 
graduate is assigned is the average of the unemployment rate the two quarters before, and two 
quarters after June, which is when the student graduates. We also include year fixed effects 
(θt
′), region fixed effects (σ𝑑), institution fixed effects (μℎ) and field of study fixed effects 
(δf). Our robust standard errors are clustered at the year subject level. 
Our main specification uses the subject specific unemployment rate. As we always include 
subject fixed effects, we are exploiting within subject across time variation. However, we 
might be concerned that the composition of each cohort differs. Therefore, we also control for 
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graduates’ observable characteristics, including socioeconomic status (SES) and academic 
characteristics (Xifhdt), as well as sex, ethnicity and degree classification. 
There is evidence that both the decision to enter university and the degree a student studies is 
responsive to the labour market conditions at time of enrolment. We therefore include 
regional unemployment rates, measured by the claimant count, the year before entry into 
university (Ud,t−4) to control for this. In addition a graduate’s decision to enrol onto a TTP 
might be sensitive to the fluctuation in the demand for teachers at the regional level. We use a 
novel approach to control for this by using teacher vacancies at the regional level during the 
year of graduation (Vd,t−1).  
Finally we include subject specific time trends to account for any systematic changes in 
enrolment onto TTP over time by field of study (𝛾(𝛿𝑓 ∗ 𝑡)). Therefore our main specification 
is: 
Yifhdt = β0 + β1Uf,t−1 + β2Xifhdt + β3Vd,t−1 + β4Ud,t−4 + θt
′ + σ𝑑 + μℎ +  δf
+  𝛾(𝛿𝑓 ∗ 𝑡) +  ϵifhdt 
 
(2) 
Our identification strategy takes advantage of the fact that students in England enrol onto a 
specific undergraduate programme at the age of 18, and there is very little scope for them to 
change programmes/institutions and dropout rates are low. As the time of graduation, and 
field of study, is largely fixed, students are unable to react to changes in labour market 
conditions. Therefore, we argue that the subject specific unemployment rate, at the time of 
graduation, is plausibly exogenous and β1represents the causal effect of labour market 
conditions on enrolment onto a TTP. 
We will also consider the interaction of Uf,t−1 with dummies including the graduate’s sex 
(male), ethnicity (white), degree classification (2:1 or above), university prestige (Russell 
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Group) and socioeconomic status to investigate how periods of high graduate unemployment 
might affect the composition of graduates enrolled onto TTPs. 
We will also use subsample analysis to investigate how the effect differs by degree subject. 
We will do this by restricting our sample to graduates with a specific degree subject and run a 
modified version of equation 2 by dropping our year fixed effects, subject fixed effects and 
subject specific time trends:18 
Yihdt = β0 + β1Ut−1 + β2Xihdt + β3Vd,t−1 + β4Ud,t−4 + σ𝑑 + μℎ +  𝑡 +  ϵihdt 
 
(3) 
Using the subject specific unemployment rate relies on assumptions about graduate mobility. 
Although graduates are highly mobile in England, a region specific graduate unemployment 
rate Ud,t−1 might be more appropriate. Therefore, we modify equation 2) by replacing subject 
fixed effects and subject-specific trends with regional fixed effects and region-specific trends 
(𝛿𝑑 ∗ 𝑡): 
Yifhdt = β0 + β1Ud,t−1 + β2Xifhdt + β3Vd,t−1 + β4Ud,t−4 + θt
′ + σ𝑑 +  μℎ +  δf
+  𝛾(𝛿𝑑 ∗ 𝑡) +  ϵifhdt 
(4) 
Here, the standard errors are clustered at the year-region level and the region of analysis (𝑑) 
is either the home domicile or the region of university, depending on whether we are using 
the university or the home domicile unemployment rate. 
The unemployment rate might be correlated with other factors that might influence the 
decision to go into teaching. Therefore, we will also estimate the effect of teachers relative 
wages, at the regional level, on the probability of enrolling onto a TTP by estimating equation 
                                                          
18 Note that our standard errors for this specification, where we restrict our sample to graduates with a specific degree 
(equation 3) are clustered at the year level to take into account possible correlation between graduates over time. To adjust 
for the relatively small number of clusters, we implement the wild cluster bootstrap procedure as recommended by Cameron 
and Miller (2015). To implement this in stata we use the boottest command using 1,000 reps (Roodman et al., 2019). 
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4 but replacing Ud,t−1with Waged,t−1, which is the difference in the natural log of  teacher 
and non-teacher wages: 
Yifhdt = β0 + β1Waged,t−1 + β2Xifhdt + β3Vd,t−1 + β4Ud,t−4 + θt
′ + σ𝑑 +  μℎ +  δf
+  𝛾(𝛿𝑑 ∗ 𝑡) +  ϵifhdt 
(5) 
Where β1,our coefficient of interest, denotes the effect of a one percentage point increase in 
teachers relative wages. 
2.4 Data 
The dataset we use in this paper comes from the Destination of Leavers from Higher 
Education (DLHE). The DLHE is a survey that is carried out on the whole population of 
graduates from all UK Higher Education Institutions six months after graduation. The survey 
is carried out by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) and the data is linked to 
data from the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). The graduation years 
we use are from 2002/03 to 2011/12.19  
We remove all the respondents who graduated in veterinary sciences as: i) none of our 
respondents with a veterinary degree enrolled onto teacher training programmes, and ii) we 
do not have any variation in the unemployment rate at the time of graduation to exploit. We 
also drop graduates from the following subjects, as we do not have significant variation in 
TTP enrolment over time: Medicine, Agriculture, Architecture, Engineering, Law, Business 
and Communication.20 This leaves us with a sample of 741,815 graduates from 10 subjects. 
Most of these graduates are female (58%), white (86%) and state school educated (86%). In 
terms of academic achievement 95% achieved at least a 2:2 which is the minimum 
                                                          
19 DLHE has a non-response rate of about 19% so our data represents a sample of labour market outcomes for roughly 81% 
of all university graduates from 2002/02 to 2011/12. 
20 We drop those who study Medicine, Agriculture, Architecture, Engineering, Law, Business and Communication as only 
16, 4, 2, 21, 16, 56 and 10 individual graduates go into TTPs respectively. 
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requirement to teach. Specifically, 14% of the graduates achieved a 1st class degree, 54% 
achieved a 2:1 and 27% achieved a 2:2. This is largely similar to the distribution of 
achievement in the whole population such that we are confident of the external validity of our 
results. 21 
Most of our graduates obtained a degree in Arts (20%), Biological Sciences (17%), Social 
Studies (15%), Languages (12%), History and Philosophy (10%) and Physical Sciences (8%).  
The sample characteristics are presented in Table 1.  
2.4.1 Unemployment Rate by Field of Study 
We use the 2003-2012 Labour Force Survey (LFS) to calculate the unemployment rate by 
field of study at the year of graduation (U, t-1). Using the LFS, we restrict our sample to the 
respondents who are between 21 and 65 and have a university degree. Using this sample, we 
compute the unemployment rate by field of study.22 Table 2 shows that the average 
unemployment rate is just over 3%, peaking at 4% in 2010. 
The field of study with the highest average unemployment rate is Arts (4%) and the lowest is 
Education (just under 1%). Social studies have the least variation in the unemployment rate 
over time while mathematical sciences have the largest variation (Table 2 in the appendix 
shows the variation in the unemployment rate by field of study).  
 
 
                                                          
21 In 2012/13, for example, 19% achieved a 1st, 51% a 2:1 and 25% a 2:2 according to HESA’s January 2018 Higher 
Education Student Statistics. 
22 We compute the unemployment rate by dividing the quantity who are unemployed by the sum of those who are employed 
and unemployed. We restrict our sample to those who are between 21, as that is the typical age of a university graduate, and 
65, which is the retirement age. We use the retirement age and not a younger age to keep the sample size large enough to 
allow us to create a meaningful measure by degree subject. The number of observations we use to calculate the 
unemployment rate is relatively small and could bias our estimates. To minimise this we use the largest available sample 
























Male 315,255 42.5  Biology 127,225 17.2 
Female 426,560 57.5  Physics 62,265 8.4 
    Maths 26,270 3.5 
Ethnicity 
 
    Computer Science 55,015 7.4 
White 635,850 85.7  Social Studies 111,590 15.0 
Black 14,080 1.9  Languages 94,565 12.8 
Asian 57,215 7.7  History/Philosophy  70,750 9.5 
Other 22,370 3.0  Arts  145,120 19.6 
NA 12,300 1.7  Education 43,915 5.9 




      
1st  107,490 14.5  Region 
 
  
2:1 400,515 54.0  London 112,680 15.19 
2:2 198,775 26.8  North East 18,815 2.54 
3rd  30,755 4.15  West Midlands 67,575 9.11 
Unclassified 4,270 0.6  East of England 82,065 11.06 
    South East 143,725 19.37 
Institution    East Midlands 61,625 8.31 
Oxbridge 27,355 3.7  South West 58,040 7.82 
Russell Group 181,015 24.4  Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
64,600 8.71 
    North West 77,830 10.49 
    Missing 54,880 7.4 
 
The frequencies are all rounded to the nearest 5 or 0 as required by the data providers. + We are missing nine respondent’s degree 








Table 2 Unemployment rate by graduation year (2003-2012) 
Year Mean (%) Interquartile 
Range(%)+  
Range (%)++ Std. Dev Skewness+++ 
2003 3.31 0.29 3.28 0.87 0.22 
2004 2.61 0.87 3.26 0.85 -0.53 
2005 2.57 1.40 4.51 0.92 0.39 
2006 2.82 0.52 3.42 0.54 -1.89 
2007 2.35 0.97 3.08 0.65 -0.90 
2008 2.63 0.39 3.65 0.69 -0.62 
2009 3.21 2.24 5.03 1.44 -0.42 
2010 4.04 4.15 7.21 1.93 0.45 
2011 3.05 0.45 5.22 0.75 -0.44 
2012 3.33 2.20 3.53 1.07 -0.04 
All Year 3.02 0.99 7.20 1.17 0.88 
The unemployment rate is calculated using data from the Labour Force Survey. We calculate it by deviding the quantity of 
graduates who are unemploymed by the quantity of graduates who are employed. + p75-p25++(min-max) +++ Measures the 
degree and direction of asymmetry in a distribution, a symmetric distribution has a skewness of 0. A distribution that is 









2.4.2 Unemployment by Year of Entry 
Using NOMIS, a service provided by the Office for National Statistics, we also add the 
regional claimant count the year prior to university enrolment to control for selection into 
university (𝑈𝑡−4). For graduates whose home address is missing (7%) we use a missing 
dummy and assign them the national average claimant count. The claimant count is a 
measure of the number of people claiming unemployment related benefits. It has a mean of 
2.3% a minimum of 1.2% (South East 2002 and South West 2005) and a maximum of 4.8% 
(North East 2000).  
The argument we make here is that the claimant count at the regional level reflects the labour 
market that young people would have faced when they finished school. As a robustness check 
we also use the LFS to estimate the youth unemployment rate (aged 18-24 and without a 
degree) by region, where we find it has no impact on our results. We do not use a national 
measure as school leavers tend to be less mobile so a national measure would not be 
appropriate.  
2.4.3 Teacher Vacancies 
Graduate enrolment onto TTPs might be sensitive to the fluctuations in the demand for 
teachers at the regional level. But it is not clear the effect fluctuations in demand will have on 
the decision to teach. An increase in teacher demand could be a signal of more favourable job 
opportunities, but it could also be perceived as a signal of stress or burnout among teachers 
(high dropout rate of existing teachers) possibly deterring graduates from the profession. We 
use a novel approach to control for this by using teacher vacancies at the regional level. To do 
this we use data from the School Workforce Census (SWC) on the quantity of advertised 
teacher vacancies, the quantity of temporary filled vacancies (a post filled by someone who is 
on a contract for one term or less) and the quantity of teachers currently in posts. The SWC is 
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a census that is completed annually by every school in England in November.23 We create our 
teacher vacancies indicator by dividing the total teacher vacancies (the sum of the quantity of 
advertised teacher vacancies and the quantity of temporary filled vacancies) by the total 
quantity of teachers in current posts. We compute this measure at both the regional and 
national level. Specifically every graduate has a regional and national vacancy rate from the 
November of the year when they would have applied to teacher training (𝑡 − 1). The highest 
vacancy rates are in London (2.1% in 2003), while the lowest rates are in the South West 
(between 0.2% and 0.4%).  
2.4.4 Socioeconomic Status Measures 
The HESA data set has two measures of the graduate’s socioeconomic classification prior to 
university enrolment: parent’s occupation and a low participation neighbourhood marker 
(LPN). The LPN is a 0/1 dummy which indicates that the graduate comes from an area where 
university participation rates are less than two-thirds of the national average.24 
To complete our SES indicators we add geographical indices of deprivation (IMD). The IMD 
is a relative measure of deprivation constructed by combining the following seven weighted 
domains of deprivation: Income, Employment, Education, Health, Crime, Barriers to Housing 
and Living Environment. The IMD comes at the Lower-layer Super Output Area (LSOA) 
level while the HESA data comes at the larger local authority district (LAD) level. Therefore, 
we construct our measure by averaging the IMD across all the LSOAs within each LAD.25 
For our analysis we split the IMD ranks into approximate quartiles by the year of graduation. 
                                                          
23 Although we are aware that this measure is highly dependent on the date of the survey, we feel that this is an adequate 
measure for teacher demand. Note that for the HESA respondents whose region we are missing, we assigned them the 
national average vacancy rate.   
24 Neighbourhoods in the LPM are sorted into 160 clusters based on their post code. 
25 The LSOA is a geographical area that has a minimum population of 1000 and a mean of 1500. There is an LSOA for each 
postcode in England. As the measure of deprivation chance over time we use 2000 for the 2000-03 cohort entry years, we 




Therefore, IMD is an ordinal variable where Rank 1 represents the least deprived quantile of 
graduates and rank 4 represents the most deprived.26  
2.4.5 Relative Wages 
Using the Labour Force Survey, we calculate teacher and non-teacher wages for each 
Government Office Region in England by year (2003-2012).27 We use two different methods 
to identify non-teachers wages. First we use the average non-teaching graduate’s earnings, in 
a given year for a given region. Using this measure teachers’ relative wages can be broadly 
split into three categories, these are teachers who earn: i) significantly less than the average 
graduate (East of England, London and South East) ii) a fairly similar amount to the average 
graduate (South West, East Midlands, North West and West Midlands) iii) more than the 
average graduate (North East and Yorkshire and the Humber).  
Entry into teaching is a choice and therefore using graduates’ salaries to estimate non-
teachers’ earnings might not reflect how much teachers would be able to earn in an 
alternative profession. In our second method to identify non-teachers’ wages we follow 
Chevalier and Dolton (2004) and Fullard (2019b) and use propensity score matching (PSM) 
to estimate non-teachers’ wages controlling for differences in observable characteristics.28 
Using this measure of teachers’ relative wages teachers earn significantly more than the 
average non-teacher in every region apart from the: East Midlands, East of England, London 
and the South East. 
In the DLHE, we assign each graduate a teacher and non-teacher wage based on i) the year 
they graduated and ii) the region of domicile or the region of the university they graduated 
                                                          
26 We do not have exactly 25% in each group due to the clumping of IMD scores in the distribution.  
27 To calculate these wages, we restrict our sample to those who have a university degree, are working full time, are of 
working age and earn more than the national minimum wage. Teachers are identified as individuals who are working as a 
secondary or primary school teacher while non-teachers are graduates who are in an occupation other than teaching. We use 
non-teaching graduates as our comparison group because teachers in England are legally required to have a university degree 
therefore all occupations available to university graduates are, in principle, also available to teachers. 
28 The controls we use include, age, age squared, sex, ethnicity, degree subject and degree classification. 
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from. For example, for an individual who graduated in 2010 from the North West we assign 
them a teaching wage of £700 p/w (£36,400 p/a), a non-teaching wage of £666 p/w (£34,532 
p/a), which is estimated using our first method and a non-teaching wage of £610 p/w 
(£32,720 p/a), estimated using our second method. We can therefore estimate teachers’ 
relative wages at the regional level using either of our measures of non-teachers’ wages by 
taking the difference in the natural logs (ln(Teacher Wage) – ln(Non-teacher Wage)).  
As policymakers have recently made the commitment to increase teachers’ initial wages to 
£30k (per year) by 2022 with the expressed purpose of recruiting the best and brightest 
graduates into teaching understanding the relationship between relative wages and the supply 














Table 3. Descriptive Statistics. The proportion of Graduates in our Sample of those who enrolled onto Initial 
Teacher Training Programs (TTP) and those who did not by observable characteristics. 
Variable On TTP 
 
Not on TTP 
 
 Variable On TTP 
 




   Subject 
 
  
Male 12.0 43.9  Biology 6.5 17.7 
Female 88.1 56.1  Physics 0.9 8.7 
    Maths 2.1 3.6 
Ethnicity    Computer Science 1.1 7.7 
White 95.0 85.3  Social Studies 1.3 15.7 
Black 0.5 2.0  Languages 6.3 13.1 
Asian 2.8 7.9  History/Philosophy  2.4 9.9 
Other 1.2 3.1  Arts  3.8 20.3 
NA 0.5 1.7  Education 74.6 2.7 
    Combined 1.0 0.7 




   IMD 
 
  
1st  7.7 14.8  Score 21.4 20.7 
2:1 51.6 54.1  Rank 1  
(least Deprived) 
20.3 24.1 
2:2 37.2 26.3  Rank 2 24.0Y 23.7 
Institution     Rank 3 29.7 31.7 
Oxbridge 0.4 3.8  Rank 4 
(most Deprived) 
24.0 22.4 
Russell Group 1.8 25.5     
Non Russell 
Group 





96.1 85.8     
These differences are all statistically significant at the 1% level apart from those that are marked with a Y, which are not statistically 
significant. +We are missing nine respondent’s degree classifications. We include them in our unclassified group (n=4377). Our results do 
not change if we do, or do not, include them. 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics of graduates going into Initial Teacher Training Programmes 
In our sample, 4.5% (33,400) of our graduates enrol onto TTPs. The characteristics of those 
who enrolled onto TTPs are shown in table 3, along with a comparison of the graduates who 
did not enrol.  Female (88% vs 56%), white (95% vs 85%) and state school educated (96% vs 
86%) graduates are over-represented among those enrolling onto TTPs. They also tend to 
have worse degree classifications (52% vs 54% with a 2:1, 37% vs 26% with a 2:2 and 8% vs 
15% with a 1st), and come from less prestigious institutions relative to the overall population 
of graduate (0.4% vs 4% from Oxbridge and 1.8% vs 26% from Russell Group). We also find 
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that graduates who enrol onto TTPs have a UCAS tariff that is, on average, 50 points lower, 
significant at the 1% level.29,30 Most of the graduates who enrol onto TTPs have a Degree in 
Education (75% vs 3%) followed by Biology (7% vs 18%), Languages (6% vs 13%) and Arts 
(4% vs 20%). The smallest group is physics (1% vs 9%). While there are also modest 
differences in representation on TTPs among the least deprived (20% vs 24%) and among the 
most deprived (24% vs 22%). Furthermore over 12% (vs 8%) are from low participation 
neighbourhoods (LPN). 
Table 4 shows that the quantity of graduates enrolling onto TTPs varies both by year and 
observable characteristics. Column 1 shows that enrolment is highest between 2009 and 2011 
while the remaining columns report the ratio of those enrolled onto TTPs against those who 
are not, by characteristics and by graduation year.31 For example, column 3 shows that among 
2003 graduates, 51% of those on TTPs have a 2:1 degree, and 51% of those not on a TTP, so 
the ratio is 1.00. Between 2004 and 2009 the proportion with a 2:1 degree was lower among 
those on TTPs than those who were not, but by 2012 it was 6% higher. Column 2 shows that 
first class degrees were always under-represented among those on TTPs, but catching up fast 
between 2009 and 2012. 
 
                                                          
29 The UCAS Tariff is an aggregate indicator of the student’s pre-university attainment. Specifically it assigns each student a 
numerical score based on the grades and qualifications achieved. Its purpose it to make achievements in different 
qualifications directly comparable. A higher UCAS Tariff indicates higher attainment. 
30 A 50 point difference in UCAS tariff is roughly similar to the difference between a student achieving A*A*A in their A-
levels and someone achieving BBC. 
31 (Percentage of graduates on a TTP who have degree classification x)/(Percentage of gradates not on a TTP who have 
degree classification x). A figure closer to 1 means that the two groups have a more similar distribution of x, a figure less 
than a means that the proportion of graduates with x  is higher in the non-TTP group while a figure greater than one indicates 
that the proportion in the TTP group with x is higher than the non-TTP group. We use odds ratios to account for the fact that 





Table 4 Equality of means across time. The figures presented are ratios (the percentage of TTP with each category/the % of non TTP) by a Graduates degree Classification, Sex and SES. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 












































White Black Asian 
2003 3,585 
(5.44%) 
0.43 1.00 Y 1.30 0.60 0.29 0.88 0.99 1.11 1.02 Y 1.37 1.11 0.23 0.32 
2004 2,775 
(4.33%) 
0.37 0.95 1.41 0.87Y 0.24 0.86 1.03 Y 1.09 1.03 Y 1.41 1.12 0.26 0.24 
2005 2,780 
(4.32%) 
0.40 0.86 1.54 1.00 Y 0.28 0.85 0.91 1.13 1.13 1.55 1.13 0.26 0.27 
2006 2,755 
 (4.10 %) 
0.40 0.89 1.53 0.87 Y 0.25 0.80 1.03 Y 1.08 1.10 1.49 1.11 0.34 0.28 
2007 3,230 
 (4.62 %) 
0.40 0.90 1.51 0.95 Y 0.26 0.84 1.00 Y 1.10 1.08 1.41 1.10 0.28 0.37 
2008 3,540 
(4.65%) 
0.44 0.91 1.54 0.82 0.27 0.79 0.99 Y 1.13 1.12 1.52 1.11 0.22 0.37 
2009 3,830 
(4.94%) 
0.48 0.95 1.46 0.89 Y 0.26 0.87 0.99 Y 1.11 1.06 1.46 1.10 0.30 0.47 
2010 3,865 
(4.78%) 
0.51 0.98 Y 1.41 0.77 0.30 0.84 1.03 Y 1.08 1.06 1.32 1.12 0.25 0.37 
2011 3,735 
(4.35%) 
0.70 1.02 Y 1.27 0.43 0.26 0.87 1.02 Y 1.08 1.03 Y 1.28 1.11 0.25 0.39 
2012 3,310 
(3.68%) 
0.84 1.06 1.10 0.33 0.29 0.79 1.14 1.03 1.06 1.34 1.12 0.19 0.38 
The closer the ratio is to 1 the more similar the means are. Figures under 1 mean that they are underrepresented on TTP while figures over 1 mean they are overrepresented on TTP. All of the 
mean differences between the TTP and non TTP groups are statistically significant unless marked with a Y which means there is no statistically significant difference between TTP and non 





 Column 4 shows that lower second-class degrees are always over-represented among those 
on TTPs, but the difference is falling significantly from 2010 to 2012. We also observe that 
men and the least deprived graduates are consistently under-represented (column 6 and 9) 
while white graduates are consistently over-represented (table 4 column 12). 
In our data, we observe a higher proportion of Black graduates graduating year on year, yet, 
from 2007, we observe a general decline in the proportion of black graduates enrolling onto 
teacher training (table 4 column 13). While Asians’ participation rates remain relatively 
consistent, the proportion on TTPs increases significantly over time (column 14).  
2.5.2 Bad Economy, More Teachers? 
Estimates of the effect of graduating during a period of high unemployment based on the 
different models discussed in section (3) are presented in Table 5. Column 1 shows our first 
model (equation 1), and we build from this by adding our graduate specific covariates 
(column 2) and other controls that might affect the cohort composition and the decision to go 
into teaching (column 3) until we reach our preferred specification in column 4 (equation 2). 
In all of these specifications we find that unemployment has no effect on the probability of 








Table 5. The effect of the unemployment rate, at time of graduation, on the probability of 
enrolling onto a teacher training program. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Unemployment 
Rate 0-100 
-0.00056 -0.0006 -0.00061 -0.00166 
(-0.00096) (-0.00095) (-0.00095) (-0.00111) 
     
Year FE X X X X 
Region FE X X X X 
Institution FE X X X X 
Subject FE X X X X 
Individual 
Controls 
 X X X 
Claimant Count   X X 
Vacancy Rate   X X 
Subject TT’s    X 
     
Constant 0.0452** 0.0495** 0.0551*** 0.0258 
 (-0.0204) (-0.0206) (-0.0204) (-0.0207) 
     
N 741815 741815 741815 741815 
     
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the subject specific 
unemployment rate derived from the Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. 
Note: Individual controls include: sex, ethnicity, degree classification and IMD rank. Claimant count is the 
unemployment rate, measured by the claimant count, the year prior to university enrolment. Vacancy Rate is 
the number of teaching vacancies, at year of graduation, as a proportion of total teachers (by region). Robust 
standard errors are clustered at the degree subject year level and reported in brackets. * p<0.10 , ** p<0.05, *** 












Table 6 Lag and lead unemployment rate on the probability of enrolling onto a teacher training program. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Year before graduation 
 
Year of graduation 
 
Year after graduation 
 
Unemployme
nt Rate 0-100 
0.00111 0.00123 -0.0009 -0.00083 -0.00115 -0.00102 
(-0.00087) (-0.00093) (-0.00094) (-0.00075) (-0.00086) (-0.00082) 
       
Year FE X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X 
Institution FE X X X X X X 
Subject FE X X X X X X 
Subject TT  X  X  X 
       
Constant -0.0241 -0.0277 -0.0163 -0.0203 -0.0154 -0.0198 
 (-0.0155) (-0.0194) (-0.0149) (-0.019) (-0.0144) (-0.019) 
       
N 586027 586027 586027 586027 586027 586027 
       
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the subject specific unemployment rate derived from the 
Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. Columns 1 and 2 use the unemployment rate the year prior to 
graduation (i.e. the 2008 graduates are assigned the 2007 subject specific unemployment rate), columns 3-4 use the unemployment rate 
of the year of graduation and columns 5-6 use the unemployment rate the year after graduation. 
Note: The sample size is reduced because we drop the 2003 and 2012 graduates as we cannot assign them a lagged and lead 
unemployment rate respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the degree subject year level and reported in brackets. * p<0.10 , 
** p<0.05, *** p< 0.01 
 
The lack of any effect of the unemployment rate might be because the unemployment rate 
measured at the year of graduation might not capture the labour market conditions that 
graduates faced when they decided to apply for teaching. The application round for TTPs for 
a given graduate cohort opens in the October of the year prior to graduation and over half of 
applications have already been submitted by the end of the year. Therefore, it might be more 
appropriate to assign graduates the unemployment rate the year prior to graduation (Uf,t−2). It 
is also possible that the unemployment rate is a lag of labour market conditions and, to get an 
accurate sense of the labour market conditions these graduates face, it might be more 
appropriate to use the unemployment rate the year after graduation (Uf,t+1). 
Columns 1 and 2 (5 and 6) in table 6 report the coefficient using a one year lagged (lead) 
unemployment rate. Similar to our estimates using the unemployment rate from the year of 
graduation (columns 3 and 4) we observe a precisely estimated no effect.  
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Another check we perform is to consider variation at the regional level. Instead of using our 
subject specific unemployment rate, which assumes that all graduates, for a given cohort and 
degree subject, face the same labour market conditions, it might be more appropriate to use a 
regional unemployment rate. Relaxing our assumption about perfect graduate mobility and 
exploiting across regional variation in the regional unemployment rate (home or university) 
we estimate equation 4. 
Columns 1 to 2 and 3 to 4 in table 7 show the effect of a 1pp increase in the graduate 
unemployment rate, at the home and university region respectively, on the probability that a 
graduate will be enrolled onto a TTP.  Across all of these specifications we observe that 
graduating during a period of high unemployment (measured at the regional level) has a very 
small effect on the probability of enrolling onto a TTP and this is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
The prevalence of a statistically insignificant estimate of labour market conditions on the 
probability that a graduate will enrol onto a TTP is not, necessarily, unexpected. This is 
because of capacity constraints. If we had data on application behaviour for this period we 
would expect to see a positive effect, but we only observe enrolment. We will discuss this in 
detail in section 7. Next we consider whether labour market conditions at graduation might 








Table 7 The effect of the regional unemployment rate on TTP enrolment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






-0.00000661 -0.0000332 -0.000376 -0.000367 
(0.000220) (0.000227) (0.000258) (0.000266) 
     
Controls X X X X 
Year FE X X X X 
Region FE X X X X 
Institution  FE X X X X 
Subject FE X X X X 
Region TT  X  X 
     
Constant  0.0513*** 0.0503*** 0.0703*** 0.0694*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0191) (0.0190) 
     
N 686937 686937 734511 734511 
     
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.208) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the regional unemployment rate derived 
from the Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. 
 
Note:  Our controls are: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies and IMD rank. Specification 1 and 2 
using the unemployment rate based on the graduatesR. Specifications 3 and 4 use the unemployment rate based on the 
region of the university they attended. Robust standard errors are clustered at the year region level, where the region 
differs depending on if we are using the university or home unemployment rate and reported in brackets. * p<0.10 , ** 














Table 8 Heterogeneity analysis by observable characteristics 





















0.0101*** -0.0142*** 0.00229 0.00232** -0.00724** 0.0169*** 
(0.00352) (0.00490) (0.00144) (0.00114) (0.00280) (0.00486) 
      
       
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.00659*** 0.0103*** -0.00185 -0.00191 0.00333* -0.00522*** 
(0.00242) (0.00373) (0.00115) (0.00118) (0.00172) (0.00187) 
       
       
Constant  0.0374* -0.0263 0.0304 0.0309 0.00852 0.0503** 
 (0.0216) (0.0255) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0217) (0.0209) 
           
N 741815 741815 741815 741815 741815 741815 
       
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the subject specific unemployment rate derived from the 
Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. 
 
Note:  Our regression include year fixed effects, region fixed effects, institution fixed effects, subject fixed effects and subject degree 
time trend. In addition we control for: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies and IMD rank. Specification 1 and 2 
interacts male and white dummies with the unemployment rate. Specifications 3 and 4 interact a low participation dummy (indicates if 
the graduates is from a region where university participation is less than two thirds of the national average) and a low SES dummy 
(defined as been from a home whose parents are either in a semi-routine, routine occupation or long term unemployed). Specifications 
5 and 6 interact Degree 2:1 or above and Russell Group dummies with the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered at 













2.5.3 Bad Economy, More Diverse Teachers? 
Now we turn to possible heterogeneity in the effect of the unemployment rate at graduation 
on enrolment behaviour by interacting indicators for sex (table 8 column 1) and ethnicity 
(column 2) with the subject specific unemployment rate in equation 2. These results show 
that the unemployment rate impacts enrolment behaviour differently according to these 
individual characteristics. Specifically an increase in the unemployment rate increases the 
probability that a male graduate will enrol onto a TTP by 1pp, relative to female graduates, 
while it decreases the probability that a white graduate will enrol by 1.4pp, relative to non-
white graduates.32  
Similar to many western countries, the school workforce is fairly homogeneous (female and 
white) and struggles to attract male graduates and graduates from ethnic minority 
backgrounds into the profession. An increase in the unemployment rate makes teaching more 
appealing to everyone. In response to this boost in interest, TTP providers are unable to 
recruit additional graduates, due to capacity constraints, but a more diverse pool of applicants 
results in a more diverse cohort of trainee teachers. 
We are also interested in whether the effect differs by a graduate’s socioeconomic status 
measured by our indicator for higher education participation in the area (column 3) or 
parental occupation (column 4).33 These results show that graduates from less affluent 
backgrounds differ in their enrolment behaviour in response to an increase in the 
unemployment rate relative to their more affluent peers. Although the magnitude of the effect 
is fairly small, an increases in the unemployment rate increases the probability that a graduate 
from a low SES household will enrol by 0.2pp (column 4), relative to their more affluent 
                                                          
32 Note that a relatively small number of non-white graduates (1.57%) go into teaching so, while the coefficient is positive, it 
is difficult to get a good idea of the effect size. 
33 The parent occupation dummy indicates whether graduates come from a household where their parents are employed in 
either a semi-routine or routine occupation or they are long term unemployed. 
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peers. Therefore an increase in the unemployment rate is unlikely to have a transformative 
effect on the SES composition of trainee teachers. 
2.5.4 Bad Economy, Better Teachers? 
Next we investigate whether the effect on the composition of graduates enrolled onto TTPs is 
likely to be welfare improving for pupils. Empirical evidence shows that low quality teachers 
negatively affect pupils to the same, or greater, extent that high quality teachers improve 
pupil outcomes. Therefore, any impact on the supply of teachers (through retention and/or 
recruitment) is only welfare improving for students if it, on average, improves teacher quality 
(Hanushek et al., 2015, Hanushek and Woessmann 2011). 
Unlike Nagler et al., (2015), who uses pupil performance to create a value-added measure of 
teacher quality, we are unable to directly measure the quality of teachers. But we can use a 
graduate’s degree classification and the selectivity of the university they attended as a proxy. 
As policymakers are trying to recruit more graduates: i) from more prestigious institutions ii) 
with higher degree classifications into teaching we will assume that an increase (decrease) in 
graduate quality measured by i) and/or ii) is welfare improving (decreasing). Although, with 
the exception of experience, it is difficult to identify teacher quality based on observable 
characteristics (Rivkin et al., 2005, Wiswall 2013)  we feel that this assumption is reasonable 
due to policymakers current recruitment objectives and the strong relationship between 
teachers’ cognitive skills and student performance (Hanushek et al., 2014). 
Now we turn to possible heterogeneity in the effect by the graduate’s degree classification 
(table 8 column 5) and the prestige of the university they attended (column 6). The 
interactions indicate that an increase in the unemployment rate has a negative effect on the 
probability that a graduate with a 2:1 or above will enrol on a TTP (0.7pp), relative to 
graduates with a 2:2 or below, and has a positive effect on graduates from a Russell Group 
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university (1.69pp), relative to non-Russell Group graduates. These results demonstrate that a 
1pp increase in the unemployment rate decreases the probability that a graduate with a 2:1 or 
above will enrol on a TTP (0.39pp) and increases the probability that a graduate from a 
Russell group university will enrol on a TTP (1.16pp).34  The modest negative effect we 
observe for graduates with a 2:1 or above might be driven by the boost in enrolment from 
graduates from more prestigious universities due to less grade inflation in more prestigious 
institutions.35  
While we are unable to confirm that the compositional effect brings teachers into the 
profession who are more effective at raising pupil test scores, we can confirm that it increases 
the proportion of graduates from more selective universities which is likely to be welfare 
improving for pupils (Ehrenberg and Brewer 1994, Ferguson 1991). Indeed we would expect 
an increase in the pool of potential teachers to improve the quality of enrolees as the TTP 
selection process (assessments, interviews, practical assignments) is intended to select the 
most suitable graduates. 
2.5.5 Bad Economy, More Subject Specialist Teachers? 
The school workforce in England overwhelmingly consists of general teaching professionals 
rather than subject specialists - 75 percent of graduates on a TTP have an undergraduate 
degree in Education. Policymakers struggle to recruit subject specialist teachers, particularly 
those with Physics degrees. Therefore, we would expect a boost in applications for TTPs, 
caused by a tougher graduate labour market, to decrease the probability that a graduate with a 
degree in Education will be enrolled onto a TTP and increase the probability that a subject 
specialist will be enrolled. Specifically, a boost in the number of graduates interested in a 
                                                          
34 Note that few Russell Group graduates go onto TTPs (0.01%) therefore it is difficult to get a good sense of the magnitude 
of the effect size. 
35 Between 2003 and 2012 the proportion of non-Russell group graduates who were awarded a first class degree increased by 
72% (compared to 35% of Russell group). 
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career in teaching from a wide range of academic backgrounds will increase the subject 
diversity of those enrolled onto TTPs.
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Table 9 Heterogeneity by subject 

























           
Unemployment 
rate 
0.00163 0.00226* 0.000149 0.000271 0.00768*** 0.000136 0.00132 0.000225 -0.0358* 0.000225 
(0.00137) (0.00115) (0.00084) (0.00029) (0.00174) (0.0003) (0.00086) (0.0003) (0.0177) (0.00242) 
           
Wild Cluster p-
values 























           
Constant 0.0284*** -2.9E-05 0.0367** 0.0192*** -0.0106** 0.0404*** 0.0190*** 0.0165*** 0.135* 0.0195 
 -0.00735 -0.00293 -0.0124 -0.00387 -0.00351 -0.00556 -0.00285 -0.00382 -0.0714 -0.0124 
           
N 127223 62266 26270 55013 111591 94563 70751 145117 43914 5107 
           
DV mean 0.0171 0.0049 0.027 0.00669 0.0038 0.0222 0.0111 0.0087 0.567 0.064 
(SD) (0.129) (0.070) (0.162) (0.081) (0.062) (0.147) (0.105) (0.093) (0.495) (0.245) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the subject specific unemployment rate derived from the Labour Force Survey and the Office for National 
Statistics data. 
 
Note:  Our regression include Region Fixed Effects, Institution Fixed Effects, Time Trends and our usual controls: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies and IMD rank. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the year level and reported in parenthesis with stars indicating statistical significant at the usual levels: * p<0.10 , ** p<0.05, *** p< 0.01. In square 








This is what table 9 shows. A 1pp increase in the unemployment rate increases the probability 
that a Physics (social studies) graduate will enrol onto a TTP by 0.2pp (and 0.8pp), columns 2 
and 5 respectively, and decreases the probability that an Education graduate will enrol by 
0.36pp (column 9). As outlined above, our standard errors for our subsample analysis 
(equation 3) are clustered at the cohort level. To adjust for the small number of clusters we 
also report the wild bootstrap cluster p-values and 95% confidence intervals (using 1,000 
repetitions). 
Our subsample analysis shows that the unemployment rate has a positive effect on the 
probability that a Physics and Social Studies graduate will enrol onto a TTP. However the 
subject specific specifications might be too noisy to get a good idea of the effect size (i.e. less 
than 1 percent of graduates from these subjects enrol). 
To assess the possible effect size, in table 10, I interact a STEM dummy with the 
unemployment rate. While the effects are initially positive (column 1 shows equation 1) when 
we include subject fixed effects and build up to our preferred specification (column 4 which 
shows equation 3) we find a precisely estimated no effect. The likely cause of this is that 
Physics and Social Science graduates make up a fairly small proportion of STEM and Non-
STEM graduates respectively (the groups we find positive effects for) so when we combine 









Table 10 Heterogeneity analysis by STEM vs Non-STEM  




    
0.0540*** 0.0540*** -0.00147 -0.000450 
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.00187) (0.00128) 
     
Unemployment rate -0.0622*** -0.0622*** -0.000386 -0.00158 
 (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.00105) (0.00122) 
     
Controls X X X X 
Year FE X X X X 
Region FE X X X X 
Institution  FE X X X X 
Time Trend  X X  
Subject FE   X X 
Subject TT    X 
     
Constant  0.233*** 0.233*** 0.0547*** 0.0257 
 (0.0530) (0.0530) (0.0204) (0.0207) 
     
N 741815 741815 741815 741815 
     
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the subject specific unemployment rate derived from the 
Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. 
Note:  Our controls are: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies and IMD rank. Our specifications interact a STEM 
dummy with the unemployment rate. Robust standard errors are clustered at the degree subject year level and reported in brackets. * 















Table 11 Teachers relative wages and enrolment onto a TTP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





(match) 0.00143  -0.000774  
 (0.00561)  (0.00632)  







  (0.00921)  (0.0111) 
     
Controls X X X X 
Year FE X X X X 
Region FE X X X X 
Institution  FE X X X X 
Subject FE X X X X 
Region TT X X X X 
     
Constant  0.0503*** 0.0484*** 0.0679*** 0.0646*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0188) (0.0188) 
     
N 686937 686937 734511 734511 
     
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.208) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the regional relative wages derived from the 
Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. 
 
Note:  Our controls are: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies and IMD rank. Specification 1 and 2 
using the relative wages based on the graduates home region. Specifications 3 and 4 use the wages based on the region of 
the university they attended. Robust standard errors are clustered at the year region level, where the region differs 
depending on if we are using the university or home unemployment rate and reported in brackets. * p<0.10 , ** p<0.05, 














 2.5.6 Higher Wages, More Teachers? 
In table 11, we estimate equation 5 using our matched relative wage (column 1 and 3) and 
graduate relative wage (column 2 and 4) at the home domicile (columns 1 and 2) and 
university (column 3 and 4) regions. As with unemployment rates, relative wages are found 
to have no effect on the probability that a graduate will be enrolled onto a TTP six months 
after graduation.  
Interestingly we do find a positive relationship between teachers’ relative wages at the time 
of university enrolment and the probability of a graduate enrolling onto an undergraduate 
programme in Education (table 12 column 1 and 2). This does show that young people from 
regions where teachers’ relative wages are higher are more likely to enrol on an 
undergraduate programme in Education. However, the effect does disappear when we include 
our region fixed effects and time trends (column 3 and 4) which suggests that the effect is 
driven by some other unobservable, such as regional differences in degree preferences, which 













Table 12 Relative wages on the probability of enrolling onto a degree in education 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Relative Wage 
(grad) at time of 
uni enrolment 
0.139*** 0.0422*** 0.00354 0.00279 
(0.0113) (0.00831) (0.0125) (0.0104) 
    
     
Controls X X X X 
Year FE X X X X 
Institution  FE  X X X 
Region FE   X X 
Region TT    X 
     
Constant  0.151*** 0.0513*** 0.0505*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.00473) (0.00183) (0.00227) (0.00208) 
     
N 547449 547449 547449 547449 
     
DV mean 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 
(SD) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245) (0.245) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the regional relative wages, from the year of 
enrolment, derived from the Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. Our sample size is reduced 
because we only have the relative wages, at year of enrolment, for the 2006-2012 graduate cohorts. 
 
Note:  Our relative wage measure is the difference in the logged teachers and non-teaching graduate’s wages. Our 
dependent variable is a dummy that indicates if a graduate has enrolled onto a undergraduate program in education, or 
not. Our controls are: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies, unemployment rate at time of enrolment 
and IMD rank Robust standard errors are clustered at the year region level, where the region is the home region, and 















Table 13 Linear vs non-linear specification 









(0-100) -0.00157 -0.000629 -0.000367 
 (0.00110) (0.000432) (0.000515) 
    
Male -0.0163*** -0.0216*** -0.0229*** 
 (0.00217) (0.00140) (0.00162) 
    
Degree 1st Class -0.00357 -0.00581** -0.00459 
 (0.00219) (0.00245) (0.00296) 
    
Degree 2:1 0.000470 -0.000482 0.000521 
 (0.00201) (0.00135) (0.00141) 
    
Degree 3rd Class -0.0158*** -0.0139*** -0.0143*** 
 (0.00328) (0.00155) (0.00149) 
    
Controls X X X 
Year FE X X X 
Region FE X X X 
Institution  FE X X X 
Subject FE X X X 
Subject TT X X X 
    
N 741815 741815 741815 
    
DV mean 0.045 0.045 0.045 
(SD) (0.207) (0.207) (0.207) 
Source: DLHE data on the selected sample described in section 4 linked with the subject specific unemployment 
rate derived from the Labour Force Survey and the Office for National Statistics data. 
 
Note:  Our controls are: sex, ethnicity, degree classification, regional vacancies, unemployment rate the year prior 
to enrolment and IMD rank.. For the institution FE’s I use a higher level to ensure that stata does not drop 
observations so that the coefficients are comparable. The Russell Group institutions are split into quintiles by size 
and non-Russell group institutions are split into twenty categories by size. Robust standard errors are clustered at 











2.6 Robustness Check 
For our main model we decide to use a linear specification. However, a non-linear model 
might be more appropriate in our setting as only a small proportion of our sample enrol onto 
TTPs. In Table 13 we compare the effect of a 1pp increase in the unemployment rate, and a 
selection of covariates, on the probability of enrolling onto a TTP using linear (column 1) and 
non-linear specifications (column 2 probit and 3 logit). 
These estimates show that when we use our preferred model (equation 2) we find that 
graduating during a period of decreased labour demand has no effect on the probability of 
going into a TTP across our specifications. Therefore we are confident that our estimates are 
not driven by our decision to use a linear specification. Looking at our other covariates we 
observe that male graduates are less likely to go into teaching as are those with a 3rd class 
degree.36  
2.7 Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper we use the variation in the unemployment rate at time of graduation to 
investigate the effect that labour market conditions have on enrolment onto Initial Teacher 
Training Programmes (TTPs) for 10 graduate cohorts (2002/03-2011/12) in England. 
Our main result is that enrolment on a TTP does not respond to periods of low labour 
demand. While it is almost certainly true these periods do boost the number of graduates 
interested in teaching for instance, the Covid-19 induced recession increased the number of 
applicants to teacher training programmes for the 2019/20 round by 65% (see Figure A1 in 
the appendix), we found no impact on enrolment, and we suspect that this is due to capacity 
                                                          
36 Note that the institution fixed effects we use in this section is at a higher level to ensure that none of our dummies 
perfectly predict failure and are therefore dropped from our regression. The institution fixed effects in this specification are 
grouped using the following: Russell Group institutions are split into quintiles by size and non-Russell group institutions are 





constraints.37 Each year roughly half of applications are not placed on a TTP programme. The 
reason so many are rejected is because, for each trainee teacher, providers must secure school 
based placements - often two twelve week placements as well as multiple shorter placements. 
Sourcing placements can be tricky as many schools are reluctant to take on trainee teachers, 
as it is costly to them, and providers have a limited number of schools they can place students 
as all placements must be in a similar geographical region to the TTP provider. 38,39  
In a wider context, these results indicate that any boost in the relative attractiveness of 
teaching, in terms of earnings, will only increase the supply of teachers as long as there is 
capacity in the system to accommodate these applicants. This means that any boost in the 
number of graduates interested in going into teaching will only impact teacher supply if it 
happens to coincide with a period of prolonged shortages (such as policymakers failure to 
meet recruitment targets between 2013 and 2019). But even then, any increase in supply, due 
to a recession, for example, will be mitigated by the reduction in attrition (teacher attrition is 
also pro-cyclical). If policymakers want to take advantage of any boost in applications they 
need to ensure that there are enough schools willing to place these trainees, they could do this 
by providing schools with incentives to take trainee teachers. 
Our heterogeneity analysis suggests that an increase in the graduate unemployment rate has a 
positive effect on the diversity of trainee teachers. In a general sense, this is beneficial as 
there are numerous advantages to a diverse workforce. Specifically, this may positively 
benefit boys, who underperform at school relative to girls, as there is some evidence of role 
                                                          
37 There is no publically available data on teacher training applications for our time period so we are unable to check. 
38 Many schools are unwilling to take on trainee teachers because it is costly to the school: i) trainee teachers are paired with 
a mentor (a senior teacher) who is required to go through additional training ii) trainee teachers require additional support 
and mentoring for the duration of their placement which increases the workload of existing teachers iii)  teacher quality 
(measured by the ability to improve student outcomes) increases with experience therefore many schools are unwilling to 
take on trainee teachers due to the potentially negative impact it might have on their academic rankings. 
39 Moreover, the ability for providers to find school placements tends to become more difficult during periods of high 
unemployment. Attrition from teaching is procyclical, when there are fewer employment opportunities teachers are less 





model effects - male students performing better with male teachers - in England (Hermann 
2017).40  
In addition, our heterogeneity analysis raises questions about whether making teaching more 
attractive (paying more) is welfare improving for students in England. Our results show a 
positive effect for subject specialist teachers (Physics) and Russell Group graduates but we 
also find a negative effect for graduates with a 2:1 or above. Further research is needed to 
establish if the compositional effect we observe is welfare improving for students. This is 
particularly important in our setting where existing research suggests that some of the 
methods used to identify the quality of potential teachers, such as the professional skills test, 
are largely uncorrelated with the ability to improve student outcomes.  Therefore a project 
looking at the effectiveness of teachers in England using a new dataset seems like a 
promising topic of future research. 
In this paper we test the hypothesis that graduates enrol into Teacher Training during periods 
of low economic activity because the demand for teachers is largely unrelated to economic 
conditions. As existing evidence shows that the supply of teachers and other public sector 
professions, such as nurses, is responsive to economic conditions we are confident that this is 
a plausible mechanism (Konetzka et al., 2018, Li et al., 2019). However, in our case, we are 
looking at enrolment into Teacher Training – a form of postgraduate study. It is also plausible 
that during periods of low labour demand graduates might enrol into any form of education, 
not just teacher training, to avoid becoming unemployed. 
We do not have data on applications to teacher training, or any other postgraduate 
qualifications, so we cannot distinguish between these two mechanisms. However we do 
                                                          
40 In the USA Dee (2007) finds that same-gender teachers significant improves the achievement of both boys and girls. 
Further research needs to be done to be done to estimate the welfare effects from an increase in gender diversity for teachers 
in England as it is possible that the positive effects for having more male teachers (for male students) could be offset by the 





control for teacher demand in our regressions and find a persistent negative, albeit small, 
statistically significant effect which suggests that the demand for teachers does influence the 
graduate’s decision to enrol. Further research is needed to investigate how the change in 
demand for teacher training, during periods of low economic activity, compares to the change 
in demand for other postgraduate qualifications.  
Our data does not allow us to identify attrition rates, given that existing evidence suggests 
that those who graduate during a recession have higher occupational mobility (more likely to 
switch jobs earlier) future research is needed to determine if recessions have a lasting impact 
on the supply of teachers (Shvartsman 2018, van den Berge and Brouwers 2017). 
Finally, our data does not allow us to identify which teacher training route, or course, 
graduates enrol onto. As there has been a significant expansion in salaried training routes 
over the last few years, it would be interesting to know if the increase in the cost associated 
with the traditional training route (PGCE) has influenced either the decision to enrol, or 






                                                          
41 As far as we are aware Fullard (2019a) and Castro-Zarzur et al., (2019) are the only paper that investigates the effect of 
tuition fees on teacher supply. The former is in our setting and paper finds that the increase in tuition fees has a negative 
effect on the probability that a graduate will enrol, where the effect is significantly stronger for male graduates. But the data 






Relative Wages and Pupil Performance, evidence from 
TIMSS 
3.1 Introduction 
Do teachers’ relative wages make a difference to pupil outcomes? This is an important policy 
question in general, as it is widely established that teachers are the most important school 
input in the education production function (Chetty et al., 2011, Hanushek 2011a, b, Hanushek 
et al., 2015, Rivkin et al., 2005). But it is specifically important in the English setting, where 
the school workforce has faced significant challenges from a decline in quantity (England has 
faced significant teacher shortages almost continually since the 1940s (Dolton et al., 2003)), 
to a decline in quality (teachers today are more likely to have lower levels of prior attainment 
compared to non-teaching graduates (Chevalier and Dolton 2004)). 
The literature suggests that there several reasons why teachers’ wages might influence pupil 
outcomes. The first is through occupation choice. When teachers’ wages improve, so does the 
quality of individuals who enter teaching. As teacher quality is the main determinant of 
school quality (Hanushek 2004), a change in the pecuniary benefits of teaching could impact 
pupil outcomes through this channel. 
Existing evidence suggests that higher salaries improve pupil outcomes by attracting higher 
quality teachers into the profession. Using a rich administrative dataset linked to pupil test 
scores Nagler et al., (2015) found that teachers in Florida who joined the profession during a 
recession (when teaching was relatively more attractive than alternative occupations) were 





and Quintini (2002) who found that the decline in the relative pay of public sector workers in 
the 1970s and 1980s led to a decline in the quality of men, measured by prior levels of 
academic attainment, entering teaching.  
The second strand of the literature investigates whether wages can be used to motivate 
existing teachers to work harder, or more productively, in a way that meaningfully affects 
pupil outcomes. Labour economists have long theorized about how wages can affect labour 
productivity using efficiency wage models e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An example of 
how this could occur is through reduced shirking. Effort is costly to the teacher and difficult 
to monitor, therefore teachers may decide to shirk. But when teachers’ wages increase, the 
outside option becomes less attractive, and the cost of shirking increases. Another possibility 
is that higher relative wages might improve labour productivity by decreasing the likelihood 
that an employee has a second job – allowing them to focus on their main job. There is 
evidence that higher wages decrease the instances of teachers holding a second jobs in 
Indonesia (De Ree et al., 2015). However, this is unlikely to be a mechanism in our setting as 
only 6% of Secondary School and 3% of Primary School teachers have second jobs according 
to the 2019 Labour Force Survey (LFS).42 
A final mechanism is that workers respond to an increase in relative wages by improving 
their productivity due to a fall in perceptions of inequity (Akerlof 1982). According to this 
hypothesis, when workers feel they are more valued, through a higher relative wage, they 
work harder. There is suggestive empirical evidence that concerns about fairness and equity 
do influence effort, see Fehr et al., (2009) for a review of this literature. Therefore, teachers’ 
                                                          
42 However, using the LFS we are unable to identify if these second jobs are during term time, or not. Given that teachers, 
during term time, typically work a 52hr week and are 12% more likely to be dissatisfied with their working hours, compared 
to the average graduate, it is most likely that the majority of these second jobs are taken out of term time and, therefore, do 





higher relative wages could drive the productivity of teachers, and thus pupil outcomes, 
through the mechanism of feeling more valued.  
Theoretical and qualitative studies suggest that salary increases are an important mechanism 
for motivating and encouraging teachers to work harder (Hanushek et al., 1999, Webb and 
Valencia 2005). However, other empirical evidence suggests that an unconditional salary 
increase has no effect on pupils’ performance. Most famously De Ree et al., (2015), using 
data from a randomized experiment in Indonesia, found that doubling teachers’ pay had no 
meaningful effect on students’ learning, although it did reduce the likelihood of a teacher 
holding a second job and improved job satisfaction. Although there is some evidence in the 
UK that pupils perform better when a teacher’s outside option is lower (Britton and Propper 
2016), the majority of the literature finds no correlation between changes in teachers’ salaries 
and student outcomes  (Hanushek 1986).  While the existing evidence suggests that an 
unconditional pay rise does not impact pupil performance, there is strong evidence that 
teachers respond positively to performance-related pay in a variety of settings around the 
world (Atkinson et al., 2009, Kingdon and Teal 2007, Loyalka et al., 2019, Woessmann 2011, 
Zhang et al., 2019). 
An important challenge in all these studies is identifying what teachers’ relative wages 
actually are. In this paper, we use twenty seven years of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to 
identify teachers’ relative wages using a novel method of estimating teachers’ outside option, 
which takes into account differences in job security, and that entry into teaching is a choice. 
In doing this we demonstrate that, when we account for non-random selection and differences 
in job security, teachers’ salaries compare favourably to their outside option. One of the main 
contributions of this paper is that we demonstrate that failing to account for the relative job 
security of teaching underestimates teachers’ relative wages. While the effect in our context 





or over)) failing to account for job security could have a large effect on the relative wage 
estimates for teachers in other settings, such as Spain, where they graduate unemployment 
rate tends to be higher. 
Using the relative wage estimates from the LFS we impute these to five waves of the Trends 
in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). Then estimate the effect of relative 
wages on pupils’ test scores and enjoyment of learning by regressing pupil outcomes on 
teachers’ predicted relative wages controlling for a rich set of classroom, school and 
household level covariates. The effect on pupils’ test scores is relatively small, with a 10% 
increase in teachers’ salaries leading to a 0.03sd improvement in test scores, which is similar 
to the benefit of an additional hour of weekly tuition (Lavy 2015). We also find that teachers’ 
relative wages lead to an increase in their pupils’ well-being, measured by enjoyment of 
learning. 
We contribute to the literature on teachers’ wages and pupil outcomes in the following ways: 
first we derive a measure of teachers’ relative wages that accounts for differences in job 
security. This is an important contribution as existing evidence shows that job security plays 
an important role in the decision to become a teacher and a failure to include this 
underestimates the returns to teaching (Heinz 2015, Priyadharshini and Robinson-Pant 2003). 
Second we use a rich data set that allows us to estimate the effect on test scores (Mathematics 
and Science) and pupil well-being, measured by enjoyment of learning. The existing 
literature has exclusively focused on the effect of teachers’ wages on test scores and other 
measures of cognitive performance.43 As teachers play an important role in the development 
of a wide range of skills, it is important to understand the role teachers’ wages have on other 
skills developed in school.  
                                                          
43 This is an important finding because empirical evidence from our setting shows that literacy and numeracy skills have a 





The empirical analysis is set in England. This is an important policy setting as the 
government is currently undergoing a wide range of sweeping policy reforms. The most 
prominent of which is the commitment to increasing teachers’ initial wages to £30,000, an 
increase of 24%, to attract the highest-achieving graduates into teaching. While making 
teaching among the highest paid graduate occupations is likely to improve the quality of 
graduates entering the profession it will take time for new teachers to be recruited, trained 
and integrate into the education system. This paper shows that policymakers should expect 
benefits from raising the salaries of existing teachers. This paper is organised as follows; in 
Section 2 we introduce three methods of estimating teachers outside option and consider if 
teachers in England are underpaid, in Section 3 we introduce the data on pupil outcomes and 
the empirical strategy, in Section 4 we present our main results, in Section 5 we present our 
robustness checks and in Section 6 we discuss our results and conclude. 
3.2 Relative Wages  
The majority of the literature that investigates the effects that teachers’ wages have on pupil 
outcomes has exploited differences in teachers’ wages relative to occupations outside of 
teaching. This is because using the changes in teachers’ absolute wage requires us to assume 
that all other factors that affect behaviour, such as wages in an alternative occupation, are 
held constant (Sharir and Weiss 1974). In many settings this assumption does not hold, 
therefore, many papers that exploit absolute wage differences do not make causal claims. For 
example, using cross-sectional data Dolton and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011) find that 
countries that pay their teachers higher salaries tend to perform better on international tests. 
However, there are settings where using absolute wages is appropriate for causal inference. 
The first is under a large policy intervention where changes in the outside option is likely to 
be inconsequential. Such a setting includes Indonesia when teachers’ salaries were doubled 





setting where non-teachers wages are plausibly similar. As we are not exploiting a significant 
policy intervention and non-teachers’ wages vary in our setting we will exploit variation in 
teachers’ relative wages. 
To investigate whether teachers respond to a change in their relative wage in a way that 
affects their pupils’ test scores or well-being, we must first estimate their outside option. The 
most common measure of estimating how much teachers would have earned had they not 
gone into teaching is by comparing the earnings of current teachers to the earnings of some 
non-teaching group. Traditionally, the comparison group used was workers in non-manual 
occupations (Nickell and Quintini 2002). Although this data is both easily accessible and 
makes sense in a historic context, these groups are sufficiently different, such that any 
difference in earnings is likely to be due to differences in workers’ characteristics. For this 
reason, using non-manual occupations is not a sensible approach in our context as it is 
unlikely to capture teachers’ outside option. A comparison group that makes more sense in 
our context is university graduates. All teachers in England are generally required to have a 
university degree, meaning that all the occupations available to graduates are, in principle, 
also available to teachers (Hermann and Diallo 2017). This will be our first measure of 
teachers’ outside option. This will be referred to as “Non-Teachers’ Wages (Normal)”. 
Using this measure consistently finds that teachers earn less than the average graduate.44 
Although this might explain why policymakers struggle to recruit graduates from the higher 
end of the ability distribution, this does not necessarily mean that teachers could earn more in 
their outside option. This is due to the fact that selection into teaching is non-random even 
                                                          
44 The Department for Educations 2019 report uses this method where they state that the earnings gaps between teachers and 






among those with a university degree. Therefore, the average graduates’ earnings are unlikely 
to reflect the salary that teachers would earn if they left teaching. 
To get around non-random selection, Chevalier et al., (2007) used a matching strategy to 
estimate teachers’ outside option by comparing teachers’ with non-teachers’ who looked 
most like them based on observable characteristics. Using this approach will be our second 
measure of teachers outside option. This will be referred to as “Non-Teachers’ Wages 
(Matched)”. 
Using this strategy, Chevalier et al., (2007) they find no evidence to suggest that teachers are 
underpaid. While these conditional estimates are more likely to reflect teachers outside option 
it fails to account for another significant benefit of teaching – job security. Existing research 
shows that job security plays a significant role in the decision to go into teaching, failing to 
account for this may further underestimate the pecuniary benefits of teaching (Priyadharshini 
and Robinson-Pant 2003). To estimate teachers’ outside option we will modify the matching 
strategy used by Chevalier et al., (2007) to take this into account. This will be our third 
measure of teachers outside option and will be referred to as the “Labour Market Returns to 
Teaching”. 
We recognize that our matched estimates may still be affected by differences in teaching and 
non-teaching graduates’ unobserved characteristics. One way to get around the difference in 
unobservable characteristics is to compare the earnings of current teachers to those of former 
teachers. By doing so, Scafidi et al., (2006) shows that very few teachers who leave teaching 
enter better-paid occupations. However, this does not tell us how much the average teacher 
would earn if they quit as attrition is non-random. In the supplementary material, we also 





current teachers to the earnings of former teachers who look most like them based on 
observables.45 
3.2.1 How we estimate teachers’ relative wage 
Our first method of estimating teachers’ relative wages is to compare the average teachers’ 
wage to the average graduates’ wage.  We use 26 years of the Labour Force Survey (1993 – 
2019) and restrict our sample to those who are: university graduates, working age, full time 
employed and report weekly earnings greater than the expected minimum wage. The average 
teacher wage, 𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 , is the average weekly wage of all individuals whose main 
occupation is teaching and who are currently teaching. The average graduate wage is the 
average wage of non-teaching graduates’,𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙). All wages are CPI adjusted 
to 2019 prices. The difference in the natural log of teachers’ and non-teaching graduates’ 
earnings is our first measure of teachers’ relative wages. This will be referred to as “Wage 
Difference (Normal)”, as shown in equation 1. 
 Wage Difference (Normal) =   𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 –  𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙) (1) 
  
Table 1 shows the teachers’ wage (column a) and graduates’ wage (column b) for each year 
between 1993 and 2019. Although the difference in teachers’ and non-teaching graduates’ 
wage might partially explain why policymakers struggle to attract the highest-achieving 
graduates into teaching, it does not mean that teachers currently face a pay penalty. This is 
because the composition of individuals who enter teaching have different characteristics to 
those who do not. For example, using the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education 
(DLHE), we observe that between 2003 and 2012, 88% of the graduates on initial teacher 
training programmes were female (vs 56% of graduates not enrolled), 95% were white (vs 
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former teachers and our matching strategy so we do not discuss this in detail in the main text but the data is available in the 





85%), 96% state school educated (vs 86%), with only 0.4% from Oxbridge (vs 4%) and 1.7% 
from Russell Group (vs 26%) institutions.  
To account for the differences in observable characteristics, we follow Chevalier et al. (2007) 
and estimate teachers’ outside option by using propensity score matching (PSM). This is our 
second measure of teachers outside option, 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑). Using this we construct 
our second measure of teachers’ relative wages – “Wage Difference (Matched)”, as shown in 
equation 2. 
Wage Difference (Matched):  𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟–  𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑) (2) 
  
PSM is a method first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) designed to balance the 
distribution of baseline covariates between a treatment group (teachers in our case) and a 
control group (graduates). This strategy allows us to estimate the treatment effect on some 
outcomes (wages) by comparing the treatment group to members of the control group who 
look most similar to them on observable characteristics. This is achieved by first estimating 
the conditional probability of an individual receiving the treatment (i.e. becoming a teacher) 
given observable characteristics. We do this by regressing observable characteristics on the 
treatment status using a logistic regression. Then we assign each member of the treatment 
group to their nearest neighbour in the control group based on their probability of receiving 
the treatment (propensity score). Within these pairs we use the outcome of the individual in 
the control group to estimate the counterfactual of the treatment group. Appendix Table 1 
shows that teachers are less likely to be men than the graduate population (42% vs 65% in 
2000 and 37% vs 59% in 2010) but when we use the matched sample, the difference falls 
(from 65% to 45% and 59% to 38% respectively). This highlights the importance of 





For our estimates of teachers’ outside option to be unbiased we must have common support 
(Heckman et al., 1997). Specifically we must compare individuals in the treatment group to 
individuals who look similar to them in the control group. To test this condition we perform 
the minima and maxima comparison (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008) by dropping all 
observations that have a propensity score which lie outside the minimum and maximum of 
either the treatment or control group. This has no effect on our estimates. An additional 
problem with common support can occur if the density in the tails of the distribution is very 
thin. To test this, we follow Lechner (2004) and do a sensitivity check by replacing the 
minima and maxima with the tenth smallest and tenth largest observation. Doing this also has 
no significant effect on our estimates. Therefore, we are confident that our matched estimates 
are not affected by problems related to common support. 
We use PSM to identify the conditional difference in teachers’ and non-teachers’ salaries 
because it is simple to estimate, it does not rely on exclusion restriction or functional form to 
control for differences between teachers and non-teaching graduates, and it is easy to check if 
covariates are balanced, as shown in Appendix Table 1 (Williamson et al., 2012). We use two 
alternative strategies (inverse probability weighting (IPW) and regression adjustment (RA)) 
to estimate teachers outside option as a robustness check. These are presented in figure 1 in 
the appendix and show that while there are some differences prior to 2000 (when the sample 
of teachers was roughly 800 each year) from 2001 the estimates are largely similar (roughly 
1,500 teachers each year).46  
Although improved, our second measure does not account for the fact that teaching, as an 
occupation, has significantly lower unemployment levels. Given that job security plays an 
important role in attracting graduates into teaching, failing to account for this benefit 
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underestimates the returns to teaching. We account for this benefit by weighting the teacher 
and non-teacher wage estimates with a teacher and non-teacher unemployment rate obtained 
using the LFS. This is our final measure of teachers’ relative wages – “Labour Market 
Returns to Teaching”. We estimate this separately using 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙) and 
𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) in equations 3a and 3b respectively. 
Labour Market Returns to Teaching (Normal) = 
𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥)𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟
+ (1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥))𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝐽𝑆𝐴 − 
𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥)𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙) + (1
−  𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥))𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝐽𝑆𝐴 
(3a) 
 
Labour Market Returns to Teaching (Matched) = 
𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥)𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟
+ (1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥))𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝐽𝑆𝐴 − 
𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥)𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝑁𝑜𝑛−𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) + (1
−  𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥))𝐿𝑛 𝑤𝐽𝑆𝐴 
 
(3b) 
Where 𝑤𝐽𝑆𝐴 is the unemployment benefits they would be eligible for.  
The teacher unemployment rate is the sum of unemployed individuals whose last job was 
teaching divided by the number of teachers plus the quantity of unemployed teachers. While 
this measure does miss those young people who are unable to find their first teaching job, 
using the alternative (e.g. individuals who are qualified to teach) would not be any better. A 
high proportion of young people who finish teacher training decide not to go into teaching (1 
in 5 men and 1 in 10 women) and this is driven by preferences and not an inability to find a 
job (Each year roughly 3,000 more teachers leave the profession than enrol onto teacher 
training programmes). 47 Using the annual statistics from the Department of Work and 
Pensions (DWP), we calculate the cost of unemployment by estimating the unemployment 
benefits (Job Seekers Allowance (JSA)) that everyone would be entitled to given the year, 
                                                          






their age and sex – similar to the wages we adjust all expected benefit entitlements to 2019 
prices using the CPI.   
In the following section we will show how teachers’ wages compare to non-teaching 
graduates wages and how accounting for differences in observable characteristics and 
differences in job security affect our measure of teachers’ relative wage. 
3.2.2 Comparison across different measures of teachers’ relative wages 
Comparing the earnings of teachers to non-teaching graduates we find that from 1993 to 
2019, the average teacher earns around 13% less than the average graduate (Table 1 column b 
and figure 1). The difference in pay was largest in the late 1990s but fell to under 10% prior 
to the 2010 public sector pay freeze. But since then the difference has risen to 14%. 
A particularly striking observation is that young teachers’ wages are highly competitive and 
remain this way despite the public sector pay freeze (Figure 2 LHS black solid line vs black 
dashed line). However teachers’ wages do grow at a significantly slower rate than non-
teaching graduates wages over the age distribution - teachers in their 30s, 40s and 50s earn 
around 20%, 23% and 15% less than the average graduate in their respective cohorts (Figure 
2 the wedge between the solid and dashed lines grow over the age distribution). This suggests 
that young people who quit teaching due to pecuniary reasons are motivated by expected 









Table 1 Teacher and non-teacher annual wages, in pounds, adjusted to 2019 prices using the 
Consumer Price Index, between 1993 and 2019 using the Labor Force Survey. 











Former Teachers  
 
1993 44000 51400 50500 40500 
1994 44100 49300 47100 42000 
1995 42400 48900 43400 39800 
1996 44700 51400 49500 40800 
1997 43300 50500 48800 40400 
1998 43000 50900 45200 41700 
1999 44300 52100 48500 42000 
2000 44300 52800 44300 44800 
2001 46500 54400 49000 43600 
2002 46800 54600 47400 45100 
2003 47600 54800 46100 48800 
2004 48200 54300 47200 44300 
2005 48500 53900 49000 45200 
2006 48400 54200 49100 46100 
2007 47400 52900 47000 43700 
2008 46700 54700 45000 42800 
2009 49100 54000 46800 45700 
2010 47900 52000 43500 42000 
2011 43700 49700 44500 49000 
2012 42500 47900 43200 46500 
2013 41400 46700 46600 43000 
2014 40600 46800 44000 43200 
2015 40400 46700 43100 42800 
2016 39600 46900 44100 40200 
2017 38700 45500 41400 40000 
2018 38300 44100 39900 37200 
2019 38100 43800 37500 41200 
Note: Wages are all rounded to the nearest hundred. Graduates’ wages are the average nominal 
earnings of all non-teaching graduates. Matched Wages are teachers outside option estimated using 
nearest neighbour propensity score matching by comparing the earnings of teachers to look most 
similar to graduates based on observable characteristics. Former teachers’ wages are the average 








Using matching to account for non-random selection, we observe that the average difference 
in teachers’ pay falls from 13% to 3% (table 1 column c). Although there is still evidence 
that, during the 1990s and after the public sector pay freeze, teachers were paid less than their 
outside option the magnitude falls significantly (to 9% and 5% respectively). Additionally, 
the 2019 data suggests that teachers do not, currently, face a wage penalty. However, this 
may, in part, be due to changes in the composition of the workforce. Teachers’ real wages 
have fallen since 2010 which may have led to the teachers who face a larger pay penalty 
leaving the occupation at a higher rate – thus changing the composition on both observable 
and unobservable characteristics. Indeed the proportion of male teachers has fallen (37% in 
2010 to 34% in 2018) as has the proportion of teachers with a degree in Mathematical 
Sciences (14% vs 10%) or Biological Sciences (7% vs 5%). 
Accounting for the difference in job security, using our final method has a fairly modest 
effect (making teaching 1 to 2% more attractive) on our estimates for any group over the age 
of thirty as older graduates have a very low unemployment rate (under 3% between 1993 and 
2019 vs 1.7% for teachers). However, young graduates have a higher unemployment rate 
(e.g. 5% between 2013 and 2016) and taking this into account does make teaching up to 5% 
more attractive. The job security young teachers enjoy combined with their relatively high 
earnings reinforces the notion that young people typically have a significant pecuniary benefit 
to enter, and remain in, the profession.4849 
                                                          
48 These figures are not reported. 
49 Although matching accounts for differences in observable characteristics teaching is a vocational occupation. Therefore, 
these estimates are likely to be biased due to differences in unobservable characteristics. Comparing the earnings of current 
teachers to the earnings of former teachers, we find no evidence that those who quit teaching entered higher paid occupations 
between 1993 and 2010. However since the public sector pay freeze, we find that teachers who left the occupation, typically 
enter occupations that pay up to 9% more than teaching. But this does not mean that current teachers could earn as much as 





Due to its policy relevance we will briefly discuss how teachers’ relative wages differ by 
school phrase (Primary vs Secondary) and educational background (STEM vs Non-STEM) in 
the following sections. 
3.2.3 Primary and Secondary School Teachers  
In this paper, we combine all teachers together (secondary, primary and nursery or special 
education) so that we can achieve: i) a sample size sufficient to estimate the relative wages by 
sex and age, and ii)  intertemporal consistency – prior to 2001 the LFS does not allow us to 
identify which type of teacher the respondent is.50 However, it is still interesting to look at the 
differences between different categories of teachers (these figures are not reported). For 
example, comparing the earnings of secondary (primary) school teachers to the earnings of 
non-teaching graduates between 2001 and 2019, we find that teachers earn between 5-12% 
(13-23%) less. Although primary and secondary school teachers are on the same national pay 
scales, it is unsurprising that primary school teachers earn less than secondary school 
teachers, relative to the average graduate, due to differences in the workforce composition. 
Teachers’ wages are linked to experience and primary school teachers tend to be significantly 
less experienced (according to the 2018 School Workforce Census 33% (24%) of classroom 
primary (secondary) school teachers are under 30 while 13% (16%) are over the age of 50). 
Using matching to account for non-random selection we find that, prior to the public sector 
pay freeze, both primary and secondary school teachers’ wages were fairly similar to their 
outside option. While both suffered significant pay penalties due to the pay freeze (up to 8% 
for secondary and 11% for primary) changes in the composition of the school workforce 
mean that there is no strong evidence that secondary school teachers face a pay penalty today 
                                                          






(the secondary school teachers with the highest outside option left the profession) but the 
average primary school teacher does face a pay penalty of around 8% today (2019). 
3.2.4 Relative Wages of STEM and Non-STEM Teachers 
In England, teacher recruitment and retention challenges are more severe in areas that require 
a degree in a STEM subject (i.e. Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics). Given 
that STEM graduates typically earn more in non-teaching jobs, differences in relative wages 
could explain this.51 
Table 2 shows that teachers with a university degree in a STEM subject typically face a wage 
penalty for entering the teaching profession. However, the magnitude of the penalty has 
fallen dramatically from over 12% in the mid-90s to around 6% (column a). This suggests 
that teaching has become more attractive to STEM graduates despite the public sector pay 
freeze. We also observe that non-STEM graduates are relatively better off in teaching as they 
typically earn as much in teaching as they would in an outside option, if not more (column b).  
Given that STEM teachers have a higher outside option we would expect STEM teachers 
who leave teaching to enter higher-paid occupations, on average. But we do not have any 
strong evidence that this is the case (column c). One possible reason for this might be that the 
skills a teacher acquires are so occupation-specific that they constrain future labour market 
opportunities. However, we also observe that, since the public sector pay freeze, non-STEM 
graduates who leave teaching appear to be entering higher paying occupations (10% higher 
since 2015). While it is possible that teaching might constrain future labour market 
opportunities differently for STEM and non-STEM graduates, it is possible these graduates 
                                                          
51 To get a sample that is large enough to estimate teachers’ relative wage by degree subject, we combine the two preceding 
and two following LFS years. For example, for the STEM and Non-STEM wages in 1995 we merge the LFS years 1993-96. 






also have systematically different preferences in the types of jobs they would be interested in 
outside of teaching. 
 
Table 2 Ratio of teacher and non-teaching wages using our matching strategy and our normal 





Comparing current teachers to 
Graduates
 
Comparing current  teachers to 
qualified teachers who are not 
teaching
 
  (a) (b) (c) (d) 








      
1993-1996 Matching 0.875 0.906 
 
 NA NA 
 Normal 
 
0.880 0.872 1.007 1.075 



















0.862 0.887 0.956 1.036 







0.867 0.911 0.970 1.070 




NA  NA 
 Normal 
 
0.905 0.922 0.900 0.982 







0.883 0.869 0.999 0.903 
Columns a-b estimate teachers outside option using non-teaching graduates while columns c-d use 
qualified teachers who are no longer teaching. Columns a and c estimate the outside option for 
teachers with a degree in a STEM subject and columns b and d estimate it for teachers without a 
degree in a STEM subject. In columns c and d we are unable to estimate teachers’ outside option 
using propensity score matching using former teachers as our comparison group due to the modest 
sample size. 
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3.3 Teacher Pay and Pupil Outcomes  
Having derived relative wage measures, we will now estimate the effect of these measures on 
pupil performance using measures of pupil outcomes from five waves of the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (1995, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015). 
Specifically we are interested in pupils’ test scores measured by performance in Science and 
Maths achievement tests and a measure of well-being, here represented by students’ self-
reported enjoyment of learning. 
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy  
To estimate the effect on pupil performance (enjoyment of learning), we will perform a least-
squares regression of test scores (learning preferences) on relative wages controlling for a set 
of pupil, class and teacher characteristics. Using test-score (student survey) data from 
different grades (4 and 8) and subjects (Math and Science), we estimate the following: 
 
 




Where Y𝑖𝑐𝑡 is the test score of students 𝑖 in class 𝑐 in year 𝑡. The test scores are originally 
standardized so they have an international mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100. As 
we are not using the international dataset, we re-standardize the scores within our sample of 
English students to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for ease of interpretation. 
To estimate the effect of relative wages on non-cognitive skills we replace Y𝑖𝑐𝑡 with a dummy 
that indicates whether the student 𝑖 in class 𝑐 in year 𝑡 enjoys learning, or not. 
Our regressor of interest,𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑡 ,is the difference in the natural log of teachers’ and the 
natural log of non-teachers’ wages of the teacher in class 𝑐 at time 𝑡 . Where the differences 
are either the simple difference in earnings or the weighted difference shown in equations 1, 2 
and 3 and non-teachers’ earnings are estimated using either the average graduates’ earnings 





This vector includes the relative student age measured in the difference in months from the 
median, the students’ sex measured as a male dummy, the size of class above the median (by 
subject). To control for the child’s socioeconomic status, we use five dummies to control for 
the number of books at home (0-10, 11-25, 26-100, 101-200, 200+) a dummy if they have a 
computer at home and a dummy if they speak English at home. We also control for teacher 
characteristics, these are: sex, experience (using 5 dummies), and age (using 6 dummies for 
different age groups.). The last term, 𝜃𝑡  represents year fixed effects. Our coefficient β1is 
our parameter to be estimated. 𝑖𝑐𝑡 is our pupil specific error term observed at time t in class 
c.  Our standard errors are clustered at the classroom level because the unobservable 
component of pupil outcomes in the same class is likely to be correlated (e.g. class resources, 
time spent on certain topics) and because predicted teachers’ pay is constant within 
classrooms. 
The difficulty of interpreting β1as a causal effect, in equation 4, is that the variation in 
teachers’ relative wages may not be exogenous to the variation in pupil performance. Indeed 
there are two forms of selection that could bias our results. The first of these is between 
school selection, in which students from more affluent households or higher ability, could 
select into schools that put a lot of emphasis on academic achievement and pay their teachers 
higher salaries (upward bias). Conversely, we might have situations where schools which 
have a higher proportion of students from less affluent backgrounds, or lower academic 
ability, might have to pay a wage premium to attract teachers (downward bias). The second is 
within school selection, in which more able students might be separated into different classes 
and taught by more able/higher paid teachers. 
Between school selection is potentially an issue in our setting: while teachers’ pay scales are 
determined at the national level, schools have the freedom to pay teachers any amount within 





within school selection could also be an issue for the older (grade 8) students in our sample, 
as most schools in England tend to sort students into classes by ability during secondary 
school.  Whatever the source of endogeneity, it is possible that variation in teachers’ wages, 
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑡, is associated with variation in pupil outcomes, Y𝑖𝑐𝑡 due to these other reasons and 
not simply because it affects teachers’ productivity. Therefore, using actual teachers’ pay 
would not provide us with a causal effect of teachers’ wage on pupil performance.  
In the TIMSS data, we do not observe actual teacher wages for each class, i.e. 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑡 and 
are therefore unable to estimate equation 1. Instead, we use the LFS data to obtain a measure 
of teachers’ wages as predicted by a model where we use age, sex and year as explanatory 
variables. Using these variables, we then impute the estimated wages to the TIMSS data. This 
way our wage measure changes by class only to the extent that classes are taught by teachers 
of a different sex and age. Ultimately, what we are exploiting is simply variation in teachers’ 
wages by year, sex and age. Consequently, β1 is less likely to be affected by a problem of 
endogeneity and could be interpreted as the causal effect of teachers’ relative wages on pupil 
performance and enjoyment of learning. 
Since 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑐𝑡 is an estimated regressor – relative wages are imputed from the LFS and 
assigned to teachers based on the teachers’ sex, age and the year they are observed - standard 
errors calculated in the usual way are biased. This is due to the fact that teachers’ predicted 
relative wages has additional sampling variance that needs to be taken into account when we 
calculate the variance of our final parameter estimates. To obtain unbiased standard errors, 
we follow Chevalier et al., (2007) and bootstrap the estimates (500 times). 
As a robustness check, we exploit variation within schools with a similar level of attainment 
by using school attainment fixed effects to show that our main results are robust to this more 





because the schools’ prior attainment data is not available in the most recent wave (2015) and 
therefore including this forces us to drop roughly 20% of our sample. 
3.3.2 Data  
The TIMSS data comes from tests in Science and Mathematics that are administered by the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement to nationally 
representative pupils in grades 4 (approximately age 9) and 8 (age 13). TIMSS is an 
international assessment designed to assess and compare the achievements of young people in 
more than 60 countries. Along with the tests, TIMSS also contains a rich amount of data on 
the students, the schools they attend and the teachers who teach them. We merge the pupil 
performance data with the pupil and teacher surveys together from the 1995, 2003, 2007, 
2011 and 2015 TIMSS surveys which gives us our data set. 
The TIMSS 4th Grade assessment in England is taken by pupils in Year 5 (primary school) 
and the 8th Grade assessment is taken by Year 9 pupils (secondary school) as long as the 
average class age is over 9.5 (13.5) years old at the time of assessment for Grade 4 (Grade 8). 
However, the 1995 and 2003 TIMSS waves were assigned based on age and not years of 
schooling. This means that the Grade 8 tests were taken by students in two adjacent grades 
that contain the largest proportion of 13 year olds (or 10 year olds for Grade 4). In England, 
this means that the grade 8 tests were taken by Year 8 and Year 9 pupils and the Grade 4 tests 
by Year 4 and Year 5 pupils. As a consequence the average ages of pupils are moderately 
lower in these waves. 
TIMSS is designed to be nationally representative of pupils. The assessment is randomly 
assigned to classes using a stratified two-staged cluster sample design. First schools are 
sampled with probabilities according to their size from the list of all schools in the population 





but the exact variables used differ by country. The most common are: region, urbanization 
and socioeconomic indicators. The second stage is selecting one or more classes from those 
eligible within the selected school. Pupils with additional educational needs who are unable 
to follow the test instructions are excluded, as are students who have received less than one 
year of instruction in the language of the test. But students who have low prior attainment 
and/or behaviour problems are eligible to participate. Roughly 2% of children are excluded 
from the sample in England for one of the reasons above. Conditional on selection and 
eligibility, participation rates in England are high (96%). 
In this paper we drop all pupils where we either cannot match the pupil to a teacher, or where 
the age and/or sex of the teacher who taught them is missing. We drop these students because 
we assign teachers’ relative wages based on their sex and age –if these are missing, we are 
unable to assign them a teaching and non-teaching wage. In addition, we drop cases where 
the student did not complete the home questionnaire, or those who did not complete the 
questions we use to control for SES. This is because a student’s socioeconomic status is an 
important predictor of cognitive performance.53 Across the 5 waves we drop 3,245 students in 
Grade 4 and 4,225 (9,514) students in Grade 8 Math (Science). This leaves us with a sample 
of 25,346 Grade 4 pupils in both Maths and Science and 15,177 Grade 8 pupils in Math and 
17,302 in Science. Table 3 shows that the young people who we drop from our analysis 
achieve lower scores on the Mathematics and Science assessment, report a lower enjoyment 
of learning and tend to be marginally younger. 
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Table 3 Difference in student performance, enjoyment of learning and age and sex of students dropped from our sample using 5 waves of 
TIMSS. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Grade 4 Keep Grade 4 Dropped Grade 8 Keep  Grade 8 Dropped Grade 8 Keep  Grade 8 Dropped 




Math Score 529.12 513.05***   513.89 490.94*** 
 (90.69) (94.92)   (81.52) (88.22) 
       
Science Score 534.54 523.00*** 551.41 534.18***   
 (82.59) (90.10) (84.33) (85.13)   
       
Enjoy Math 
(Dummy) 
0.81 0.64***   0.64 0.66*** 
(0.396) (0.479)   (0.481) (0.473) 
       
Enjoy Science 
(Dummy) 
0.74 0.63*** 0.74 0.71***   
(0.440) (0.482) (0.439) (0.454)   
       
Student Age 10.04 10.01*** 14.15 14.04*** 14.15 13.84*** 
 (0.469) (0.518) (0.381) (0.505) (0.389) (0.595) 
       
Student Male 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.49*** 0.50 0.51 
 (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
N 25346 3245 17302 9514 15177 4225 
Note. Math and Science scores are at the standardized at the TIMSS level with an international mean of 500 and standard deviation of 100. Enjoy Math and Enjoy Science are 
(dummies where 1 indicates that they enjoy learning or not). Mean coefficients; sd in parentheses, standard errors at the usual levels and indicate statistical significant from 
the corresponding ‘keep’ column. For example, stars in column 2 indicate that the mean in column two is statistically different from the mean in column 1.:* p < 0.05, ** p < 





3.3.3 Assigning Teachers’ Relative Wages 
We assign each teacher in TIMSS a teaching and non-teaching wage based on their age, sex 
and the year they are observed. Our wage estimates are obtained from the LFS (see section 2) 
by combining the two preceding and two following LFS years to each TIMSS year. For 
example, we merge the LFS years 1993-1996 and use this sample to estimate the relative 
wages of teachers observed in the 1995 TIMSS wave (see supplementary material). We 
assign each teacher the following: a teacher wage, a non-teacher wage estimated using 
matching and a non-teacher wage estimated not using matching. We also assign each teacher 
a teacher unemployment rate and a non-teacher (graduate) unemployment rate based on their 
sex, age and year observed using the LFS. Finally, each teacher is assigned an estimate of the 
unemployment benefit entitlement (JSA) by applying Department of Work and Pensions 
(DWP) rules (for a give age, sex and year the JSA entitlement is the same for both teachers 
and non-teachers).54 
Using this information we compute each teacher’s difference in wages – the natural log of 
their predicted teacher wage minus the natural log of their predicted non-teacher wage. We 
do this twice, first using non-teachers’ wages estimated using matching and second using the 
outside option estimated using the average graduate’s wages.  
Finally, we account for both the differences in job security and the cost of unemployment. It 
is important to note that all the wages are logged so that the results show the effect of a one 
percent change in wages or relative wages on pupil performance.  
                                                          








Table 4 TIMSS Teachers Wage Descriptive Statistics     




















Ln Teacher Wage 
 
6.316 .249 6.42 .224 6.43 .229 
Ln Non Teacher Wage Matched 
 
6.283 .298 6.40 .283 6.42 .283 
Ln Non Teacher Wage Graduate 
 
6.384 .298 6.52 .282 6.53 .283 
Difference In Wage Matched 
 
.032 .123 .009 .123 .004 .122 
Difference in Wage Graduate 
 
-.068 .101 -.104 .105 -.104 .104 
Teacher Unemployment Rate 
 
1.710 .438 1.73 .469 1.76 .499 
Graduate Unemployment Rate 
 
3.123 1.400 2.94 1.38 2.93 1.40 
Labour Market Differences 
Match 
 
.061 .126 .034 .126 .029 .126 
Labour Market Differences 
Graduate 
-.037 .111 -.076 .114 -.077 .113 
N 25,346  17,302  15,177  
 
 
Note. The estimates for teachers’ and non-teachers’ wages come from 1993-2019 LFS with all wages adjusted to 2019 prices. Non-teacher Wage 
graduates is the average non-teaching graduates wage while non-teacher wage matched is non-teaching graduates’ wage matched to teachers using 
nearest neighbour propensity score matching. The difference in wages is Log(Teacher Wage) –  Log (Non-Teacher Wage) while the labour market 
differences is the same but they define  Log(Teacher Wage) as 𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥)𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 + (1 − 𝑃(𝐸𝑚𝑝|𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑥))𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑤𝐽𝑆𝐴 






Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of these different measures. From this table 
rows 1, 3 and 5 show that the average graduate earns more than the average teacher but when 
we account for non-random selection, there is no evidence that the teachers in our sample, on 
average, face a pay penalty (rows 2 and 4). Additionally, teachers are significantly less likely 
to be unemployed than graduates (1.7% vs 3.1% for Grade 4 teachers and 1.8% vs 2.9% for 
Grade 8 teachers). Therefore, when we combine these differences we find that the teachers in 
our TIMSS Grade 4 and Grade 8 samples do not, on average, face a pecuniary penalty for 
remaining in the profession. 
3.3.4 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the students who took the TIMSS assessment. 
Consistent with the design of the assessment, where the average class age for grade 4 (grade 
8) had to be higher than 9.5 (13.5), the grade 4 students are typically 10 years old and grade 8 
students are 14 years old. There is an equal gender split for both grades.  
More grade 8 students live in a household with a home computer (94% vs 87%). Grade 4 
pupils are more likely to be taught by a teacher with less than 4 years’ experience (27% vs 
22.5% for grade 8 Math and 21.4% for Science). The younger pupils are also more likely to 
be taught by a teacher 25 or under (7.8% vs 6.1% for grade 8 Math and 4.9% for Science) and 
over 60 (15.4% vs 2.5% Math and 2.1% Science). Consistent with the gender gap in primary 
teaching the young pupils are much less likely to be taught by a male teacher (26%) than the 









This table shows the descriptive statistics of the students in our TIMSS sample. For example the final 
row should the proportion of Grade 4 students who have male teachers (column 1, 26.1%). 
Table 5 TIMSS students descriptive statistics. 




















Student Age 10.040 .469 14.148 .381 14.147 .3893 
Student Male .497 .500 .507 .499 .499 .500 
       
Books at home:       
0-10 .097 .295 .119 .324 .135 .342 
11-25 .189 .391 .181 .385 .197 .398 
26-100 .320 .466 .286 .452 .286 .452 
101-200 .198 .399 .191 .393 .184 .388 
200+ .195 .396 .220 .414 .196 .397 
       
Home 
Computer 
.870 .335 .942 .233 .947 .225 
Speak English in 
Home 
 
.781 .414 .868 .337 .873 .332 
 
Class Size Above 
Median 
      
Math .540 .498   .542 .498 
Science .549 .498 .534 .498   




      
1 .092 .289 .078 .269 .078 .268 
2 .100 .300 .071 .258 .071 .258 
3 .078 .269 .065 .247 .076 .265 
4 .076 .252 .063 .244 .053 .224 
5 .087 .282 .044 .206 .050 .218 
6+ .565 .495 .675 . 468 .670 .470 
       
Techer Age:       
Under 25 .078 .268 .049 .218 .061 .240 
25-29 .087 .282 .191 .393 .167 .373 
30-39 .086 .280 .300 .458 .270 .444 
40-49 .197 .398 .237 .425 .278 .448 
50-59 .276 .447 .199 .399 .196 .397 
60+ .154 .362 .021 .143 .025 .158 
       
Teacher Male .261 .439 .495 .499 .497 .500 





Table 6 OLS regression of Grade 4 and 8 pupil performance on observable characteristics in TIMSS. 
 1 2 3 4 












Class Size Above Median 0.123*** 0.101** 0.557*** 0.271*** 
(0.0445) (0.0401) (0.0555) (0.0519) 
     
Relative Student Age  0.0350*** 0.0364*** 0.0126*** 0.0126*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00237) (0.00206) (0.00187) 
     
Student Male 0.0876*** 0.0489*** 0.0924*** 0.148*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0151) (0.0222) (0.0169) 
books at home     
0-10 (Omitted)     
     
books at home   
11-25  
0.381*** 0.448*** 0.361*** 0.440*** 
(0.0282) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0257) 
     
books at home  26-100 0.748*** 0.805*** 0.705*** 0.809*** 
(0.0281) (0.0275) (0.0320) (0.0274) 
     
books at home 101-200 0.994*** 1.083*** 0.961*** 1.176*** 
(0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0382) (0.0322) 
     
books at home 200+ 1.059*** 1.246*** 1.232*** 1.493*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0333) (0.0431) (0.0329) 
     
Computer in Home -0.0388+ -0.000321 0.0540 -0.0134 
 (0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0377) (0.0314) 
     
Speak English in Home 0.0103 0.150*** -0.106*** 0.0371+ 
 (0.0243) (0.0238) (0.0321) (0.0249) 
     
Teacher Male 0.0180 0.0236 0.00976 0.0514* 
 (0.0315) (0.0291) (0.0440) (0.0290) 
     
Teacher Experience 1 Year -0.0910* -0.0888** -0.0398 0.0317 
(0.0465) (0.0427) (0.0789) (0.0657) 
     
Teacher Experience 2 
Years 
0.0256 0.0148 0.0207 -0.0549 
(0.0591) (0.0526) (0.0984) (0.0665) 
     
Teacher Experience 3 
Years 
0.0146 0.00716 -0.191** 0.0159 
(0.0542) (0.0493) (0.0902) (0.0618) 
     
Teacher Experience 4 
Years 
-0.0834+ -0.0709+ 0.163 -0.00617 
(0.0511) (0.0489) (0.115) (0.0620) 
     
Teacher Experience 5 
Years 
-0.0162 0.00698 -0.0427 -0.0878 
(0.0593) (0.0563) (0.117) (0.0702) 
     
Teacher Experience 6+ 
years (Omitted) 
    
[continues on next page]     





Teacher age Under 25 -0.0752 -0.0689 -0.00211 -0.215*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0563) (0.111) (0.0769) 
     
Teacher age 25-29 0.0263 0.00820 0.0765 -0.0315 
 (0.0470) (0.0429) (0.0746) (0.0508) 
     
Teacher age 30-39 -0.0157 -0.0285 0.0254 -0.00447 
 (0.0347) (0.0338) (0.0628) (0.0382) 
     
Teacher Age 40-49 
(Omitted) 
    
     
Teacher Age 50-59 0.0984** 0.0992** -0.110+ 0.0183 
 (0.0414) (0.0388) (0.0681) (0.0449) 
     
Teacher Age 50+ 0.412*** 0.230 -0.0295 0.114 
 (0.154) (0.168) (0.164) (0.107) 
     
Constant -0.589*** -0.922*** -0.875*** -1.087*** 
 (0.0658) (0.0598) (0.0880) (0.0749) 
N 25346 25366 15177 17302 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The regressions 
include year dummies but are not reported. Standard errors are clustered at the class level and the starts 





Table 6 presents the relationship between our controls and outcomes in a multivariate 
regression that does not include our regressor of interest. First looking at the differences in 
school and student characteristics, the first row shows that pupils in larger classes tend to do 
better. Consistent with the literature this suggests that there is non-random sorting in England 
where pupils who need more individual attention tend to be sorted into smaller classes 
(Woessmann and West 2002). Similar to the literature, the second row shows that, within 
cohorts, older students perform better in Math and Science – an increase in age by one month 
is associated with an increase in pupil performance by 0.03sd for Grade 4 and 0.01sd for 
Grade 8 (Bedard and Dhuey 2006, Strøm 2004). Consistent with the existing evidence of 
gender gaps the third row shows that male students tend to outperform female pupils in both 
Maths and Science and the gap gets larger with age (Contini et al., 2017, Muñoz 2018).  
There is a large body of existing literature that demonstrates the strong relationship between 
socioeconomic status and academic achievement; these include Duncan and Murnane (2011) 
and Dahl and Lochner (2012). As we do not know parental income, occupation, or highest 
educational attainment we use two different controls for SES (Rows 4-9). Our first proxy for 
SES is books at home. Rows 4-8 show that pupil achievement increases with the quantity of 
books in the home and the achievement gap is steady for both grade 4 and grade 8 pupils. 
Consistent with Hanushek et al., (2019), who found that the achievement gap has remained 
fairly constant between 1954 and 2001 in the US, figure 4 shows that the disadvantage gap in 
Math has remained fairly constant over the last two decades in the UK. But the difference in 
Science achievement between the most advantaged pupils and the least advantaged pupils fell 
by 0.4sd. Our second proxy for SES is having a computer in the home, which (as shown in 





Row 10 shows that there is a positive relationship between speaking English in the home for 
Science performance while there is a negative relationship with grade 8 Math performance, 
this is consistent with existing evidence in England that uses TIMSS (Greany et al., 2016). 
The literature on teacher effects consistently shows that teachers have a significant impact on 
pupil performance. Among the characteristics which are considered important include the 
teachers’ sex, years of teaching experience and age. We do not observe any aggregate effects 
of teachers’ sex on pupil performance apart from Grade 8 Science, in line with the existing 
literature we also observe that the pupils with the least experienced teachers and the youngest 
teachers tend to perform worse (rows 12 – 23).  
3.4 Estimation Results  
The literature has predominately focused on the effect of relative wages on pupil performance 
therefore we will introduce these results first (Table 7) and then present the results on 
learning enjoyment (Table 8).  
In our data we only observe one teacher for each student.  For the young students (grade 4), 
this is their only teacher. For the older students (grade 8), this is one of many teachers, likely 
to be of a diverse profile.55 As a consequence spill-over effects or complementarities could 
attenuate any wage effects we find for the older students. For example, the benefits that a 
pupil who is taught by a more effective Science teacher, who is more motivated due to a 
higher relative wage, might make a positive difference to their Maths score, and vice versa 
(spill-over effect). Alternatively, having a more effective maths teacher might increase the 
returns of having a more effective Science teacher (e.g. by improving numeracy skills). As 
there is evidence that these effects exist in one form or another it will be fairly difficult to 
                                                          
55 In a scenario where students are taught by equally effective teachers with correlated characteristics (and therefore are 
estimated to face the same relative wage) this would not be a problem. However, this is unlikely to hold as secondary school 





identify a wage effect on secondary school pupils (Bryson and Papps 2016, Kinsler 2016, Sun 
et al., 2017). Therefore our main focus will be on the results of the primary school pupils. 
Our estimates for grade 8 pupils are smaller and less precise than our estimates for the 
younger pupils, which is consistent with spill-over effects, but we cannot assess their 
magnitude.  The results for our secondary school pupils are available in the appendix (Tables 
2 - 4). 
3.4.1 Teachers and non-Teachers Wages 
Column 1 in table 7 shows that, consistent with an efficiency wage model, the effect of 
teachers’ wages on pupil performance in grade 4 Science is positive. An increase in teachers’ 
wages by 10%, which is roughly how much teachers would expect their salaries to increase 
after acquiring an additional year of experience (for example moving up from the lowest pay 
band (M1 to M2) on the 2019-20 pay scales), improves pupil performance by 0.024sd. The 
effect of such an increase in wages is similar to that identified in the literature from a 1 pupil 
reduction in class size (Krueger (1999) 0.03sd) and a 15% decrease in traffic pollution 
Heissel et al., (2019) 0.024sd). What these estimates mean in a wider policy context will be 
discussed in detail in section 6. The effects on Grade 4 Math performance, columns 8 – 10, 
display a similar pattern although the magnitude is smaller. 
3.4.2 The Difference in Relative wages 
In the previous section we observe that teachers’ wages are positively associated with pupil 
performance and non-teachers’ wages are negatively associated with pupil performance. 
Therefore, when we take the difference in teachers’ and non-teachers’ wages we would 





Table 7 OLS regression of grade 4 standardized science and math scores in TIMSS on teachers wages 





Log Teacher Wages 0.240 0.417* 0.447+     -0.0801 0.0843 0.129     
 (0.244) (0.239) (0.273)     (0.232) (0.238) (0.266)     
               





      
-0.241***  
    
        (0.0771)      
               
Log Non-Teacher Wages 
(Normal) 
  -0.208+ 
(0.139) 
 
     
 -0.209+ 
    
         (0.130)     
               
Wage Difference (Match)    0.265***       0.235***    
    (0.0799)       (0.0766)    
               
Wage Difference (Normal)     0.208+       0.209+   
     (0.139)       (0.130)   
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Match) 
     
0.296*** 




      (0.0840)       (0.0796)  
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Norm) 
      
0.259* 
     
 0.197+ 
       (0.142)       (0.132) 
               
Constant  -0.895*** 0.810+ 0.489 -0.897*** -0.896*** -0.896*** -0.896*** -0.564*** 1.025** 0.827 -0.565*** -0.564*** -0.565*** -0.564*** 
 (0.0304) (0.545) (0.925) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0304) (0.0309) (0.509) (0.864) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0309) (0.0309) 
               
N 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 25346 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regression includes all of our controls, these are: Class Size, 
Class Size Missing Dummy, Student Age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, 
teacher experience, teacher age and year fixed effects. Standard Errors in parentheses clustered at the class room level. Signs indicate significance at the 






Regressing pupils’ Science performance on the difference in teachers’ and our matched non-
teachers’ wages (table 7 column 4), we find that a 10% increase in teachers’ relative wage 
causes a 0.0265sd increase in pupil attainment, statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
effect is stronger than using the non-matched outside option (0.0208sd column 5). While this 
does provide some evidence that our matched estimate might be a better measure of teachers’ 
outside option, than the average graduates’ wage, the two estimates are statistically 
indistinguishable. We observe a similar effect on Math performance, but with a smaller effect 
size (column 11 – 12). 
Our relative wages’ estimates are similar to Britton and Propper (2016), in which a 10% 
increase in teachers’ wages, relative to their local labour market, was found to improve pupil 
performance by 0.02sd, but are significantly smaller than those found by Dolton and 
Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011), where a 10% increase in teachers’ relative wages improves 
pupil performance by between 0.1sd and 0.2sd. However, this is what we’d expect as Dolton 
and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2011) are unable to distinguish between selection effects - 
countries that pay teachers’ higher salaries attract more productive teachers - and efficiency 
wage effects. 
3.4.3 Labour Market Conditions and Relative wages 
Accounting for differences in job security, and the cost of unemployment, using our 
constructed labour market returns to teaching we find that the coefficients are marginally 
stronger. Column 6 shows that a 10% increase in the matched labour market returns to 
teaching causes a 0.03sd increase in Science and 0.024sd in Math (column 13), all 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the more general graduates labour market 





The TIMSS assessments are taken between April and June in England. Therefore, our 
estimates reflect the impact that a more motivated teacher has after 0.8 to 0.9 of an academic 
year. Therefore, when evaluating the merit of a salary intervention, to improve teacher 
retention and recruitment, policymakers should also consider the impact on teacher 
motivation. For example, we estimate that the increase in teachers’ pay scales, for the 2020-
21 academic year, of 5.5% (the first stage of increasing teachers starting salaries by 24% and 
more experienced teachers’ salaries by 8%) would improve student test scores by roughly 
0.016sd in Science and 0.013sd in Math in the first academic year alone, ceteris paribus. 
Second our results indicate that, even in the absence of a policy intervention, the fluctuations 
in teachers’ relative wages over the business cycle will impact pupils’ test scores. 
Specifically, during periods of economic downturn (prosperity), pupils will benefit (suffer) 
from having a more (less) motivated teacher. For example, if the graduate unemployment rate 
increases by 4% and teachers’ salaries rose by 4%, compared to non-teachers, we would 
expect pupil outcomes to improve by a magnitude quite close to the effect of a 10% increase 
in teachers’ salaries. 
3.4.4 Teacher Pay and Pupil Happiness 
A change in teacher effort could also affect their pupils’ enjoyment of learning. In the TIMSS 
students survey students are asked about their attitudes towards learning Mathematics and 
Science. In response to the question ‘I enjoy learning’ they can respond Agree a lot, Agree a 
little, Disagree a little or Disagree a lot. Using this data, we create a dummy that indicates if a 
young person enjoys leaning the subject (Agree a little or Agree a lot) or not (Disagree a little 











Regression includes all of our controls, these are: Class Size, Student Age above median in 
months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, 
teacher experience, teacher age and year fixed effects. Standard Errors in parentheses 
clustered at the classroom level. Signs indicate significance at the following levels  +p<0.15,* 
p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. Note: standard errors obtained from bootstrap (500) and our 






As the results in table 8 shows, teachers’ relative wages also have an effect on their pupil’s 
enjoyment of learning. The main effect is on Science enjoyment (column 1-4) where a 10% 
increase in the matched labour market returns to teaching increases Science enjoyment by 
1.8%, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In the student survey, enjoyment of learning is reported in an ordinal form where 1 indicates 
that pupils enjoy learning this subject the most and 4 indicates pupils who enjoy learning this 
subject the least. If we use this variable and regress it on the same covariates using an ordinal 
probit we find that, in line with our previous results, a 10% increase in teachers’ relative 
wages has a positive effect on Grade 4 pupils enjoying learning Science a lot (1.75%) and has 
a negative effect on the probability that a Grade 4 pupil does not enjoying learning a lot (-
0.85%), all statistically significant at the 10% level (see figure 5). 
As the correlation between learning enjoyment and test scores is relatively weak – 0.015 in 
Science and 0.04 in Math for primary school pupils – it is unlikely that the effect of relative 
wages on pupil performance is been driven by changes in pupil happiness, and vice versa. A 
growing body of literature both in England, and abroad, finds that pupils’ enjoyment of 
learning and well-being at school, while unrelated to test score performance, are strong 
predictors of future labour market success (Gibbons and Silva 2011, Jackson 
2012).Therefore, our estimates suggest that relative wages have a causal effect on two 







Table 9 OLS regression of grade 4 Science and Math scores excluding teachers with two or less years experiences in TIMSS on teachers wages 





Log Teacher Wages 0.279 0.536** 0.526*     -0.223 -0.00275 -0.0252     
 (0.267) (0.272) (0.310)     (0.259) (0.264) (0.291)     
               
Log Non-Teacher Wages 
(Match) 
 
-0.344***      
 
-0.297***      
  (0.0994)       (0.0930)      
               
Log Non-Teacher Wages 
(Normal) 
 
 -0.270*     
 
 -0.216+     
   (0.159)       (0.148)     
               
Wage Difference (Match)    0.351***       0.287***    
    (0.0985)       (0.0921)    
               
Wage Difference (Normal)     0.277*       0.209   
     (0.159)       (0.148)   
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Match) 
 
    0.386***  
 
    0.299***  
      (0.104)       (0.0969)  
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Norm) 
 
     0.332** 
 
     0.206 
       (0.165)       (0.151) 
               
Constant  -0.903*** 1.367** 0.896 -0.906*** -0.905*** -0.906*** -0.904*** -0.570*** 1.389** 0.868 -0.572*** -0.571*** -0.572*** -0.570*** 
 (0.0344) (0.657) (1.064) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0353) (0.613) (0.987) (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353) 
               
N 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 20462 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regression includes all of our controls, these are: Class Size, 
Class Size Missing Dummy, Student Age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, 
teacher experience, teacher age and year fixed effects. Signs indicate significance at the following levels. Standard Errors in parentheses.  +p<0.15,* 







3.5 Robustness Checks 
3.5.1 Inexperienced Teachers 
Assuming that new teachers have strong teaching preferences – they will exert high effort 
regardless of the outside option – we can test our results to check if they are being driven by 
teacher effort. We do this by running our OLS model again but excluding new teachers – 
those whose effort is unlikely to be responsive to variation in the relative wage. We define 
new teachers as those who have two years of experience or fewer (Table 9). 
Using this smaller sample if our coefficients are larger it would suggest that our results are 
driven by teachers but if they are smaller, or unchanged, it would suggest that our results are 
driven through some other channel. Consistent with our predictions, restricting our analysis to 
those teachers whose effort we would expect to be responsive to changes in relative wages 
increases our effect sizes by 1% of a standard deviation in both Math and Science 
performance. For example, column 6 in table 9 shows that our effect on Science performance 
increases when we remove the least experienced teachers (the effect of a 10% increase in 
wages increases from 0.029sd to 0 0.038sd). 
3.5.2 Academic Attainment Fixed Effects  
Ideally we would include region fixed effects in our main model to account for the fact that 
there are significant regional differences in England that might bias our results. For many 
countries in TIMSS, such as Australia, Germany and Northern Ireland you could easily do 
this using the School Strata as the stratification is by region. In England, stratification is done 
on two levels. The first is by whether the School is just a Primary School or a combined 
Primary and Secondary school and the second is by the school’s prior level of academic 





a combined school. This has no impact on our main results – although Grade 4 pupils in a 
combined school tend to score .20sd lower in Science and 0.18sd lower in Math.  
Apart from 2015, each wave of TIMSS in England is stratified by six levels of the schools’ 
prior level of academic attainment. The prior levels of academic attainment are calculated 
using key stage 2 results (primary school) and key stage 3 (secondary school). Table 10 
shows that pupils in better schools typically achieve higher scores in both Mathematics and 
Science.56 For example, students in the best schools typically outperform students from the 
lowest achieving schools by around one quarter of a standard deviation. Adding academic 
attainment fixed effects to our model to exploit within year, within similarly achieving 
schools, variation Table 11 shows that not only do our main results persist, in this more 
conservative specification, but the effect sizes get marginally larger. Column 3 shows that the 
effect on Grade 4 Science of a 10% increase in the labour market returns to teaching 







                                                          
56 These categories were based on the schools key Stage 2 (KS2) and key stage 3(KS3) results. These are formal assessments 
that examine young people on the material that they have learnt in years 3 to 6 (ages 6 to 11 (This is KS2)) and year 7 to 9 





Table 10 OLS regression of primary school pupils’ Math and Science scores on schools academic attainment levels in 
TIMSS 
 1 2 




Attainment Level 1   
(Omitted)   
   
Attainment Level 2 0.0757+ 0.0610 
 (0.0488) (0.0495) 
   
Attainment Level 3 0.0873* 0.0541 
 (0.0484) (0.0470) 
   
Attainment Level 4 0.156*** 0.175*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0524) 
   
Attainment Level 5 0.166*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0516) (0.0468) 
   
Attainment Level 6 0.236*** 0.230*** 
 (0.0548) (0.0559) 
   
_cons -1.244*** -0.870*** 
 (0.0752) (0.0756) 
   
N 17951 17951 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regression includes all of our controls, these are: 
Class Size, Student Age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, teacher 
experience, teacher age and year fixed effects. Standard Errors in parentheses clustered at the class level and significant is displayed at the usual 
levels.  +p<0.15,* p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. Note these attainment categories are not ordered in TIMSS, I ordered and named them based on 
the pupils’ science scores where the category with the lowest scores is 1 and highest is 6. Also note that the sample sizes are slightly smaller as this 






Table 11 OLS regression of Grade 4  Math and Science Scores using schools prior attainment fixed effects in TIMSS on teachers wages 
















   








































      
         
constant -1.198*** -1.176*** -1.199*** -1.180*** -0.831*** -0.813*** -0.830*** -0.814*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0416) (0.0415) (0.0416) (0.0415) 
         
N 17931 17931 17931 17931 17931 17931 17931 17931 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regression includes all of our controls, these are: Class Size, 
Student Age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, teacher experience, teacher age 
and year fixed effects. Standard Errors in parentheses level and significant is displayed at the usual levels.  +p<0.15,* p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01. . Note: 
standard errors obtained from bootstrap (500). Our sample size is significantly lower using School prior attainment FE’s because the prior attainment data is 









Using a novel estimation strategy this paper shows that when we account for selection bias 
and relative job security there is no strong evidence that teachers could leave teaching for a 
higher paying occupation.  However, we do find that the growth in male teachers’ wages 
tends to be flatter than what they would expect in their outside option. As a consequence, 
when we take into account the differences in earnings growth there is a high probability 
(>50%) that a male teacher could maximise their lifetime earnings by leaving the occupation. 
This is despite the fact that their initial wages are fairly similar. Looking at the earnings of 
teachers who quit we find no evidence that they tend to leave teaching for higher paying 
occupations. This is also true for teachers with a degree in a STEM subject who have fairly 
strong labour market opportunities. This suggests that either teaching is a strong negative 
signal on the labour market, teachers are misinformed about their outside option or 
individuals who leave the occupation are not motivated by pecuniary factors. 
Using our wage estimates we find that teachers’ wages, consistent with an efficiency wage 
model, improve pupils’ test scores and well-being, measured by enjoyment of learning. To 
put the size of our effect on pupil performance into a policy perspective the magnitude of a 
10% increases in teachers’ relative wages has roughly the same effect that Krueger (1999) 
found for a 1 pupil reduction in class size in Project STAR and Lavy (2015) found for a one 
hour increase in weekly instructional time using PISA. 
These results indicate that current students will benefit from raising teachers’ salaries. 
Specifically, over an academic year more motivated teachers will improve their students’ 
academic attainment and enjoyment of learning. However, this does not mean that an 
unconditional salary increase is a cost-effective policy instrument to improve pupil 





likely to cost an additional £1.3bn per year in primary schools alone.57 To put the magnitude 
of the cost into perspective to achieve the same improvement in pupil performance by 
reducing class sizes in primary schools would cost £232m.58 A more efficient mechanism to 
improve pupil performance could be a conditional wage increase. Atkinson et al., (2009) 
shows that the effect of performance related pay on pupil performance is noticeably stronger 
than our estimates and is considerably cheaper to implement.  
These results suggests that more experienced teachers are more responsive to wage 
differentials than less experienced teachers. As the government is committed to increasing 
less experienced teachers’ salaries (roughly 24% by 2022) by significantly more than their 
more experienced colleagues (8%) this might adversely affect teacher effort. Investigating if 
teachers’ wages, relative to other teachers, influences pupil performance and the potential 
adverse effects of flattering teachers’ pay schedule seems like a promising topic for future 
research.  
This paper provides some evidence that teachers’ relative wages also affects pupils’ well-
being. As well-being plays an important role in a wide range of pupil outcomes failing to 
consider the wider effects of a policy mechanism might lead to a misallocation of resources 
(Lévy-Garboua et al., 2006). Therefore, investigating the impact of policy mechanisms on a 
wider range of outcomes and potential dynamic complementarities seems like an important 
area of future research. 
                                                          
57 Using the 2018 SWC 172,055 primary school teaches’ (mean salary £38,862) and 83,051 primary academy school 
teachers (mean salary £37,235). Assumed non-teachers’ salaries will grow at 3%. 
58 Reducing primary school class sizes from 27 to 26 would require roughly 9,800 additional teachers. Assuming that we can 
hire this number of teachers at the lowest point of the pay band (£23,720) and there are not additional costs (such as building 


















Figure 2 Average teachers’ pay between 1993- 2019 as a ratio of graduates pay by age. The LHS is younger teachers and graduates (under 30 and 30-39) and 















Figure 3 shows the probability that a teacher quitting would maximise their lifetime earnings by age and sex (Male LHS and Female RHS) using the high 
discounting parameter (25%). The red solid line assumes that markets perfectly clear (i.e. an individual is employed as a teacher or non-teacher with 
probability 1) and no switching cost. The Blue dashed line assumes that markets perfectly clear but there is a switching cost of 10% (i.e. when teaching sort 
out of teaching they face an immediate pay penalty). Finally the Green dash dot line is the same as the solid red line but relaxes the assumption about 
perfect market clearance using the teachers and non-teachers actual unemployment rates from the Labour Force Survey. See the supplementary material 




These figures show clear differences in quitting intentions by male (LHS) and female (RHS) teachers. Even with a high switching cost the probability that a 
male teacher could maximise their lifetime earnings by leaving the occupation exceeds 50% for the majority of their career while for female teachers the 









Figure 4 shows the change in the difference in achievement by our SES proxy “Books at Home” in Grade 4 Math (LHS) and Science (RHS) achievement in a 














Figure 5 shows the marginal effect of a 1% increase in the labour market returns to teaching on grade 4 science enjoyment where category 1 is enjoy 











In this thesis I explore the importance of pecuniary or labour market factors for educational 
outcomes and individual educational training choices. The various empirical results obtained 
can be used to inform the public debate in various areas of educational policy. 
Finally, I would like to point out several possible extensions of my work, which I hope to be 
able to pursue in the future. In my first chapter I find that parents/young people who expect 
higher labour market returns from a degree also expect a higher probability that their 
child/they will apply to university. An exciting feature of the data, the Innovation Panel of the 
UK Household Longitudinal Study, is that I can observe the young person’s actual enrolment 
behaviour. A possible extension of this work would be to investigate whether educational 
aspirations are predictors of actual behaviour and if the light touch information treatment we 
administered has any effect on the decision to go to university.  
An important policy implication of my second chapter is that an increase in the returns to 
teaching will only have a meaningful increase on the number of trainee teachers if there is 
capacity in the system. One important obstacle to increase capacity in the system is that 
schools are generally reluctant to take on trainee teachers. Unless policymakers incentivise 
schools to take on trainee teachers capacity constraints mean that it is unlikely that any boost 
in the ‘returns to teaching’ will have a transformative effect on the number of graduates 
enrolling onto teacher training programmes. In the absence of adequate incentives for 
schools, reducing teacher attrition would be the most fruitful avenue to boosting the supply of 
teachers in England. 
Each year more than 30,000 classroom teachers leave the profession in England. From an 
unmanageable workload, long hours and unrealistic expectations to a pay scale that doesn’t 





potentially non-exclusive, reasons why a teacher might decide to leave.  However existing 
data does not allow us to distinguish between these factors as a combination of beliefs and 
constraints can be consistent with observed choices. To address the limitations of traditional 
data sets I plan to use the mobile EssexLab to elicit teachers’ subjective expectations on their 
probability of remaining in the profession under a variety of different circumstances such as 
an increase (decrease) in wages, working hours and school leadership quality to identify 
which factors play the most significant role in determining attrition.  
Given the importance of teachers on the development of human capital and the impact of 
teacher disruptions on pupil outcomes in both the short and long run, understanding the 
determinants of attrition are beneficial in our context (Hanushek and Rivkin 2006). In 
addition this research will also contribute to a growing literature that shows that subjective 
expectations can be used to predict a wide variety of outcomes ranging from voting behaviour 
(Delavande and Manski 2010) and  university enrolment (Delavande and Zafar 2019, 
Lergetporer et al., 2018) to college major choice (Zafar 2013) and investment behaviour (Hill 
and Viceisza 2012). Yet one significant area has not been investigated – the decision to leave 
a job. The extremely high turnover rate in the teaching occupation in England gives me an 
opportunity to test the hypothesis that economic agents’ subjective expectations on their 
probability of remaining in the profession under different scenarios, over different time 
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Appendix Chapter 1 
A1 Complete list of expectations questions asked in Waves 8 and 9: 
Next we have a few questions about your [son/daughter] [CHILD NAME]'s education plans. 
On a scale from 0% to 100% where 0% means 'No chance of happening' and 100% means 
'Totally likely to happen', please tell me how likely it is that the following events will happen 
to [CHILD NAME] in the future.  
 
How likely is it that [CHILD NAME] will have a university degree by age 30? 
 
How likely is it that [CHILD NAME] will gain the required qualifications to get into 
university? 
 
Suppose [CHILD NAME] gains the required qualifications to apply to university. How likely 
is it that [CHILD NAME] will apply to university? 
 
Suppose [CHILD NAME] gains the required qualifications to apply to university. How likely 
is it that [CHILD NAME] will apply to university if all costs (tuition, books, boarding, etc) 
were paid out of a scholarship, grant, bursary or fee reduction scheme? 
 
Excluding any scholarship, grant, bursary or fee reduction scheme that [CHILD NAME] 
might receive, how much do you expect [CHILD NAME] to pay as yearly tuition if he/she 
goes to university 
 
How much does [CHILD NAME] expect to borrow yearly in student loans if he/she goes to 
university 
 
Suppose [CHILD NAME] gains the required qualifications to apply to university, applies, 
and gets a place. How likely is it that [CHILD NAME] will finish his/her studies? 
 
How likely is it that [CHILD NAME] will be working at age 30 if he/she has a university 
degree? 
 
How likely is that [CHILD NAME]will be working at age 30 if [CHILD NAME] does not go 
to university at all? 
Look ahead to when [CHILD NAME] will be 30 years old and suppose that he/she is working 
then. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to [CHILD NAME]. Assuming that 
one pound today is worth the same as one pound when [CHILD NAME] is 30 years old, if 
he/she had a university degree, how much do you think [CHILD NAME]could earn per year 





And how much do you think [CHILD NAME] could earn per year on average at the age of 45 
if he/she had a university degree? 
 
Which of these do you think might fairly represent [CHILD NAME]'s yearly earnings at age 
45 if he/she had a university degree? 
 
Look ahead to when [CHILD NAME]will be 30 years old and suppose that he/she is working 
then. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to [CHILD NAME]. Assuming that 
one pound today is worth the same as one pound when [CHILD NAME] is 30 years old, how 
much do you think [CHILD NAME] could earn per year on average at the age of 30 if he/she 
did not go to university at all? 
 
And how much do you think [CHILD NAME] could earn per year on average at the age of 45 
if he/she did not go to university at all? 
 
Think about all current 30 year old women / men who are working full time. What is the 
average amount that you believe these workers currently earn per year if they have a 
university degree? 
 
What is the average amount that you believe all 30 year old Women / men currently earn per 
year if they did not go to university at all? 
 
Note that for all the earnings expectations, the following follow-up question was asked if the 
respondent initially said ‘Don’t know’: 
 
Which of these do you think fairly represents the annual earnings 
The response options are bracketed incomes that start at £10,000 p.a. and increase by £5,000 
incrementally with the largest value being £100,000 p.a. These secondary responses were 
combined with the initial responses via bracketed means. The proportion of “don’t knows” 


















Appendix table A1. Difference in parent’s belief in the employment rate and the actual employment rate  
  (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
  Sample 
 
Belief About Women 
 
Belief About Men 
 


















































































































Beliefs in 1a , 2a and 3a  are all in £10,000’s. The others are percentages.  T-tests conducted for equality of means 





































The reference category for ethnicity is ethnicity missing. se in parentheses, starts indicate significance as the following labels 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
 
 
Appendix Table A2 showing parents applications Intentions on their expected returns and observable 
characteristics by the child’s sex (OLS subsample analysis) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Probability to Apply to University 















     
Labor  Market 
Returns age 30 of 
going to University 
 2.835* 
(.433) 
  2.655 
(2.284) 
 
     
Employment 
Returns 
  0.286* 
(0.171) 




   












       












       
Male Parent -7.596 -10.34** -3.627 5.378 -0.0439 5.937 
 (5.269) (4.863) (5.518) (5.618) (5.406) (5.740) 
       
HH Degree 6.167 4.075 9.862* 6.163 1.717 5.384 
 (5.520) (5.016) (5.516) (6.646) (6.603) (6.330) 
       












       












       
White British -6.359 -3.626 -8.67 13.016 16.57* 11.51 
 (5.963) (5.472) ( 6.335) (9.267) (8.364) (8.640) 
       
Ethnic Other 11.45 9.311 1.790 7.02 17.31 9.817 
 (10.68) (9.661) (9.88) ( 12.05) (11.92) (11.63) 
       
England 4.356 0.0278 -2.931 -9.407 -13.32 -0.692 
 (8.855) (8.729) (9.545) (9.640) (9.548) (9.431) 































Constant 60.02*** 76.32*** 78.01*** 72.52*** 69.33*** 62.14*** 
 (11.16) (9.622) (12.68) (14.48) (13.20) (13.44) 





Appendix A3 OLS Treatment effect on the Children’s accuracy of the distribution of earnings (OLS) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Within 10% of the True Value 
 
 With A Degree With No 
Degree 
Returns to A 
Degree 
    
Treatment 0.0202 -0.00324 0.0551 
 (0.0875) (0.1000) (0.0385) 
    
Accurate at 
Wave 8 
0.110 -0.0459 -0.122* 
(0.130) (0.141) (0.0676) 
    
Male Child  0.107 0.352*** -0.0389 
 (0.0930) (0.106) (0.0610) 
    
HH High 
Income 
-0.118 -0.0892 0.00428 
 (0.124) (0.130) (0.0372) 
    
HH Degree 0.000936 0.0620 0.130* 
 (0.0989) (0.126) (0.0755) 
    
England -0.250 0.0375 0.0711 
 (0.214) (0.0995) (0.0777) 
    
Ethnic 
British  
0.0251 -0.217 0.141 
 (0.116) (0.132) (0.188) 
    
Ethnic 
Other 
-0.0367 -0.203 0.0831 
 (0.192) (0.180) (0.202) 














-0.0970 -0.285 0.209 
(0.156) (0.172) (0.200) 
Constant 0.319 0.0478 -0.196 
 (0.259) (0.180) (0.257) 










 Standard errors in parentheses, starts indicate significance as the following labels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 






Appendix Chapter 2 





Undergraduate Fees PGCE Fees Professional 
Skills Test 
1998 2001 £1,000 £1,000 Low 
1999 2002 £1,000 £1,000 Low 
2000 2003 £1,000 £1,000 Low 
2001 2004 £1,000 £1,000 Low 
2002 2005 £1,000 £1,000 Low 
2003 2006 £1,000 £3,000 Low 
2004 2007 £1,000 £3,000 Low 
2005 2008 £1,000 £3,000 Low 
2006 2009 £3,000 £3,000 Low 
2007 2010 £3,000 £3,000 Low 
2008 2011 £3,000 £3,000 Low 
2009 2012 £3,000 £9,000 Low 
2010 2013 £3,000 £9,000 High 
2011 2014 £3,000 £9,000 High 
2012 2015 £9,000 £9,000 High 
2013 2016 £9,000 £9,000 High 
2014 2017 £9,000 £9,000 High 
2015 2018 £9,000 £9,250 High 
2016 2019 £9,000  High 
2017 2020 £9,000  High 
2018 2021 £9,250  High 
+ This the first year an individual would be eligible to start a PGCE after they completed a three year undergraduate course. Also note 

















Appendix Table A2 Unemployment rate by field of study 













2.66 1.04 1.77 1.95 -0.11 
Physical Sciences 2.75 0.66 1.46 2.63 -0.12 
Mathematical 
Sciences 
3.26 2.87 3.68 1.38 0.21 
Computer Sciences 3.86 1.71 5.37 3.99 0.93 
Social Studies 2.90 0.44 0.89 1.95 -0.25 
Languages 2.74 1.14 2.97 2.68 0.39 
History/Philosophy 3.16 1.24 3.52 2.27 -0.02 
Arts 4.00 1.36 4.82 3.39 1.05 
Education 0.98 0.79 1.98 2.95 -0.24 
Combined Degrees 0.84 1.62 3.43 2.92 1.10 
      
All Degrees 3.02 0.99 7.20 5.49 0.88 
+ p75-p25++ A normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3. Distributions with a kurtosis greater than 3 have heaver tails while a kurtosis less 
than 3 means the distribution has lighter tails +++ Measures the degree and direction of asymmetry in a distribution, a symmetric 
distribution has a skewness of 0. A distribution that is skewed to the left has a negative skewness, while a distribution skewed to the right 




Source: UCAS ITT Statistics. UCAS statistical release occurs at uneven intervals.  Note that the UCAS statistical release 
occurs at uneven intervals. We have adjusted for that by reporting 30.4*the average number of applications per day during 





Appendix Chapter 3 
Appendix Table 1  shows the differences in observable characteristics between graduates who go into teaching and 
those who do not for the years 2000 (column a vs b) and 2010 (d vs e) and how using propensity score matching 
reduces the observable difference between teachers and non-teachers (a vs c and d vs f). 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 






















Male .417 .65*** .45* .369 .588*** .381 
White .967 .928*** .968 .946 .869*** .933 
Age 41.46 36.85*** 42.08* 41.5 39.1*** 42.2 
Married .669 .538*** .649 .626 .561*** .601 
Region of 
Domicile: 
      
London .117 .221*** .110 .118 .193*** .125 
South East .284 .310** .295 .300 .281 .287 
Degree Subjects:       
Medicine  .017 .082*** .017 .018 .101*** .015 
Education .414 .022*** .412 .437 .024*** .433 
Mathematical 
Sciences 
.151 .307*** .147 .137 .270*** .132 
Biological 
Sciences 
.062 .064 .067 .071 .079 .072 
Social Sciences .113 .369*** .117 .108 .380*** .107 
Humanities .186 .109*** .182 .168 .085*** .178 
Art .053 .042* .052 .058 .045** .059 
n 1,573 6,400 1,459 7,409 
The starts indicate statistical significance in the difference in observable characteristics between the non-teachers (columns b, c and e,f) and 
teachers (columns a and d respectively)to the usual levels * p<0.10,**p<0.05,***p<0.01 
The data source is the 2000 and 2010 labour force surveys. The sample is restricted to graduates who work full time and are between the ages of 
21 and 65. Teachers (column a and d) are teachers who teach in a primary or secondary school. Non-teachers (column b,c and e,f) are defined are 






Appendix Table 2 The impact of teachers wages on Grade 8 Scores in TIMSS 





Log Teacher Wages 0.170 -0.0235 0.454     -0.674** -0.720*** 0.390     
 (0.268) (0.286) (0.341)     (0.264) (0.275) (0.339)     
               




      0.0611 
(0.324) 
     
             
               
Log Non-Teacher Wages 
(Normal) 
  -0.250 
(0.181) 
 
      -0.955* 
(0.557) 
    
             
               
Wage Difference (Match)    -0.222*       -0.0918    
    (0.113)       (0.118)    
               
Wage Difference (Normal)     0.236       0.987***   
     (0.180)       (0.187)   
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Match) 
     -0.200* 
(0.115) 
 




             
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Norm) 
      0.256+ 
(0.176) 
 
      1.056*** 
(0.186) 
 
             
               
Constant  -1.087*** -2.584*** 0.584 -1.087*** -1.086*** -1.087*** -1.086*** -0.876*** -1.280+ 5.505*** -0.875*** -0.878*** -0.875*** -0.877*** 
 (0.0455) (0.752) (1.213) (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0455) (0.0415) (0.789) (1.255) (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0415) 
               
N 17302 17302 17302 17302 17302 17302 17302 15177 15177 15177 15177 15177 15177 15177 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regression includes all of our controls, these are: class size, 
student age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, teacher experience, teacher age and 
year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level while statistical significant is indicated by:  +p<0.15,* 








Appendix Table 3  The impact of teachers wages on Grade 8 Scores Excluding teachers with two or less years experiences in TIMSS 





Log Teacher Wages 0.218 0.0464 0.553+     -0.630** -0.871*** 0.223     
 (0.302) (0.316) (0.365)     (0.306) (0.316) (0.351)     
               
Log Non-Teacher Wages 
(Match) 
 
0.199      
 
0.287      
  (0.229)       (0.355)      
               
Log Non-Teacher Wages 
(Normal) 
 
 -0.319     
 
 -0.820     
   (0.430)       (0.620)     
               
Wage Difference (Match)    -0.194+       -0.303**    
    (0.125)       (0.127)    
               
Wage Difference (Normal)     0.314*       0.830***   
     (0.189)       (0.190)   
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Match) 
 
    -0.177  
 
    -0.223*  
      (0.125)       (0.129)  
               
Labor Market Returns to 
Teaching (Norm) 
 
     0.319* 
 
     0.987*** 
       (0.188)       (0.194) 
               
Constant  -1.063*** -2.379*** 1.070 -1.065*** -1.063*** -1.065*** -1.063*** -0.915*** -2.813*** 4.565*** -0.914*** -0.915*** -0.914*** -0.914*** 
 (0.0527) (0.833) (1.274) (0.0527) (0.0528) (0.0527) (0.0528) (0.0479) (0.850) (1.271) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0479) 
               
N 14696 14696 14696 14696 14696 14696 14696 12901 12901 12901 12901 12901 12901 12901 
Our Dependent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Regression includes all of our controls, these are: Class Size, 
Student Age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak English at home, teacher sex, teacher experience, teacher age and 
year fixed effects. Standard Errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level while statistical significant is indicated by:  +p<0.15,* 








Appendix Table 4 Effect of relative wages on Grade 8 pupil enjoyment in TIMSS 
















   
       













       














       













       
         
Constant  0.680*** 0.680*** 0.680*** 0.680*** 0.607*** 0.606*** 0.607*** 0.606*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) 



















N 17156 17156 17156 17156 15060 15060 15060 15060 
Regression includes all of our controls, these are: Class Size, Student Age above median in months, student sex, books at home, computer in home, speak 
English at home, teacher sex, teacher experience, teacher age and year fixed effects. Standard Errors in parentheses clustered at the classroom level while 





Appendix Figure 1 shows how the teachers’ estimated outside option has changed using three 
different strategies. The black hollow triangle represents the estimates we use in this paper; these are 
calculated via nearest neighbour propensity score matching. The grey square is nearest neighbour 
propensity score matching, but slightly modified, as we increase the number of neighbours used to 
calculate the matched outcome to 13. Finally the filled black circle is teachers’ outside option 
















Teachers Unemployment Rate 
Specifically, we use the LFS to estimate the teachers’ year and sex specific unemployment 
rate. This measure is the sum of unemployed individuals whose last job was teaching divided 
by the number of teachers plus the quantity of unemployed teachers. We estimate this 
separately by sex and year. Our measure of teacher unemployment only considers those who 
actually entered the teaching profession and therefore does not include those young people 
who want to go into teaching after they finished their training, but are unable to find a job. 
Although it is true that between 1 in 5 men and 1 in 10 women who finish teacher training do 
not to go into teachingthis does not mean that newly qualified teachers struggle to find a job 
as this is down to preferences and not employment opportunities. Each year roughly 3,000 
more teachers leave the profession than enrol onto teacher training programmes. With pupil 
numbers increasing and more teachers leaving newly qualified teachers have extremely 
strong employment opportunities. Therefore any teacher unemployment we miss by using 
former teachers is unlikely to be significant. But if we measure teacher unemployment using 
qualified teachers we are likely picking up a lot of measurement error as many of these 
graduates may have never actually gone into teaching. 
Teachers’ unemployment rate tends to be around 1.7% and there are no meaningful gender 
differences. As the demand for teachers is driven by pupil numbers and policymakers desired 
pupil to teacher ratio we would not expect the teachers’ unemployment rate to be affected by 
the financial crisis. However, we do observe that the unemployment rate rose above 2% 
between 2009 and 2012. We suspect this increase was driven by the fact that more than 50, 
mostly small rural Primary schools, closed during this period. It is important to note that the 





for teachers to get fired and the teachers who are affected by school closures tend to be 
amalgamated with another school. Similarly, we use the LFS to estimate the graduate 
unemployment rate by age, sex and year. 
Teachers Relative Wages Descriptive Statistics using Merged Years 
We have pupil performance data from the 1995, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 TIMSS surveys. 
Additionally we are assigning each TIMSS teacher a teaching and non-teaching wage based 
on their sex (Male and Female) and age (measured in the following age bands: under 30, 30-
39, 40-49, 50-59 and 60+). To achieve the required sample size we merge the LFS years 
together in the following way: the TIMSS 1995 teachers wages are estimated using LFS data 
from 1993 to 1996, 2003 uses 2001 to 2004, 2007 uses 2005 to 2008, 2011 uses 2009 to 2012 
and 2015 uses 2013-2017. 
Consistent with our estimates from the previous section teachers tend to earn less than the 
average graduate but table 1a column a shows that when we account for non-random 
selection the difference falls significantly (from 17% to 8% and 13% to 7% in 1995 and 2015 
respectively) or dissipates entirely (2003, 2007 and 2011). Male teachers face a significant 
pay penalty for remaining in the occupation (Table 1b) while female teachers have 
considerable pecuniary benefits (Table 1c).  
Comparing earnings of current teachers to former teachers we have no strong evidence that 
teachers who quit the occupation sort into higher paying occupations (table 2a) however now 
that we have the power to split this by gender we find that, actually, male teachers sort into 








Table 1a Ratio of teacher and non-teacher wages using a matching strategy (normal 
strategy). Using the combined sample of men and women. 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Age Group 








































































Our matching strategy is estimating teachers’ outside option using propensity score matching by 
matching teachers to non-teacher graduates who are working full time. The variables we match on 
are: ethnicity, sex, age, marital status and region. The normal strategy that is reported in brackets is 
simply the ratio of teacher and non-teacher mean earnings. All of these differences are significant to 
the usual levels unless specified. 
 
 
Table 1b Ratio of teacher and non-teacher wages using a matching strategy (normal 
strategy). Using a sample of only males. 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
 Age Group 








































































Our matching strategy is estimating teachers’ outside option using propensity score matching by 
matching teachers to non-teacher graduates who are working full time. The variables we match on 
are: ethnicity, sex, age, marital status and region. The normal strategy that is reported in brackets is 








Table 1c Ratio of teacher and non-teacher wages using a matching strategy (normal 
strategy). Using a sample of only females. 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 









































































Our matching strategy is estimating teachers’ outside option using propensity score matching by 
matching teachers to non-teacher graduates who are working full time. The variables we match on 
are: ethnicity, sex, age, marital status and region. The normal strategy that is reported in brackets is 
simply the non-teacher mean earnings. All of these differences are significant to the usual levels 
unless specified. 
 
Table 2a Ratio of teacher and non-teaching qualified teachers wages using 
matching strategy (normal strategy) using a combined sample of both men and 
women by age group by year 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 









































































Our matching strategy is estimating teachers’ outside option using propensity score matching by 
matching teachers to non-teacher graduates who are qualified to teach and are working full time. The 
variables we match on are: ethnicity, sex, age, marital status and region. The normal strategy that is 
reported in brackets is simply the non-teacher mean earnings. All of these differences are significant 









Table 2b Ratio of teacher and non-teaching qualified teachers wages using 
matching strategy (normal strategy) by sex and year 
 Sex 




































Our matching strategy is estimating teachers’ outside option using propensity score matching by 
matching teachers to non-teacher graduates who are qualified to teach and are working full time. The 
variables we match on are: ethnicity, sex, age, marital status and region. The normal strategy that is 
reported in brackets is simply the non-teacher mean earnings. All of these differences are significant 
to the usual levels unless specified. 
  
If only pecuniary factors matter, what quitting rates would we observe? 
Teachers in England have a high rate of attrition, especially young teachers - according to the 2018 
School Workforce Census (SWC), of the teachers who started in 2016 1 in 4 quit within 24 months. 
The relatively limited empirical evidence on the determinants of teacher attrition (Smithers and 
Robinson 2003, Stinebrickner 1998) suggests it should be modelled as some combination of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors ( as in Manski (1987)). Indeed a simple econometric model of 
occupational choice is that teacher 𝑖 will continue to teach at time 𝑡 if her expected utility for 
remaining in teaching (𝑗) is greater than, or equal to, her expected utility in her next best non-teaching 
alternative (𝑗′). Where her expected utility is some function of pecuniary (𝑤) and non-pecuniary (𝑔) 
job specific characteristics. Formally: 
1.       𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 = {
 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑈(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡) ≥ 𝐸𝑈(𝑤𝑖𝑗′𝑡 , 𝑔𝑖𝑗′𝑡)
0 𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝑈(𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡) < 𝐸𝑈(𝑤𝑖𝑗′𝑡 , 𝑔𝑖𝑗′𝑡)
 
Policymakers have largely focused on using pecuniary factors to reduce teacher attrition; recent 
policies include restructuring teacher training bursaries into early career payments and a commitment 
to increasing teachers’ initial wages to £30k a year. As our estimates suggest that young teachers 





security, it seems unlikely that pecuniary factors motivate attrition. However, the growth in teachers’ 
wages is typically slower than their outside option. As a consequence the decline in relative wages 
over the lifecycle might, partially, explain the high rates of attrition in England. In this section, we 
estimate the probability that, for a given age and sex, a teacher who leaves the occupation would 
maximise their lifetime earnings using the following logit model: 
2.    Pr(𝑌𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 1 |𝑋) = 𝜙(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1 +  𝜖𝑎𝑦𝑠) 
𝑌𝑎𝑦𝑠 is a dummy that indicates if for age 𝑎, in year 𝑦 and for sex 𝑠 the Net Present Value (NPV) for 
teaching is lower than the NPV of their outside option. We calculate the NPV of teachers and non-
teachers using estimates obtained from the LFS.  Specifically the teachers’ wages are the mean 
earnings of all teachers in England for a given age, year and sex while their non-teaching wage is the 
average non-teaching graduates earnings, controlling for differences in observable characteristics via 
propensity score matching, for a given age, year and sex. 𝑿𝟏is our vector of covariates, these are age 
(21-65), sex (Male vs Female) and year (1995, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015).  
To calculate the NPVs we assume that every teacher starts teaching at 21 and retires at 65 and their 
earnings over their lifecycle are the same as current teachers and non-teachers.59  We are assuming 
that the unexplained component of teachers’ wages is negatively correlated with the unexplained 
component of non-teachers’ wages - teaching specific human capital is not rewarded on the labour 
market (Rickman and Parker 1990). 
In addition, we are also assuming that there is no switching cost, a high (25%) or normal (12%) 
discount parameter, and that the market perfectly clears – they will be employed in teaching or non-
                                                          
59 For example in 2015 a 21 a female teacher earns £26kp.a, we will assume they will earn £34kp.a. when they turn 32, 
which is how much the average 32 year old female teacher earnt in 2015. We estimate the NPV separately by age (21-65), 





teaching with a probability of 1.60,61 Under these initial assumptions our estimates are intended to be 
interpreted as an upper bound. 
Assuming a high (normal) discount parameter and perfect market clearance our logit estimates 
suggest that there is a 75% (77%) chance that male teachers could maximise their lifetime earnings by 
leaving teaching. While, consistent with the gender pay gap, we observe it is considerably less likely 
for female teachers (12% (9%)). The solid red line in figure 3 shows that the probability is highest for 
young teachers (88% (91%) for men and 21% (18%) for women) and lowest for those approaching 
retirement age (58% (57%) for men and 1%(3%) for women). 
Relaxing our assumption on perfect market clearance and instead using the actual teacher and non-
teacher unemployment rates we observe that the probability that a young teacher would be financially 
better off if they quit teaching falls - from 88% to 79% for men and 21% to 15% for women. As older 
graduates have a relatively low unemployment rate the impact of including employability on our 
estimates decreases with age to the extent that the probability for older teachers remains largely 
unchanged (see the green dot-dashed line vs the red solid line in Figure 3). If we impose a switching 
cost of 10% the probability does fall even more (from 75% to 60% for men and 12% to 6% for 
women), but even then there remains a high probability that young male teachers could maximise 
their lifetime earnings by quitting (see blue dashed line figure 3).  
The probability that a male teacher would be financially better off if they left the profession exceeds 
50% at almost every point over the lifecycle. Even if we assume a 40% switching cost, which is 
significantly larger than the impact of job displacement in our setting (Hijzen et al., 2010), we would 
still expect to observe an attrition rate of 33%. Yet, using the 2011 to 2018 SWC, we observe that 
male teachers’ actual rate of attrition is between 9.5-10.7%. This large discrepancy suggests that male 
                                                          
60 A discount parameter of 25% indicates that the value of getting £1 after one year and the £1 the year after has a net present 






= 1.44). While if we use a lower discount parameter (12%) the same income 







61 Discounting rates tend to range between 10-14% (Meyer 2013) therefore we use the median (12%) as our normal 
discounting parameter. While our high discount rate is an arbitrary choice intended to show a scenario where individuals 





teachers hold strong teaching specific non-pecuniary preferences and/or they are considerably 
misinformed about their outside option.  
In contrast, for female teachers’ the actual rate of attrition (9-10%) is consistent with what we would 
expect to observe if female teachers were trying to maximise their lifetime earnings (6-12%). As the 
labour market has become more female friendly it could be that the historic female specific non-
pecuniary benefits to teaching (such as compatibility with household production and fertility choices) 
might not be as unique to the profession today as they once were. As a consequence, the attrition of 
female teachers could be, in part, driven by a desire to maximise expected earnings. 
 
